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ABSTRACT 
 
David Bradley Wright: The Last Shall Be First? Mission versus Margin and the Role of 
Consumer Governance in Federally Qualified Health Centers 
(Under the direction of Jonathan B. Oberlander, Ph.D.) 
 
Federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) provide primary care services to a 
disproportionate number of low-income, uninsured patients. They are required to have a 
governing board of which at least 51% of the board members are FQHC consumers. The 
objective of this study is to evaluate the effect of FQHC board composition on service 
provision and financial performance.  
 In a multi-method study, I use six years of quantitative data from the Uniform Data 
System and Area Resource File, supplemented with four years of board data from FQHC 
grant applications. I classify board members as non-consumers, non-descriptive consumers 
(whose socioeconomic status does not resemble the typical FQHC patient), and descriptive 
consumers (whose socioeconomic status resembles the typical FQHC patient).  
 Using a mix of OLS and Poisson regressions with FQHC-level fixed effects, I model 
the relationship between the proportion of consumers on the board and a set of four mission-
oriented and four margin-oriented dependent variables. Using Chamberlain’s conditional 
logistic regressions, I use board member characteristics to model both the likelihood of 
holding executive committee office and the likelihood of serving as board chair. To 
complement the statistical analysis, I conduct in-depth interviews with a purposive stratified 
sample of FQHC board members (N = 30) to obtain data on board function and board 
members’ perceptions of consumer governance. 
iv 
 I find that a minority of board members are descriptive consumers, that descriptive 
consumers are less likely than others to hold board leadership positions, and that under 
certain conditions the proportion of descriptive consumers on the board is negatively 
associated with FQHC operating margin. The proportion of descriptive consumers on the 
board is not associated with other mission and margin variables. However, the composition 
of descriptive consumers on the executive committee is positively associated with both the 
scope of enabling services and financial self-sufficiency. Therefore, including descriptive 
consumers on the board, while excluding them from the executive committee, may mean 
enduring the financial disadvantages of consumer governance, without enjoying the potential 
advantages it brings to service provision and financial performance. 
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PREFACE 
 
A portion of this dissertation’s title, “The Last Shall Be First?” is a reference to a 
verse in the Christian scriptures. In the Book of Matthew, a parable of the kingdom of heaven 
is presented, which tells the story of an estate owner who hires several men to work in his 
vineyard for the day. He pays each of the men the same wages—wages they agreed to at the 
outset—although some of the men are hired later in the day than others.  
When the time comes to be paid, those who have labored a full day are no longer 
happy to be paid the same amount as the workers who labored only part of the day. But the 
estate owner replies: “I haven’t been unfair. We agreed on the wage of a dollar, didn’t we? 
So take it and go. I decided to give to the one who came last the same as you. Can’t I do what 
I want with my own money? Are you going to get stingy because I am generous? Here it is 
again, the Great Reversal: many of the first ending up last, and the last first.” (Matthew 
20:13-16)  
The owner of the estate saw potential in everyone and put them to work, and—by his 
definition—he treated all of them equally, including those who had been overlooked earlier 
in the day and who were looked down upon by the other workers. In fact, from the 
perspective of the workers, the last—those who had worked the least—were made first in 
terms of their rate of pay.  
In the same way, health centers do not overlook or ignore the vulnerable populations 
they serve, nor do they look down on them in the way that the workers in the parable did. 
Instead, they acknowledge the potential of these individuals to contribute to the health center 
ix 
and give them majority control of the organization. In this way, those whom society would 
typically consider the “last” on the basis of their socioeconomic status are made “first” when 
they compose the majority of the governing board. Ideally, the goal is that the underserved 
are elevated from a position of powerlessness to a position of power. However, the extent to 
which this occurs is uncertain. Thus, the title is posed as a question: “The Last Shall Be 
First?” This dissertation strives to answer that question. 
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 CHAPTER 1 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
 
Federally qualified health centers (FQHCs) are primary care facilities that provide 
care to the country’s most vulnerable populations. The federal program that funds FQHCs is 
authorized by section 330 of the Public Health Service Act and administered by the Bureau 
of Primary Health Care (BPHC) of the Health Resources and Services Administration 
(HRSA). By law, health centers are mandated to provide medical care to all without regard 
for their ability to pay, to operate an income-sensitive sliding-fee scale, and to provide a 
variety of non-clinical enabling services, which are designed to increase access to care.  
As a result of their legally mandated mission, health centers serve a disproportionate 
share of uninsured and low-income persons and are a critical source of care for medically 
underserved populations in both urban and rural areas. While they do receive federal grants 
and enhanced Medicaid and Medicare payments, these funds often fail to fully offset the 
costs of the uncompensated care provided. Consequently, health centers face the difficult 
challenge of maintaining the organization’s finances while pursuing their mission.  
In addition to these requirements, health centers are required to have a consumer-
majority governing board.1 This means that at least 51% of the board members must be 
                                                 
1
 The members of the board who receive their care at the health center are frequently referred to by a variety of 
names, including: patients, clients, consumers, and users, among others. I have chosen to refer to them as 
“consumer board members” as that is the official language employed by the Bureau of Primary Health Care in 
its policy information notice on health center program expectations (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a). 
However, in all other instances, I refer to non-board member users of the health center as “patients.” 
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patients of the center. For decades, the assumption has been that this makes health centers 
more responsive to the needs of the communities and patients they serve:  
“Community governance means that patients can – and must – take charge of their 
healthcare systems…So empowered, boards actively involve themselves in being a 
part of the solution to local problems…the board model creates a forum for 
bringing real and immediate problems to the table for action, for gaining real-time 
feedback from the people who receive care, and for generating action to meet 
pressing community needs such as affordable housing, improved water supply and 
sewer systems, or better consumer information…(Hawkins & Rosenbaum, 2005)” 
 
Consumer governance has been labeled instrumental in “the selection of key staff, 
service priorities, hours of service, budgets, recruitment of outreach workers and other local 
personnel and grievances (Zwick, 1974).” It has even been posited as an explanation for 
health centers providing a broader scope of non-health services and increasing access to 
primary health care (Davis & Schoen, 1978). To be sure, few health center advocates are 
ambivalent when it comes to consumer governance, proclaiming that “the real key to [health 
centers’] success has always been the community’s feeling of ownership over their centers… 
(Dan Hawkins quoted in Lefkowitz, 2007).” 
Yet, no consensus regarding the value of consumer governance has been reached. For 
all of the examples of consumer-majority governing boards heading up successful centers, 
there are anecdotal cases of boards gone bad, leading centers into debt and even closure 
(Lefkowitz, 2007). Still, there has recently been a renewed call for direct citizen participation 
in health care (Morone & Kilbreth, 2003). 
Despite the long debate over the value of FQHC consumer governance, few studies 
have been conducted on the topic, and none of those has empirically evaluated the 
relationship between the composition of the board and the performance of the health center. 
Therefore, it remains unclear whether consumer governance has any tangible effect on health 
  
3 
center outcomes. Thus, the purpose of this study is to gain a better understanding of FQHC 
board composition and function and to evaluate the effect of FQHC board composition on 
service provision (i.e., mission) and financial performance (i.e., margin). In pursuit of these 
objectives, the study attempts to answer the following specific research questions: 
(1) To what extent do consumer board members resemble the health center’s 
patient population with regards to socioeconomic status? 
 
(2) What is the relationship between the proportion of consumers on the board 
and the health center’s provision of services consistent with the FQHC 
mission? 
 
(3) What is the relationship between the proportion of consumers on the board 
and the health center’s financial performance? 
 
(4) Does the composition of the board’s executive committee moderate the 
relationship between the proportion of consumers on the board and the 
health center outcomes being studied? 
 
(5) Are consumer board members more or less likely than other board 
members to (a) serve on the board’s executive committee or (b) serve as 
board chair? Does the likelihood depend on the extent to which consumer 
board members resemble the health center’s patient population? 
 
(6) How do consumer-majority governing boards function, and how does this 
function explain the relationship between board composition and 
organizational outcomes? 
 
To answer these research questions, I conduct a multi-method study combining 
quantitative analysis of the relationship between board composition and health center 
outcomes with qualitative interviews that provide additional data on board function and the 
dynamics of board decisionmaking. Specific directional hypotheses and research methods are 
informed by theories of representation, status generalization, and agenda setting. 
 
 
 
  
4 
Significance and Policy Implications 
 The findings from this research have the potential to contribute more to our 
understanding of the link between board composition and organizational outcomes in the 
context of non-profit health care governance with non-elected consumer board members. 
Such knowledge may be meaningful in other contexts where the input of consumers, citizens, 
or other community members is sought. Examples of such contexts include citizens’ juries 
(prevalent in Canada and the United Kingdom) and community-based participatory research 
(Gooberman-Hill, Horwood, & Calnan, 2008; Lasker & Weiss, 2003; Menon & Stafinski, 
2008). 
Prior studies of consumer governance in health care have been conducted in a variety 
of domestic and international contexts, including Canadian regional boards of health  
(Contandriopoulos, 2004), lay health boards in the United Kingdom (Pickard et al., 2002),
health maintenance organizations (Cross, 2002; Schwartz, 1964), health systems agencies 
(HSAs) (Vladeck, 1977), community mental health centers (Robins & Blackburn, 1974) and, 
to a lesser extent, community health centers.  
Most of these studies find consumer governance to be fraught with significant 
implementation challenges, including dominance by social elites (Robins & Blackburn, 
1974), low levels of consumer participation (Windle, Bass, & Taube, 1974), disparities in 
working knowledge between consumers and non-consumers (Paap, 1978), and unanswered 
questions about the effect of consumer governance on actual measurable outcomes (Dudley, 
1975; Grant, 2007; Scherl & English, 1969; Thomson, 1973). As the first study to explicitly 
test the relationship between consumer governance and health center outcomes, this study 
has the potential to answer some of these unanswered questions. 
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 The findings from this research also have the potential to inform federal health policy. 
At the same time as the health center program has been permanently authorized and received 
the largest funding increase in its history, there is an ongoing debate about the effectiveness 
of consumer governance and the appropriateness of restricting federal funding only to 
organizations with consumer-majority boards. Many hospitals, free clinics, and other safety-
net providers without consumer-majority boards are ineligible for the federal grant funds and 
enhanced Medicaid reimbursement rate that FQHCs enjoy.  
 Despite the sizable financial benefits it would confer, most of these organizations are 
unwilling to adopt a consumer-majority board. Hospitals, for one, are not amenable to ceding 
control of their clinic operations to members of the patient community or lay public (Larson, 
2003). Not surprisingly, these entities wish for the consumer governance provision to be 
abolished or amended so that new funding becomes available to them. Thus, determining the 
value of the consumer governance provision is a critical next step in the ongoing policy 
debate. 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows: Chapter 2 provides an 
overview of the history of health centers and the origins of consumer governance. Chapter 3 
reviews the relevant literature to create a theoretical framework and generate directional 
hypotheses for the study. Chapter 4 describes the empirical methods used to test these 
hypotheses and answer the research questions from Chapter 1. Chapters 5 and 6 present the 
respective results from the quantitative and qualitative analyses. Finally, Chapter 7 integrates 
the quantitative and qualitative results with each other and the existing literature, discusses 
the implications of the findings for both policy and theory, acknowledges some study 
limitations, and proposes directions for future research.
 CHAPTER 2 
 
HEALTH CENTER BACKGROUND 
 
 
 This chapter describes the history of the health center program, the challenges health 
centers face in meeting their obligations to mission and margin, and how consumer 
governance may affect their operation for better or worse. It also provides background on the 
concept of maximum feasible participation, from which the consumer governance provision 
originated. 
 
The Origin of Health Centers 
The community health center movement was introduced to the United States in 1965 
by Dr. Jack Geiger, who brought home the lessons he had learned while shadowing Drs. 
Sidney and Emily Kark at the Pholela Health Centre in South Africa during the late 1950s. 
At Pholela, the focus was on the combination of public health and medicine, a process 
termed community-oriented primary care (COPC) (Cassel, 1955). The main idea was to 
understand and address the needs of the whole community, not just individual patients. These 
needs were assessed by “analysis of the clinical records…[and community] surveys (Cassel, 
1955).” 
These surveys, which sought input on community needs directly from community 
members, are part of the foundation of the consumer governance espoused by community 
health centers today. The other part of the foundation of consumer governance comes from 
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the need for legitimacy and community buy-in. John Cassel, a central figure in the COPC 
movement, writes, “A fundamental working principle was that new concepts and practices 
should never be imposed upon the community; rather, they should be integrated into the 
culture through active popular participation (Cassel, 1955).” Echoing Cassel, fellow COPC 
pioneer Oscar Lewis (1955) writes: 
“Those who enter a community to engage in an action program must 
recognize the implications of the fact that they are not entering a power 
vacuum. In every human community there exists a network of relations 
between individuals. It is to the interest of many of these individuals to 
maintain this system of relationships. Any group of outsiders moving into a 
community will be seen by some as potentially disruptive, even if they plan no 
action. If they do plan action, whatever positive measures they undertake, no 
matter how benign, will be perceived by some community members as a 
threat to their own status and interests (p. 431)” 
 
When he entered office, President Lyndon Johnson made the eradication of poverty 
his top domestic priority, going so far as to declare a “War on Poverty.” As the Office of 
Economic Opportunity (OEO)—the lead agency of Johnson’s effort—began to fund 
Community Action Programs (CAPs) across the country, it became clear that the poor were 
not only impoverished, but also in poor health. That, and the fact that the academics 
President Johnson tasked with developing the OEO were advocates for empowering 
disadvantaged communities directly, made health centers and COPC a natural fit with the 
War on Poverty (Moynihan, 1969).  
Through that effort, the OEO provided funding for the first neighborhood health 
centers in 1965.2 The first two health centers were the Tufts-Delta Health Center, located in 
                                                 
2
 Health centers have gone by a number of different names during the course of their history. From 1965 to 
1975, they were known as “neighborhood health centers.” Beginning in 1975, they became known as 
“community health centers”—a name by which they are still known today. Then, in 1989, the additional label of 
“federally qualified health centers” came into being. The relationship between the two is such that all 
community health centers are FQHCs, but not all FQHCs are community health centers. In writing about the 
history of health centers, I make every attempt to refer to them using the term that was applicable to them at that 
time. 
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the town of Mound Bayou, in Bolivar County, Mississippi, and the Columbia Point Health 
Center in Boston, Massachusetts (Geiger, 2002). More than mere medical care, the health 
center movement aimed to break the cycle of poverty in which many Americans were stuck. 
While health centers certainly sought to heal the sick, they also sought to prevent illness, 
educate people, and employ low-income individuals in the community as health center staff. 
In short, OEO officials saw health care as one way to begin improving the lives of 
underserved individuals (Davis & Schoen, 1978).  
One of the specific ways in which the OEO sought to do this, was to require the 
“maximum feasible participation” of community members in all new poverty programs, 
including health centers (Geiger, 2002). The origins of maximum feasible participation are 
discussed later in more detail, but for now suffice it to say that OEO officials suggested that 
maximum feasible participation would ensure that the CAPs targeted the needs of the poor, 
achieved buy-in from community residents, and made lasting differences in the lives of 
vulnerable populations.  
The earliest neighborhood health centers practiced COPC and defined health to 
include not only physical, but also “mental, social, economic, environmental, and political 
aspects. Thus, improved housing, better sewer and water systems, employment, job training, 
community economic development, counseling, advocacy with other social services and, 
perhaps most important, personal and minority group power building were all major goals of 
neighborhood health programs (Davis & Millman, 1983).” Since the 1960s, however, health 
centers and the health care system in which they operate have grown increasingly more 
complex. 
  
9 
Beginning in the 1970s, health centers became more exclusively focused on the 
provision of clinical health care services when funding for less traditional services such as 
job training, agricultural co-operatives, and sanitation was limited by the Nixon 
administration’s dismantling of OEO and transfer of the health center program to the 
Department of Health, Education, and Welfare (DHEW) (Davis & Millman, 1983). By May 
1973, DHEW announced that health centers must “recover the maximum amount possible 
from sources of funding other than federal grants” and “become self-sustaining, community-
based operations with diminishing need for … [federal] support (Sardell, 1988).”  
As funding became tighter, most centers began to focus exclusively on the provision 
of basic primary health care services, and many of the earlier services provided to combat 
poverty were eliminated. As early as 1974, services like transportation were well-established 
(provided by 93% of centers that year), while environmental services were losing traction 
(only 67% of centers provided them in 1976) (Reynolds, 1976).3 
 Congress reauthorized health centers in 1973 and 1974, but President Nixon—who 
was continuing to grow more concerned with the amount of federal spending on domestic 
programs—vetoed the 1974 bill. The bill was reintroduced in 1975 and again passed 
Congress, but was again vetoed—this time by President Ford. However, Congress overrode 
Ford’s veto to enact the Special Health Revenue Sharing Act of 1975 (P.L. 94-63), which 
authorized and appropriated funds for health centers—now called community health 
centers—through 1977. In addition, the legislation established a number of program 
requirements as outlined in Figure 1. 
                                                 
3
 Environmental services refer to sanitation and hygiene efforts. For example, in the earliest days, some health 
centers worked to install indoor plumbing in the community. While such services can clearly benefit the 
public’s health, they were non-clinical, and often the first to be threatened with elimination when health centers 
faced funding cuts. 
  
10 
 Figure 1. Federally Qualified Health Centers Must 
 
Source: 42 U.S.C. § 254b (Emphasis added) 
 
 After being reauthorized by the Health Services Extension Act (P.L. 95-83), the 
program survived and even grew during the Carter administration, before once again facing 
difficulties during the Reagan administration. Following a failed attempt to convert the health 
center program into a block grant, substantial budget cuts were made and nearly one in four 
centers were de-funded. Of the remaining centers, two-thirds faced significant funding cuts, 
and the other third were forced to operate at between 90 – 100% of the previous year’s 
funding level (Sardell, 1988).  
 By May of 1982, some 186 health centers had been de-funded by the federal agency 
based on the relative need of the health center’s service area, the center’s performance on 
indicators of administrative efficiency, the center’s billing and revenue collection 
performance, the most recent financial audit, and comments from state officials and 
administrators (Sardell, 1988). Still, the program survived, largely because of the efforts of 
career bureaucrats who supported the principles of the health center movement even when 
political support for the program waned (Sardell, 1988). 
• Serve a medically underserved area or population 
• Provide comprehensive primary care and enabling services 
• Provide care on a sliding-fee scale, regardless of ability to pay 
• Meet strict governance requirements, including: 
• Must have between 9 and 25 members 
• A majority (51%) must be registered users of the FQHC 
• Of the other 49%: 
• No more than half may be health professionals (receiving 
more than 10% of their annual income from health care) 
• Group should be representative of patients and community 
• Board member, their spouse or relative may not be a FQHC employee 
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 The passage of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-239) 
created the designation of federally qualified health centers (FQHCs). In return for meeting 
the legal requirements outlined in Figure 1, health centers are designated as FQHCs and are 
eligible to receive federal grant funding, an enhanced Medicaid payment rate, and liability 
coverage under the Federal Tort Claims Act (McAlearney, 2002).  
 While the passage of this legislation bolstered the program financially, the 1990s 
were an uncertain time for health centers. First, it was unclear how, or even if, they would 
exist in the context of managed competition proposed by President Clinton’s Health Security 
Act. Then, when reform was defeated in Congress, President Clinton’s goal of reducing the 
deficit made annual budget appropriations a concern (Lefkowitz, 2007). However, thanks to 
the support of key members of Congress and the strong lobbying efforts of the National 
Association of Community Health Centers, Congressional appropriations routinely exceeded 
President Clinton’s budget request for health centers during this time, growing funding for 
the program from $734 million in 1994 to $925 million by 1999 (Taylor, 2004).  
During the last decade, thanks to bipartisan support, health centers have enjoyed 
unprecedented increases in funding as shown in Table 1. In 2002, President George W. Bush 
launched the President’s Health Center Initiative, which doubled the amount of federal grant 
appropriations for health centers from $1.1 billion to $2.2 billion over 8 years (Iglehart, 
2008). The increased financial support continued under the administration of President 
Barack Obama with a one-time infusion of $2 billion provided to health centers under the 
American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 and the permanent authorization of the 
health center program under the health reform law known as the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act, which also provides health centers with $12.5 billion between 2011 and 
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2015 (Adashi, Geiger, & Fine, 2010). While some of these funds are being used to establish 
new centers, existing FQHCs are also using the additional funds to invest in more delivery 
sites, hire more staff, and provide more uncompensated care (Lo Sasso & Byck, 2010).  
 
Table 1. Federal Appropriations for FQHC Program 
Fiscal 
Year 
Appropriation 
(millions of real dollars) 
No. of 
Centers 
Average Appropriation per Center  
(millions of 1998 dollars) 
1998   $825   694 $1.19 
1999   $925   691 $1.30 
2000 $1018   730 $1.31 
2001 $1169   748 $1.45 
2002 $1433   843 $1.54 
2003 $1505   890 $1.50 
2004 $1618   914 $1.52 
2005 $1735   952 $1.51 
2006 $1782 1002 $1.44 
2007 $1988 1067 $1.47 
 Source: Bureau of Primary Care, Health Resources and Services Administration, available at: 
http://bphc.hrsa.gov/programs/CHCPrograminfo.asp; National Association of Community Health 
Centers available at:  http://nachc.com/client/documents/Charbook%202008%20FINAL.pdf  
 
 
As of 2009, there were 1,200 FQHC grantees caring for approximately 20 million 
patients at some 7,500 delivery sites (National Association of Community Health Centers, 
2009). According to the most recent data available compiled from multiple sources by the 
National Association of Community Health Centers, 70.7% of FQHC patients have incomes 
below the federal poverty level (FPL), and 91.9% have incomes less than or equal to 200% 
FPL. FQHCs also serve a disproportionate share of racial and ethnic minorities. In 2008, 
36.3% of FQHC patients were white, compared to 36.1% Hispanic, 23.0% African 
American, 3.5% Asian, and 1.1% American Indian. FQHC patients also tend to be uninsured 
(39.8%) or publicly insured by Medicaid/SCHIP (35.1%), Medicare (7.5%), or another 
public program (2.3%).  
  
13 
While health centers are extremely cost-effective primary care providers (Streeter, 
Braithwaite, Ipakchi, & Johnsrud, 2009), federal funding does not entirely cover the costs of 
this care. In 2000, the average annual cost of care for an FQHC patient was $406, while 
federal funding per uninsured patient was only $226. By 2007, the average annual cost of 
care per patient had risen to $552, while federal funding per uninsured patient had only 
increased to $270, increasing the funding gap from $180 to $282 (National Association of 
Community Health Centers, 2008).  
Clearly, FQHCs are shouldering an increasing share of the burden of uncompensated 
care. In fact, the average FQHC operating margin inclusive of grants over the 2000 – 2007 
period was only 0.85%. This has been compounded by the fact that federal funding of the 
safety net has not increased at the same rate as the demand for safety net services, leading to 
a net decline of 8.9% in federal safety net spending per uninsured during the 2001 – 2004 
period (National Association of Community Health Centers, 2008). The next section explores 
in more detail the tradeoffs safety net facilities face in balancing the organization’s financial 
health against the strong demand for service provision. 
 
Mission versus Margin: The Financial Difficulties of the Safety Net 
The U.S. health care system is often described not as a system at all, but rather as a 
haphazard patchwork of patients, payers, and providers. For many, health care is inaccessible, 
unaffordable, and of insufficient quality. Barriers and coverage gaps pose a significant 
challenge to vulnerable populations and limit their ability to utilize health care. The obstacles 
are especially great for the nearly 51 million U.S. residents without health insurance, but 
lacking insurance is far from the only barrier many residents face (U.S. Census Bureau, 
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2010). For some with insurance, the inadequacy of their coverage leaves them insufficiently 
protected from the high cost of care. For others, transportation or language barriers may exist, 
hours of operation may be inconvenient, or cost-sharing may be prohibitive. 
For the multitudes that wind up falling through the cracks, there is a last resort aptly 
labeled the “health care safety net.” The safety net is made up of a variety of organizations 
ranging from public hospitals to community health centers, from free clinics to private 
physicians who write-off uncompensated care for office visits. According to the Institute of 
Medicine (IOM), the safety net includes any provider that “organizes and delivers a 
significant level of health care and other health-related services to uninsured, Medicaid, and 
other vulnerable patients (Lewin & Altman, 2000).” 
The IOM further defines a group of core safety net providers that are uniquely 
characterized by an “open door” policy and the amount of uncompensated care they provide. 
Specifically, core safety net providers are required by law or by organizational mission to 
provide care to anyone regardless of insurance status or ability to pay. Consequently, they are 
easily identified by the high proportion of uncompensated care they provide relative to all 
care provided (Lewin & Altman, 2000). Federal legislation requiring that health centers 
provide care to all who enter their doors ensures that FQHCs are an essential part of the core 
safety net. 
The financial demands placed on core safety net providers are enormous. They are 
required to provide services to individuals whom the market has failed, and forced to 
shoulder the burden of caring for a disproportionate share of uncompensated care without 
adequate means to cost-shift onto insured individuals (Lewin & Altman, 2000). Since the 
first years of the health center movement, federal funding for non-medical services has dried 
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up, and the scope of such services provided by FQHCs has narrowed significantly (Lefkowitz, 
2007). As Dr. Jack Geiger (2005), co-founder of the U.S. health center movement, writes: 
“the early health center focus on social determinants and community development is greatly 
attenuated, as the costs of simply providing medical care have grown nearly overwhelming.”  
Indeed, the notion that a health center’s financial performance may come at the 
expense of fulfilling its mission is made explicit as far back as a 1978 report by the U.S. 
Government Accountability Office:  
“HEW [The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare] no longer 
requires centers to become financially self-sufficient. However, its emphasis 
on having centers obtain as much revenue as possible from non-federal 
sources may be having an adverse impact on the main objective—serving the 
medically underserved.” 
 
One of the greatest threats to health centers’ continued viability comes from increased 
demand—in the form of higher patient volume and increased patient morbidity—that is 
outpacing available resources. In the most recent study of health center financial performance 
available, McAlearney (2002) finds that as a result, many FQHCs are struggling financially, 
with “more than half of all [FQHCs reporting] operating deficits in 1997, 1998, and 1999.” 
Additionally, a report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) cites Health 
Resources and Services Administration (HRSA) data on the organizational success of health 
centers, noting that 40 percent of centers are generally successful, 50 percent are “viable 
but…experiencing some operational problems” and the organizational viability of the other 
10 percent is in question as they contend with financial struggles.  
The report indicates that approximately 2 percent of centers lose their federal grant 
funding each year. These centers have frequently failed to adapt accordingly to changes in 
the health care market, are slow to respond to Medicaid payment reforms, and do not 
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compete successfully for privately insured patients. The report concludes that centers with 
boards actively involved in oversight and that are able to balance the demands of both 
mission and margin are typically the most successful, while other centers that tend towards 
either extreme of mission or margin are more likely to encounter problems (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2000b). As these pressures mount, tension is likely to develop 
between the boards’ obligations to mission and margin. While a commitment to the mission 
of caring for the underserved is a critical component of the FQHC model, it is equally 
important for FQHCs to remain solvent and competitive in today’s complex health care 
system. 
A significant literature finds that many of these same pressures are faced by other 
non-profit health care organizations. In fact, non-profits tend to prioritize margin over 
mission when they are forced to compete with for-profits operating in close proximity 
(Schlesinger & Gray, 2006). In such cases, non-profits may emulate for-profits by avoiding 
low-income areas, opting against offering services that the uninsured use, and denying access 
to care for those without insurance or unable to pay for services (Marmor, Schlesinger, & 
Smithey, 1985). Health centers are not immune from these competitive pressures, and 
depending on the competitive context in which they operate, may behave similarly to other 
non-profits in adopting for-profit behaviors. That is, they may sacrifice mission at the altar of 
margin if it seems necessary for organizational survival. 
There is evidence that despite their mandate to serve all who seek services, some 
health centers turn patients away or establish waiting lists in the face of capacity constraints 
(Jacobson, Dalton, Berson-Grand, & Weisman, 2005). When patients cannot pay in full, 
some health centers allow them to pay whatever they are able and write-off the 
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uncompensated care as bad debt. Others set up payment plans or use a collection agency to 
collect unpaid balances. Still others deny treatment and refer patients to other providers 
(Cunningham, Bazzoli, & Katz, 2008; Gusmano, Fairbrother, & Park, 2002). Lastly, FQHCs 
may respond by revising their mission—either literally or in practice—to incorporate a more 
business-oriented focus that includes fee increases and reduced service provision deemed 
necessary to keep the centers operational (Jacobson et al., 2005).  
When times are tough—as they often are for health centers—some centers opt to cut 
back on mission-oriented services (Breyer, 1977; Feldman, Deitz, & Brooks, 1978; Ricketts, 
Guild, Sheps, & Wagner, 1984). One of the areas where the tension between mission and 
margin is likely to be the greatest for FQHCs is that of enabling services. Enabling services 
refer to non-clinical services provided in an effort to reduce or eliminate barriers to health 
care access (e.g., transportation, translation, child-care, after-hours appointments, etc.). By 
law, they are a defining characteristic of the health center program, and have been 
demonstrated to have economic, health and social benefits, which accrue to those who use 
them (Sandler & Duncan, 1998).  
While FQHCs are required to provide case management, substance abuse and mental 
health treatment referrals, outreach services, transportation, translation, and patient education, 
other enabling services are optional (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a). Thus, there is 
variation in the scope of services provided by each center. However, the scope of enabling 
services varies less than the volume of services provided (Wells, Punekar, & Vasey, 2009). 
Furthermore, there is variation in how services are provided. Specifically, a center may 
provide and pay for a service, may pay for a service but refer the patient elsewhere, may refer 
the patient elsewhere and not pay for the service, or not provide the service at all. 
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Despite the critical role they play in increasing access to health care, most enabling 
services are not reimbursed by public or private insurance (Park, 2006). Thus, providing such 
services can be a drag on FQHC finances (Lewin & Altman, 2000). There is evidence that 
providing more enabling services leads to financial deficit, but that FQHCs with the financial 
slack to do so are targeting marginal funds towards the provision of these much-needed, but 
poorly reimbursed services (Roby, 2006). It also seems that the more enabling services a 
center provides, the higher its average cost per medical encounter will be and the less 
financially self-sufficient it will be (Martin, Shi, & Ward, 2009).  
Indeed, a GAO report indicates that “enabling services are often the first to be 
reduced when [health center] revenues decline. Centers may reduce the number of staff 
providing a service or the scope and volume of services (U.S. Government Accountability 
Office, 2000a).” Similarly, another study found that, in the wake of Medicaid rate cuts, 
centers responded by reducing their scope of services, focusing first on traditionally non-
covered enabling services (Hoag, Norton, Rajan, Determination, & Island, 2000). 
The tradeoff is apparent: FQHCs are legally required to provide certain enabling 
services and often choose to provide additional ones because their vulnerable patient 
populations rely on them, yet the competitive financial performance of the FQHC can be 
threatened if too many unprofitable services are provided. The situation can be best 
understood as a zero sum game:  
“Because [health centers] derive most of their income from grants, they 
largely operate on fixed annual budgets. From its budget, the center is left to 
determine the optimal mix of services it will provide to the community. If the 
center is operating at full efficiency, this will necessitate trade-offs among the 
number of persons to be served, the range of services to be offered, and the 
amount of care to be provided to any registrant seeking care. Each alternative 
the center faces in this type of decision is equally grievous in terms of 
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contradicting the goals of the [health center] program (Reynolds, 1976, p. 
67).” 
 
A line must often be drawn between mission and margin, and legally, the FQHC 
governing board is responsible for making that determination (although in practice such 
decisions may be left to the CEO). As shown in Figure 2, some boards may be more margin-
oriented, while others may be more mission-oriented, although mission and margin are not 
mutually exclusive. The question is what role, if any, consumer governance plays in 
organizational decisionmaking as FQHCs strive to navigate the tension between mission and 
margin. The next section begins to answer this question by exploring the origins of consumer 
governance. 
 
Figure 2. Margin-Oriented versus Mission-Oriented Boards 
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4
 “Mission-orientation” refers to a board’s focus on the provision of care and services explicitly targeted to the 
vulnerable populations health centers are mandated to serve. Elsewhere in the literature, this concept has been 
called “community orientation” and has been investigated in the context of the level of “community benefit” 
being provided by non-profit hospitals in return for their tax-exempt status (Proenca, 1998; Proenca, Rosko, & 
Zinn, 2000). Similarly, “margin-orientation” refers to a board’s focus on the organization’s financial 
performance. 
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Maximum Feasible Participation 
President Lyndon B. Johnson came into office with a large Democratic majority in 
Congress, but the centerpiece of his agenda, the War on Poverty, was implemented not only 
because of the political balance of power, but also because the effort was linked to the Civil 
Rights Movement, which allowed the idea of empowering the vulnerable and disenfranchised 
to gain traction (Morone, 1998). 
Maximum feasible participation—a central tenet of the War on Poverty programs—
was a widely used, but poorly understood phrase (Rubin, 1969). Yet, despite the ambiguity of 
its intent, the phrase’s origin is much clearer. The maximum feasible participation language 
was inserted into the legislation at the insistence of Richard Boone in an exchange recounted 
by Adam Yarmolinsky (1969): 
“The phrase ‘maximum feasible participation’ entered into our 
discussions…[by] Dick Boone….At one point after he had used it several 
times, I said, ‘You’ve used that phrase four or five times now.’ ‘Yes, I know,’ 
he replied. ‘How many more times do I have to use it before it becomes part 
of the program?’ ‘Oh, a couple of times more,’ I told him. So he did, and it 
did become part of the program (p. 51).” 
 
As interpreted by Yarmolinsky (1969), who was involved in the development 
of the OEO programs, the language of maximum feasible participation was included 
to encourage “the residents of poverty areas to take part in the work of community-
action programs and to perform a number of jobs that might otherwise be performed 
by professional social workers (p. 49).” The original idea, it seems, was involvement 
of the poor, not leadership by the poor. In fact, the first CAPs established by OEO 
required only that representatives of the poor had to reside in the program’s service 
area, not that they must be poor themselves (Levitan, 1969).  
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Richard Boone (1972) suggests that the motivation for maximum feasible 
participation was drawn from the participatory democracy of the Civil Rights Movement, and 
a strong sentiment of “antiprofessionalism” that sought to help the poor help themselves. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the resultant undefined phrase “maximum feasible participation” 
was interpreted in wildly different ways depending on who was referring to it. Primary 
questions included to whom the phrase referred, precisely how many persons constituted the 
“maximum” and in what capacity participation was to take place (e.g., did this mean staff 
employment, advisory boards, or formal governance?) (Strange, 1972). 
In one CAP memo, OEO clarified that the law was only intended to ensure that the 
representatives of the poor had the best interests of the poor in mind when making decisions. 
They did not actually have to be poor themselves. The memo, from July 1965 stated: 
“The requirement for resident participation in a community action program—
as stated in the Act and in the CAP Guide—refers to ‘residents of the areas 
and members of the groups’ to be served. This requirement is met—in part—
by including on the governing body or policy advisory committee of the CAA 
at least one representative selected from each of the neighborhoods or areas in 
which the CAP will be concentrated….Be sure that you do not equate our 
requirements for resident participation in policy-making with the fact that one 
or more poor persons may be placed on the governing body or policy advisory 
committee. In determining whether the requirement for representation has 
been met, it is not the incomes of the representatives that we are concerned 
with; it is the degree to which they truly represent the persons to be served by 
the community action program. We do not require that such representatives 
themselves meet an income test (Wofford, 1969, pp. 82-83).” 
 
There were many questions about how maximum feasible participation was to be 
formally operationalized. According to political scientist James Morone (1998):  
“An early task force announced that maximum feasible participation meant ‘at 
least one representative’ from each neighborhood served by the 
agency….[Then in] 1965, the requisite number had expanded to ‘roughly one 
third’ of the agency’s governing board, chosen by ‘democratic techniques’.”  
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Representatives were chosen by a variety of means including special elections, town 
meetings and otherwise specially established local committees, although low turnout in the 
elections fostered a sense of program illegitimacy, which led the OEO to ban the practice 
(Morone, 1998). 
In the period shortly after the creation of OEO, maximum feasible participation was 
considered as “an average representation on the governing board of a community-action 
agency of 30 per cent from target areas to be served….[which] Congress amended…[in 1966 
to] mandate that a minimum of 33 per cent of the community-action-agency board be 
democratically selected from the target areas of the program (Kravitz, 1969).” Despite rather 
optimistic rhetoric, real citizen involvement and community control was not easily achieved. 
The one-third rule is interesting, because as James Sundquist (1969) points out, “A literal 
interpretation of ‘maximum’ would have been all, not one-third (p. 239).” 
There were also concerns about the competency of local representatives. While a 
member of Sargent Shriver’s OEO task force said, “I don’t think it ever occurred to me, or to 
many others, that the representatives of the poor must necessarily be poor themselves (James 
N. Adler quoted in Moynihan, 1969),” this became the assumption, and maximum feasible 
participation got blamed for installing program participants who lacked fiscal responsibility 
and financial competence (Morone, 1998). In his book Maximum Feasible Misunderstanding, 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1969) expounds, “They are going to get hold of a lower level 
of…genuine leaders who are—what?—inarticulate? Irresponsible? Unsuccessful?”  
Some critics argue that maximum feasible participation was a cleverly contrived 
effort to dupe the poor into believing that power was being shared with them, thereby 
diffusing their hostility towards those in traditional positions of authority and thwarting any 
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prospects for true empowerment of the disenfranchised and substantively meaningful social 
change (Brieland, 1971). Ironically, according to Morone (1998), “Congress never intended 
maximum feasible participation as anything more than a rhetorical flourish.” Instead, it 
became the linchpin of the entire movement. 
Even among those who enacted the legislation, the concept of community 
participation was not well understood, nor was it carefully considered before the legislation 
was passed. According to James Sundquist (1969):  
“One can search the hearings and debates in their entirety and find no 
reference to the controversial language regarding the participation of the poor 
in community-action programs. The whole novel concept of community 
action—the definition of the community, the nature of the community-action 
agency, the content of its program, all of which were to have a profound 
impact on federal-state-local relations and on the social and governmental 
structures of participating communities—was left to OEO in an exceptionally 
broad grant of discretion (p. 29).”  
 
Politically, the CAP programs caused quite a stir, as the federal government bypassed 
state and local governments to provide funding and authority directly to local residents 
operating community programs. Those groups benefiting from the status quo tended to be 
threatened by—and resistant to—the proposed changes. Many members of Congress, 
especially southern conservatives, opposed the War on Poverty, and as early as December 
1965, plans to dismantle OEO were presented to President Johnson (Lemann, 1988).  
Over the next decade, most of the programs created under OEO were, in fact, 
dismantled and the emphasis on maximum feasible participation faded quickly (Naples, 
1998). Still, between 1964 and 1974, at least ten federal laws were enacted that included a 
call for consumer participation in health care, and health centers were one such program that 
managed to survive (Koseki & Hayakawa, 1979). 
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The FQHC Consumer Governance Requirement 
For health centers, the concept of maximum feasible participation was formally 
defined by the passage of the Special Health Revenue Sharing Act of 1975. This legislation 
specified for the first time that health centers must have a governing board that: 
“…is composed of individuals, a majority of whom are being served by the 
center and who, as a group, represent the individuals being served by the 
center, and meets at least once a month, selects the services to be provided by 
the center, schedules the hours during which such services will be provided, 
approves the center’s annual budget, approves the selection of a director for 
the center, and…establishes general policies for the center…” (Section 330, 
Public Health Service Act) 
 
Health center program expectations elaborate by completely defining who should be 
considered as a consumer for the purposes of the requirement:  
“Since the intent is for consumer board members to give substantive input into 
the health center’s strategic direction and policy, these members should utilize 
the health center as their principal source of primary health care. A consumer 
member should have used the health center services within the last two years. 
A legal guardian of a consumer who is a dependent child or adult, or a legal 
sponsor of an immigrant, may also be considered a consumer for purposes of 
board representation (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a, p. 22).” 
 
They also explain that consumer board members are required, as a whole, to 
“represent the individuals served by the health center in terms of race, ethnicity, and gender 
(Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a, p. 22).” The Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) 
is, however, aware that consumer board members, while perhaps necessary, are not sufficient: 
“The board should be comprised of members with a broad range of skills and 
expertise. Finance, legal affairs, business, health, managed care, social 
services, labor relations and government are some examples of the areas of 
expertise needed by the board to fulfill its responsibilities (Bureau of Primary 
Health Care, 1998a, p. 22).” 
 
In sum, FQHC governing boards are simultaneously required to have a consumer 
majority and sufficient technical and professional expertise required for effective governance. 
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Given a fixed number of board seats, striking this balance may prove a challenge, unless 
board members are both consumers and technical or professional experts. In this case, 
however, the consumer board members would not likely resemble the average health center 
patient, with which the law seems at least partially concerned. 
 
Lessons from the Health Systems Agencies 
The experience of health systems agencies (HSAs) provides an instructive case for a 
study of consumer governance. A decade after the creation of the first community health 
center, Congress passed the National Health Planning and Resources Development Act of 
1974 (P.L. 93-641), which established a nationwide network of health systems agencies 
designed to incorporate consumer input into health care systems planning at the local level.  
As written, the law required the HSA boards to have a consumer majority ranging 
between 51 and 60 percent, with consumers defined as “consumers of health care…broadly 
representative of the social, economic, linguistic, and racial populations…[and] geographic 
areas” of the HSA ( P.L. 93-641 §1512(b)(3)(C)(i)). The remaining 40 to 49% of the HSA 
board was to be comprised of health care providers, at least one-third of which were direct 
providers of clinical care (Vladeck, 1977).  
The legislation took every effort to achieve “mirror-like” levels of representation by 
including at least one representative from any major health care provider in the area (e.g., the 
Veterans Administration, local health maintenance organization, etc.) and requiring that all 
HSA board members reside in the local area and be present on the board in the same rural-
urban proportion as seen in the community population (Vladeck, 1977). 
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This approach, however, amounted less to community representation and more to 
interest group representation (Marmor & Morone, 1980). That is, a particular individual from 
the community would not be selected at random, but rather would be selected because they 
represented the local business community or the school board, for example, with the result 
being a rather fragmented HSA, with little capacity for making meaningful changes to the 
health care system in the community (Vladeck, 1977). For the HSAs to be truly responsive to 
their communities, consumer board members would have to have been knowledgeable about 
health care issues and held strong leadership positions (Checkoway, O’Rourke, & Bull, 
1984). This was seldom the case. 
At least in terms of socioeconomic status, many HSA consumer board members were 
not representative of the communities they served (Checkoway, 1982). Consumer members 
were overwhelmingly drawn from high-income census tracts, while low-income census tracts 
tended to be excluded from participation (Checkoway & Doyle, 1980). And, even if 
consumer board members had been more representative, records indicate that consumers’ 
attendance rates at HSA meetings were quite low. In fact, despite the requirement that they 
constitute at least 51% of the board, in practice their absence typically meant that consumers 
were in the minority at planning meetings (Greer, 1976). Furthermore, there is evidence that 
consumer board members—despite being in the majority—were less influential than provider 
board members (Steckler, Dawson, Dellinger, & Williams, 1981). This finding is also 
supported by ethnographic evidence of the HSAs that demonstrates that consumer board 
members, while technically co-equals with health care provider board members, tended to 
defer to the opinions of professionals during the decisionmaking process (Paap & Hanson, 
1982). 
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 Ultimately, the HSAs never achieved a meaningful level of consumer participation or 
consumer influence, but rather experienced communication problems and information gaps 
between consumers and health professionals, despite consumers holding a majority of seats 
on the HSAs (Riddick, Cordes, Eisele, & Montgomery, 1984). Consumer representation 
failed, Marmor and Morone (1980) claim, primarily because the law authorizing HSAs failed 
to specify a formal process to guide the selection of board members.  
Various groups filed lawsuits claiming that they were being denied their right to 
representation on the HSA, and questions about who constituted an adequate representative 
of any particular group were raised. In short, in the case of HSAs, the absence of a formal 
mechanism for representation, combined with the inherent status differentials between 
consumer board members and health professionals, resulted in the maintenance of the status 
quo rather than effective consumer governance. 
 
Conclusion 
It is clear that health centers are providing critical health care services—including a 
unique variety of enabling services and incomparable amounts of uncompensated care—to a 
population that desperately needs them. It is also clear that, in so doing, health centers are 
operating under some of the most resource-limited conditions in health care. What remains 
unclear is what effect consumer governance may have on health center service provision and 
financial performance. The next chapter uses existing theories of representation, status 
generalization, and agenda setting to create a theoretical framework, which explains how and 
why consumer governance may be related to health center outcomes. 
 CHAPTER 3 
 
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
 
Daniel Patrick Moynihan (1969) described maximum feasible participation as a 
rhetorical device used to legitimate the Community Action Programs (CAPs) as being 
responsive to the poor, even when the programs failed to yield results that were beneficial to 
the poor. It was a concept that had broad appeal to the public and promised to achieve lofty 
goals, but which was never clearly articulated by Congress and consequently never well 
implemented. To some extent, the same may be true today. This chapter outlines a theoretical 
framework for considering the relationship between governing board composition and 
organizational outcomes. 
 
Theories of Representation: A Typological Framework 
Two basic concepts underlie the consumer governance mandate: representation and 
participation. Specifically, the aim is to ensure representation of the frequently under-
represented by requiring the participation of federally qualified health center (FQHC) 
consumers as board members. Participation is clearly understood as involvement—and while 
the magnitude or specific mechanism may vary, the concept remains the same. 
Representation, however, is more complex. 
As classically described by Hanna Pitkin (1967), representation can take on a number 
of different conceptual forms including formal, descriptive, and substantive representation. 
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Formal representation refers to the process by which representatives are chosen (e.g., election, 
nomination, etc.), while descriptive representation describes the degree to which a 
representative shares relevant characteristics with constituents. Socioeconomic status, race, 
and gender are examples of various potential dimensions of descriptive representation. In 
short, descriptive and formal representation focus on representational structure and process 
(i.e., who does the representing and how).  
Conversely, substantive representation is concerned with representational outcomes. 
Specifically, substantive representation is the degree to which a representative represents the 
true interests of constituents (Pitkin, 1967). Measuring substantive representation can be 
challenging, because the true interests of constituents are not always known, sometimes even 
to the constituents themselves. 
As shown in Figure 3, there are strong parallels between Pitkin’s concept of 
representation and the assertions made by consumer governance advocates. Specifically, 
proponents of the FQHC consumer governance mandate claim that having more consumers 
on the board will make the health center better serve the patient community. What they are 
asserting in theory, is that formal representation designed to require descriptive 
representation will lead to substantive representation.  
Additionally, I have indicated the possibility that agenda setting may moderate the 
relationship between descriptive and substantive representation. In the health center context, 
this is depicted as the composition of the executive committee moderating the relationship 
between board composition and health center outcomes. The theory behind this is motivated 
in a later section. 
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Figure 3. Types of Representation in the FQHC Context 
 
 
 
 
The framework depicted in Figure 3 rests on three theoretical premises: 
 
1) Formal representation leads to descriptive representation. 
2) Descriptive representation leads to substantive representation. 
3) Agenda setting moderates the relationship between descriptive and substantive 
representation. 
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Formal Representation Leads to Descriptive Representation 
The first premise is that the legal requirement for health centers to have consumer-
majority governing boards actually leads to descriptive representation. The extent to which 
this premise is true is likely to depend on how consumer board members are selected. In the 
case of health centers, community members have no formal mechanism by which to 
authorize consumer board members or to hold them accountable. Initially, there was such a 
mechanism, as consumer board members were elected to advisory boards by the community, 
however, low turnout led to criticism that the program failed to truly represent the 
community and the elections were discontinued (Hollister, 1974; Peterson, 1970). 
Consequently, achieving descriptive representation can be a real challenge. Certain 
groups will rightly argue that they are not being represented by the board (Chesney, 1982; 
Cross, 2002; Lipsky & Lounds, 1976). For instance, defining who is or is not a “consumer” is 
fraught with a number of questions. As Hochbaum (1969) writes:  
“Does the term ‘consumer’ apply equally to the individual with a broken 
finger who comes to a clinic into which he has never set foot so far and 
probably will not set foot again for a long time if ever, as well as to the 
individual who conscientiously comes for his yearly check-up in addition to 
seeking medical advice whenever appropriate reasons exist?.... Are the better 
educated and more affluent members of, say, the urban black ghetto really true 
representatives, or are they almost as far removed from the people for whom 
they are to speak as are the professionals themselves? Or should these 
representatives be selected from the very segments of the population which 
heretofore have been its most disadvantaged? If so, would they not be so 
uneducated, so naïve about health services and about planning, so incompetent 
as to be unable to contribute meaningfully to the planning? Moreover, would 
attempts to communicate between them and the professionals be so difficult as 
to be almost futile?” 
 
The trouble here is that descriptive representation can lead to tokenism. While, for 
example, most black men may hold similar opinions on an issue, including a black man on 
the board is no guarantee that he will vote as another black man would have. The same is true 
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for any demographically-defined group. Whether or not this matters is debatable. Indeed, 
there are some cases where descriptive representation is clearly unfavorable. For example, “a 
lunatic may be the best descriptive representative of lunatics, but one would not suggest that 
they be allowed to send some of their numbers to the legislature (Pitkin, 1967, p. 89).” 
Furthermore, it is nearly impossible to achieve descriptive representation completely. 
It simply is not feasible to try to recreate the complex demographic profile of a large 
population within a governing board with a relatively small and fixed number of board 
members. As Pitkin (1967) puts it, “the most perfect replica in miniature will not duplicate 
every characteristic of the original (p. 87).”  
Today, absent a strong mechanism of formal representation, it remains unclear 
whether FQHC boards are descriptively representative of the patient population. Health 
center board members may be selected in ways that result in differing levels of descriptive 
representation. Some boards may value the contribution of the patient’s voice more than 
others who may view technical and professional expertise as essential to proper governance. 
Still others may try to satisfy both criteria simultaneously. There is even evidence that FQHC 
executive directors find ways to meet the consumer governance requirement that potentially 
undermine the original intent of the provision. For example, in some cases, they first identify 
potential board members, recruit them, and then encourage them to become consumers 
(Bracken, 2007).  
In the only national survey of its kind, Samuels and Xirasagar (2005) find that FQHC 
board chairs—nearly two-thirds of whom self-identified as consumers—are significantly 
more likely than the average FQHC patient to be male and/or white. Thus, while more board 
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chairs are consumers than non-consumers, it seems likely that few board chairs are 
descriptively representative with regards to race and gender. 
Based on this literature, I anticipate that most boards will not be descriptively 
representative of the typical health center patient. However, the current study does not 
explicitly test the level of descriptive representation. Instead, I use descriptive statistics to 
assess the extent to which consumer board members are socioeconomically representative of 
the patient population. 
 
Descriptive Representation Leads to Substantive Representation 
The second—and perhaps most important—premise underlying consumer governance 
is that a member of a group will accurately represent the views of that group (Phillips, 1998). 
Using Pitkin’s (1967) framework, higher levels of descriptive representation ought to result 
in higher levels of substantive representation. In exploring the potential link between the two, 
it is first helpful to consider each separately. 
Again, descriptive representation is concerned with the concordance between the 
representative and the represented along some set of agreed upon characteristics (Pitkin, 
1967). Put simply, the idea is that the representative(s) should “look like” the represented, 
though this is not limited to visible traits. The focus here is not on the actions taken by 
representatives, but rather on the degree to which they resemble their constituents.  
Substantive representation, on the other hand, focuses on the outcomes of the 
representative process. In this view, the decisions themselves, and not who makes them, are 
what matters. Ideal substantive representation requires a representative to possess both the 
influence to affect outcomes and a commonly held position on an issue of importance to his 
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or her constituents. The problem, again, is the difficulty posed in ascertaining constituents’ 
interests which they may not even know themselves (Peterson, 1970). This can be especially 
troublesome in the case of health centers, where different patient groups may have competing 
interests. The question then becomes whether substantive representation is improved by the 
degree of descriptive representation present. Fortunately, this topic has been widely studied 
in other settings. 
The link between descriptive representation and substantive representation has been 
investigated by race (Scherer & Curry, 2010), ethnicity (Preuhs, 2007), gender (Wängnerud, 
2009), and sexual orientation (Herrick, 2009). The majority of studies find that there is 
indeed a positive association between descriptive and substantive representation, but they 
also find that descriptive representation alone is not necessarily as dominant a factor as 
political party affiliation, the degree to which issues being deliberated are crystallized, or 
even other demographic factors not in question.  
Political scientist Suzanne Dovi (2003) explores the relationship between descriptive 
representation and substantive representation and makes a case that the value of descriptive 
representation varies according to the quality of the descriptive representative (i.e., some 
descriptive representatives are better than others). Dovi argues that simply including 
descriptive representatives is insufficient and that more attention must be paid to establishing 
“criteria for identifying preferable descriptive representatives….[that] have strong mutual 
relationships with dispossessed subgroups.” At the center of Dovi’s claim is the idea that 
descriptive representation is a necessary, but not sufficient basis for the substantive 
representation of the interests of disenfranchised and under-represented groups. It is a 
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tremendous oversimplification to assume that all women think and believe alike, or that all 
blacks share the same views on the issues. The problem of tokenism returns. 
Beyond mere visible similarities (e.g., gender, race, age, etc.), a preferable descriptive 
representative is one who shares “similar interests, opinions, and perspectives” with their 
constituents. To the extent that there is concordance between a person’s race and their life 
experiences, race is an acceptable proxy for representation. However, two individuals of the 
same race with quite different experiences would be unlikely to represent each other as well.  
In selecting criteria for identifying a preferable descriptive representative, the 
thinking is that only members of the disadvantaged group have the legitimate authority to 
identify the criteria that they want in a descriptive representative. As Dovi (2003) explains, if 
the views of the disadvantaged group are well-known, then anyone could adequately 
represent the group. If the views are only known within the group by its own members, then 
it only makes sense for the group to nominate a representative.  
Dovi’s central tenet is that the relationship between the descriptive representative and 
the represented is one of mutual agreement and understanding. Constituents must view the 
descriptive representative as “one of us.” She claims that this relationship is just as important 
as assessing the concordance between the substantive outcomes of representation and the 
wishes of the constituency (Dovi, 2003). Using Dovi’s framework, a low-income black 
health center patient would be a better descriptive representative than a wealthy black health 
center patient, primarily because while both individuals share a common race with a sizable 
portion of the health center patient population, the experiences and attitudes of the low-
income individual are more likely to resemble the experiences and attitudes of the typical 
health center patient who lives in poverty. 
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Jane Mansbridge (1999) echoes Dovi’s opinion, asserting that descriptive 
representation improves substantive representation in cases where disadvantaged groups are 
distrusting of those in power and where the views of the disadvantaged groups are not well 
known to persons outside of the group. She further suggests that while one descriptive 
representative in a deliberative body might seem sufficient for raising a given point of view, 
if the goal is to actually influence the substantive outcomes of deliberation, then a larger 
number of descriptive representatives may be needed to reach “critical mass.” This is 
especially true when an issue is sensitive and the minority representative is afraid to raise it 
without adequate support from others in the group. It also helps representatives to develop 
their thoughts in much the same way that the dynamics of a focus group draw out more 
information than a series of separate interviews as participants respond to the issues raised by 
others. In the case of a governing board, which does much of its work in committees, it is 
important to have multiple descriptive representatives so that disadvantaged groups are 
represented in each of the various committees, which would be difficult for one individual to 
achieve.  
Finally, Mansbridge (1999) questions the potential for harm inherent in descriptive 
representation, and debates whether ongoing descriptive representation is warranted. 
Descriptive representation can harm substantive representation, Mansbridge claims, if 
constituents assume that they are being represented because of the descriptive characteristics 
their representative shares with them. In turn, they may be less likely to hold their 
representatives to a high standard of accountability. Descriptive representation may be 
warranted initially, but then grow unnecessary “…when the systemic barriers to participation 
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have been eliminated through reform and social evolution [and] the need for affirmative steps 
to insure descriptive representation will disappear (Mansbridge, 1999).” 
 The literature on representation theory reviewed here suggests a generally strong 
positive association between descriptive and substantive representation with a few exceptions 
in cases where the level of descriptive representation is inadequate or the views of the under-
represented are widely known. In the health center context, this suggests that having more 
descriptively representative consumers on the board is likely to result in the board making 
decisions that are in the interest of the majority of patients.  
 Unfortunately, data on actual patient interests are not available. Therefore, I was left 
to assume that the provision of uncompensated care and enabling services were in the best 
interest of the majority of patients. Given that the majority of patients are low-income and 
many are uninsured, this seemed a reasonable assumption to make. Additionally, both of 
these service areas are integral to the mission of FQHCs. Armed with this assumption and 
guided by representation theory, I hypothesized that:  
H1.1: The percentage of board members who are descriptive consumers 
will be positively associated with the scope and volume of enabling 
services provided by FQHCs, the per capita number of enabling full-time 
equivalent staff (FTEs), and the ratio of uncompensated health care 
spending to federal grant funding. 
 
H1.2: The percentage of board members who are not descriptive 
consumers will not be associated with the scope and volume of enabling 
services, the per capita number of enabling FTEs, and the ratio of 
uncompensated health care spending to federal grant funding. 
 
Likely to be equally as important to patients, however, is that their health center 
remains financially sound and able to maintain operations in order to continue providing 
services. However, given that the typical health center patient is low-income, uninsured, and 
likely to be poorly uneducated, descriptively representative consumer board members may 
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lack the expertise needed to govern a complex organization. Indeed, involving consumers in 
a program has been shown to make the program less efficient (Howell, Devaney, McCormick, 
& Raykovich, 1998), and there is evidence that health centers that provide more services 
have poorer financial performance (Breyer, 1977). 
While health center consumers may be able to contribute their unique experience of 
receiving care at the center—or even raising the community’s needs before the board—health 
center governance is a complex task, requiring a board to possess a variety of technical 
competencies (e.g., law, business, accounting) that the typical low-income, poorly educated 
health center patient is unlikely to possess. Consumer participation in governance may make 
organizations more responsive to patient demands, but the potential “technical expertise gap” 
between consumers and non-consumers may have important implications (LeRoux, 2009). 
As Gaventa (1998) writes, “Mandates for participation from ‘above’ must be linked with pre-
existing capacities for participation ‘from below’.” Consequently, I hypothesized that: 
H2.1: The percentage of board members who are descriptive consumers 
would be positively associated with the percentage of costs attributable to 
enabling services and the average cost per medical encounter, but 
negatively associated with operating margin and self-sufficiency. 
 
H2.2: The percentage of board members who are not descriptive 
consumers will not be associated with the percentage of costs attributable 
to enabling services, the average cost per medical encounter, operating 
margin, or self-sufficiency. 
 
 
Measuring Power: Decisions, Non-Decisions, and Agenda Setting 
Substantive representation can be attributed to descriptive representation only when 
descriptive representatives are truly empowered to act. Consumer governance—even where 
consumers are in the majority—is not synonymous with consumers having decisionmaking 
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ability in practice (Kramer, 1969; Paap, 1978). The effective consumer board member must 
not only be knowledgeable of the patients’ needs, but must also be able to present those 
needs to the board in a way that affects policy outcomes. (Kramer, 1969).  
Knowledge of the patients’ needs may come from a variety of sources, including a 
board member’s own experience as a consumer, their interactions with other patients, and 
their connections as an employee and/or resident of the community. Yet, absent the capacity 
for meaningful participation, descriptive consumer board members are unlikely to affect 
substantive outcomes. The law as it is written requires only that 51% of the board be 
comprised of health center consumers. It does nothing to ensure the active involvement of 
these board members in decisionmaking, or to preclude non-descriptive board members from 
dominating the decisionmaking process. This may or may not be the intention of more 
powerful members of the organization. 
Power has been described as the sum of authority and influence and is realized as the 
ability to affect the outcome of the decisionmaking process (Altshuler, 1970). Authority is 
the legal right to compel another to act in accordance with one’s wishes, while influence is 
the ability to compel another to act in accordance with one’s wishes absent any legal 
authority for doing so (Altshuler, 1970). Every member of a governing board has been 
legally granted authority, but not every member is equally influential. For instance, the board 
chair possesses more influence than the ordinary board member (Donahue, 2003). 
In Who Governs? Robert Dahl (2005) describes the pluralist concept of power, which 
sees not a single elite, but a dynamic multitude of interests which compete with each other 
hoping to realize their preferred outcome. A major critique of Dahl’s work, however, is that 
he examines only the outcomes of decisions, and ignores the power inherently leveraged, but 
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not displayed, in setting the agenda—marked as much by non-decisions as decisions—that 
determines which items will be decided upon, and which will not even be considered. 
According to Bachrach and Baratz (1962):   
“…[P]ower is exercised when A participates in the making of decisions that 
affect B. But power is also exercised when A devotes his energies to creating 
or reinforcing social and political values and institutional practices that limit 
the scope of the political process to public consideration of only those issues 
which are comparatively innocuous to A. To the extent that A succeeds in 
doing this, B is prevented, for all practical purposes, from bringing to the fore 
any issues that might in their resolution be seriously detrimental to A’s set of 
preferences…In each [case], A participates in decisions and thereby adversely 
affects B. But…in the one case, A openly participates; in the other, he 
participates only in the sense that he works to sustain those values and rules of 
procedure that help him keep certain issues out of the public domain. True 
enough, participation of the second kind may at times be overt; that is the case, 
for instance, in cloture fights in the Congress. But the point is that it need not 
be. In fact, when the maneuver is most successfully executed, it neither 
involves nor can be identified with decisions arrived at on specific issues  
(p. 948).” 
 
These non-decisions, even if nearly impossible to observe or measure, are equally 
important to consider, because of the power of agenda setting (Kingdon, 1995). For instance, 
when the executive director and other key staff present reports at the board meeting, they are 
able to at least partially control what information is being provided to the board. They can 
present highly technical content during meetings, schedule meetings at times and in locations 
that are inconvenient for consumer board members to attend, use the by-laws and modified 
versions of Robert’s Rules to run meetings in ways that minimize the consumer board 
members’ voice, and reinforce—through board training and other means—that there is a 
knowledge and skill divide between consumer board members and others that cannot be 
resolved (Paap, 1978; Steckler & Herzog, 1979).  
In this way, they may—at least for a while—manage to keep poor performance 
hidden from view. However, agenda setting can go much farther than this to ensure consumer 
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board members are kept on the sidelines. They may also oversee the process by which new 
board members are selected, use carefully crafted selection criteria to ensure that only “safe” 
consumers are added to the board, and prevent consumers from holding positions of power 
within the board—particularly those on the executive committee—relegating them instead to 
low-priority committees (Steckler & Herzog, 1979). 
Similarly, Paap (1978) outlines three ways that consumers’ influence may be limited. 
First, consumers have restricted access to information, which is filtered to them through 
established professional networks. Second, health center boards are often forced to act 
quickly to meet deadlines, and thus consumer input is often not sought out by professionals 
before submitting applications. Third, consumer board members’ interactions with providers 
are limited to their board work, while non-consumer board members interact with providers 
on a variety of social and professional levels outside of the board meeting (Paap, 1978). 
Many studies of the CAPs in the 1960s and 1970s found that community boards acted in an 
advisory role, but lacked any real authority, and also that policies favorable to the community 
could be passed, but implemented in such a way as to have no benefit to the community 
(Campbell, 1971; Gittell, 1977; Peterson, 1970; Veatch & Branson, 1976).  
The literature on power and agenda setting makes it clear that those in positions of 
power have the potential to keep certain issues on the agenda while ensuring that others are 
never brought to the board for a vote. In this way, agenda setting has the potential to 
moderate the relationship between board composition and health center outcomes. For 
example, if members of the executive committee share the same position on an issue with the 
consumers on the board, they would be in a position to prioritize that issue for action. 
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Conversely, if they held the opposing view, the members of the executive committee could 
push the issue to the bottom of the agenda, ensuring that it never gets discussed. 
 The chief executive officer (CEO) and members of the executive committee (chair, 
vice-chair, secretary, and treasurer) are likely to possess such de facto power. However, 
because the current study focuses on board composition, and because CEO data are not 
available, I solely consider the composition of the executive committee as it pertains to 
agenda setting. Specifically, I use agenda setting theory to hypothesize that: 
H3.1a: The number of descriptive consumers on the executive committee 
will increase the magnitude of the relationship between the proportion of 
descriptive consumers on the board and the mission and margin outcomes 
to be modeled. 
 
H3.1b: The number of descriptive consumers on the executive committee 
will decrease the magnitude of the relationship between the proportion of 
non-descriptive consumers on the board and the mission and margin 
outcomes to be modeled. 
 
H3.2a: The number of non-descriptive consumers on the executive 
committee will decrease the magnitude of the relationship between the 
proportion of descriptive consumers on the board and the mission and 
margin outcomes to be modeled. 
 
H3.2b: The number of non-descriptive consumers on the executive 
committee will increase the magnitude of the relationship between the 
proportion of non-descriptive consumers on the board and the mission and 
margin outcomes to be modeled. 
 
 As noted earlier, the link between descriptive and substantive representation can be 
greatly affected by the extent to which descriptive board members serve on various 
committees, and the executive committee is the most powerful of these (Mansbridge, 1999). 
Therefore, it is important to assess how the likelihood of holding an executive committee 
position changes as a function of individual board member characteristics. Furthermore, the 
board chair occupies a position distinct from even the rest of the executive committee 
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officers. Therefore, it is also important to assess how the likelihood of serving as board chair 
changes as a function of individual board member characteristics. 
Status generalization theory suggests that small groups tend to organize themselves 
hierarchically according to the status characteristics of the group members as understood 
within the larger societal context (Berger, Cohen, & Zelditch Jr, 1972; Moore Jr, 1968; 
Webster Jr & Driskell Jr, 1978). Indeed, there is evidence to suggest that board members 
with professional expertise are viewed—both by themselves and others on the board—as 
more competent than community, lay, or consumer board members and that higher status 
individuals tend to exert greater influence over other board members than their lower status 
counterparts (Partridge & White, 1972). Low social status can even make an individual feel 
that their opinion will not be valued enough to change the outcome of a decision and this has 
been associated with decreased participation rates in a variety of settings ranging from jury 
deliberations (Strodtbeck, Simon, & Hawkins, 1965) to voting behavior (Campbell, Converse, 
Miller, & Stokes, 1960). 
Given that descriptive consumer board members belong, by definition, to a low 
socioeconomic status group, while board leadership positions are inherently superior to non-
leadership positions in the governance hierarchy and have been used as an indicator of board 
member influence (Latting, 1983), I used status generalization theory to hypothesize that: 
H4.1: Descriptive consumer board members will be less likely than other 
board members to hold any board office (defined as chair, vice-chair, 
secretary, or treasurer). 
 
H4.2: Descriptive consumer board members will be less likely than 
other board members to serve as board chair.  
 
In the next chapter, I propose a set of methods for answering the research questions posed in 
Chapter 1 and testing the hypotheses presented here. 
 CHAPTER 4 
 
METHODS 
 
 
 This chapter describes in detail the methods used to answer the research questions 
posed in Chapter 1. Building on the theoretical framework and hypotheses outlined in 
Chapter 3, it begins with a general overview of the study design and data sources. Next it 
provides a detailed explanation of the construction of the primary independent variable of 
interest, which is central to all study aims. Finally, it provides an aim-by-aim overview of the 
analytic methods, data sources, and measures, including a detailed discussion of the 
empirical model and specification tests used in each analysis. 
 
Study Design and Rationale 
This study is comprised of four specific aims, designed to address the research 
questions posed at the conclusion of Chapter 1, while overcoming some of the limitations of 
prior federally qualified health center (FQHC) governance studies discussed in Chapter 3. 
The specific aims of the study are: 
(1) To determine the association between consumer governance and the 
organization’s provision of services consistent with the FQHC mission and 
mandate. 
 
(2) To determine the association between consumer governance and organizational 
financial performance measures. 
 
(3) To determine the association between a board member’s consumer status and 
their likelihood of (a) serving on the executive committee and (b) serving as 
board chair.
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(4) To use semi-structured interviews to complement Aims 1 through 3 by exploring 
board members’ perceptions of the role consumer governance in FQHCs. 
  
To address each of these aims, this study employs a multi-method design. As shown 
in Figure 4, quantitative methods are used to model the association between the extent of 
consumer composition on FQHC governing boards and both the provision of services 
targeted to the needs of the underserved (Aim 1) and the financial performance of FQHCs 
(Aim 2). Quantitative methods are also used to estimate the likelihood of consumer board 
members holding executive committee positions (Aim 3). Because the available quantitative 
data alone are insufficient for understanding the dynamics of board decisionmaking, semi-
structured interviews were conducted to gather this information (Aim 4). The University of 
North Carolina at Chapel Hill Public Health-Nursing Institutional Review Board determined 
this study (#09-2194) to be exempt from human subjects review on November 30, 2009.
 
 
Figure 4. How Specific Aims Address the Question of FQHC Consumer Governance 
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Previous FQHC governance studies have been limited in important ways. For 
instance, most qualitative studies have used a limited sample of board chairs and/or executive 
directors, and both quantitative and qualitative studies have tended to have a limited 
geographic focus. To overcome these limitations, this study extends interview eligibility to 
all board members (not just chairs) in the qualitative analysis, and uses a nationally 
representative sample of FQHCs for the quantitative analysis. Most importantly, this study is 
the first to estimate quantitative models of health center outcomes as a function of consumer 
governance. 
The data used to address each aim were drawn from a variety of sources over a 
number of years as shown in Table 2. Aims 1 and 2 relied on data from the Uniform Data 
System (UDS), the Area Resource File (ARF), and hard copy data from Exhibit D of FQHC 
grant applications, while Aim 3 relied solely on data from Exhibit D of FQHC grant 
applications. These datasets were merged using UDS identifiers and Federal Information 
Processing Standard (FIPS) codes as shown in Figure 5. Finally, Aim 4 relied on primary 
data collection in the form of qualitative interviews. Each of the data sources is described in 
more detail in subsequent sections specific to each aim. 
 
 
Table 2. Overview of Data Sources 
Data Source Years 
Uniform Data System 2002 – 2007 
Area Resource File 2002 – 2007 
Exhibit D of FQHC Grant Applications* 2003 – 2006 
Board Member Interviews 2010 
* Obtained by Freedom of Information Act request. 
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Figure 5. Construction of the Analytic Data File 
 
 
 
 
A Note on Board Member Consumer Status 
 The key independent variable for all quantitative aims is board member consumer 
status. The Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) defines consumers as “individuals who 
have at least one encounter during the year” (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a) and 
defines encounters as “documented, face-to-face contacts between a consumer and a provider 
who exercises independent professional judgment in the provision of services to the 
consumer (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a).”  
However, data on board members’ consumer status, which comes from Exhibit D of 
FQHC grant applications, are self-reported. This raises a concern about the validity of the 
measure, because some consumers are likely to be more descriptively representative of the 
patient population than others. For example, a low-income consumer board member is more 
descriptively representative of the patient population than is a high-income consumer board 
member.  
To address this concern, data on board member occupation were coded to conform to 
Standard Occupational Classification (SOC) Codes used by the U.S. Bureau of Labor 
Statistics (BLS) (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010a). These codes uniquely identify 
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occupations and allow them to be linked to data on average annual income, which are also 
available from the BLS (U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2010b). In this way, based on their 
self-reported occupation and BLS data, each board member was assigned to a high or low 
status occupation. Occupations with a mean annual income greater than 200% of the federal 
poverty level for a family of four in 2009 ($44,100) were considered high status. This cutoff 
was used not because it absolutely reflects high status occupations, but because it reflects a 
socioeconomic status superior to the overwhelming majority (>90%) of FQHC patients.  
Using this information, the dichotomous consumer variable reported on FQHC grant 
applications was recoded categorically to include non-consumers, descriptive consumers, and 
non-descriptive consumers as shown in Figure 6. This variable is constructed at the FQHC-
level (as the percentage of descriptive and the percentage of non-descriptive FQHC 
consumers on the board) for Aims 1 and 2, and at the individual level for Aim 3. 
 
 
Figure 6. Flowchart Depicting Consumer Categorization of FQHC Board Members 
 
 
 
Is Board 
Member a 
Consumer? 
Is Board Member’s 
Occupation High Status? 
If Yes… 
If Yes… 
Non-
Descriptive 
Consumer 
If No… 
If No… 
Non-
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Appendix D provides a table indicating how SOC codes were applied to the board 
member occupation data. There were 293 cases where occupation was missing as well as 27 
cases where occupation could not be clearly coded using the SOC codes. All of these cases 
(N = 320) were coded as “other” and treated as a low-status occupation. The goal of this was 
to code as conservatively as possible, making it more likely to have assigned someone of 
high socioeconomic status to an SOC with a lower mean income than to have assigned 
someone of low socioeconomic status to an SOC with a higher mean income. This approach 
is more likely to overestimate rather than underestimate the proportion of descriptive 
consumers. To the extent that this affects the results, it will bias them towards the null, rather 
than overstating them. In the next section, the specific analyses used to empirically test the 
relationship between this categorical board member variable and several dependent variables 
of interest are described in more detail. 
 
Analyses for Aims 1 and 2 
 Aims 1 and 2 are discussed jointly here because they rely on the use of the same data, 
sample, general methodological approach, and independent variables, and differ only in their 
dependent variables. Both aims are concerned with the relationship between consumer 
governance and organizational outcomes. Specifically, Aim 1 is focused on mission-oriented 
outcomes, while Aim 2 is focused on margin-oriented outcomes, which are defined in the 
data and measures section. 
The first aim of the study was to determine the association between consumer 
governance and the organization’s provision of services consistent with the FQHC mission 
and mandate. Using the theories of descriptive and substantive representation, I hypothesized 
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that, at the FQHC level, the percentage of board members who are descriptive consumers 
would be positively associated with the scope and volume of enabling services provided by 
FQHCs, the per capita number of full-time equivalent enabling staff (FTEs), and the ratio of 
uncompensated health care spending to federal grant funding. I also hypothesized that there 
would be no relationship between these factors and the proportion of non-descriptive 
consumers on the board. 
Similar to the first aim, the second aim of the study was to determine the association 
between consumer governance and organizational financial performance measures. Again 
using theories of descriptive and substantive representation, I hypothesized that, at the FQHC 
level, the percentage of board members who are descriptive consumers would be positively 
associated with the percentage of costs attributable to enabling services and the average cost 
per medical encounter, but negatively associated with operating margin and self-sufficiency. 
I also hypothesized that there would be no relationship between these factors and the 
proportion of non-descriptive consumers on the board. 
 
Data Sources 
 To address these aims, the FQHC board member dataset was collapsed to the FQHC 
level. This resulted in the loss of individual level characteristics, replaced by a dataset of 
means at the health center level. For example, the data no longer indicate if an individual 
board member is a consumer or not. Rather, they report the percentage of board members at 
an FQHC comprised of consumers. In addition to the board member data, Aims 1 and 2 use 
data from the Uniform Data System and the Area Resource File. 
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The Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) of the Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) is responsible for collecting annual data on each of the consolidated 
health center programs, including community health centers, migrant health centers, rural 
health centers, school-based health centers, and health care for the homeless programs. This 
data is collectively referred to as the Uniform Data System (UDS). The UDS, which was 
initially established in 1996, is reported on the basis of the calendar year, and any health 
center that receives federal funding for any part of the calendar year must submit a UDS 
report, unless funding began after October 1. The UDS contains data on health center patient 
demographics and health status, staffing, scope and volume of services, number of delivery 
sites, caseload, and finances (Bureau of Primary Health Care, Multiple years.).  
Specifically, the UDS collects aggregate data on patients’ age, gender, race, ethnicity, 
insurance status, and income as a percentage of the federal poverty level. It also includes data 
on health center staffing and service area, the number of patient encounters, and the number 
of unique patients. Service areas reported include medical care, dental, mental health, 
substance abuse, other professional health services, pharmacy services, and enabling services. 
Financial variables include costs for medical care, other clinical services, enabling services, 
and administration as well as revenues by source (e.g., third-party, self-pay, grants), and 
amounts written off as bad debt or as part of the sliding fee scale. 
Beginning in 2005, select financial and enabling service variables were deemed 
proprietary and were no longer released to the public. However, complete UDS data through 
2007 were obtained for this study through a data use agreement with the George Washington 
University (GWU) Department of Health Policy, which had obtained the data directly from 
Congressman Henry Waxman who requested it from HRSA in his oversight role as chairman 
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of the House Energy and Commerce Committee. Congressman Waxman shared the data with 
GWU on the condition that it be used solely for educational purposes, which permitted its use 
in this dissertation. Consequently, much of the data in this study is unavailable to other 
researchers even under the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). 
HRSA also compiles data from a variety of sources to create the Area Resource File 
(ARF). The ARF contains county-level data on “health facilities, health professions, 
measures of resource scarcity, health status, economic activity, health training programs, and 
socioeconomic and environmental characteristics” and is used to control for a variety of 
community characteristics in my analyses (Health Resources and Services Administration, 
Multiple years.). 
 
Sample and Exclusion Criteria 
Some FQHCs were excluded from this study using a set of criteria designed to limit 
the analysis to fully operational federally-funded health centers. At a minimum, such centers 
should have at least one full-time medical provider and at least one full-time administrative 
staff person. Similarly, FQHCs with fewer than 5,000 annual encounters have previously 
been labeled as less than fully operational (Wells et al., 2009). Therefore, to be eligible for 
participation in this study, each health center had to: 
1) be federally-funded with a CHC grant5; 
                                                 
5
 FQHCs consist not only of community health centers (CHCs), but also include grantees of the migrant health, 
health care for the homeless, public housing, and school-based health center programs. These entities are 
eligible for a waiver of the consumer governance requirement if, and only if, they do not also receive funding 
from the community health center program (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998b). Therefore, because this 
study is concerned with the effect of the consumer governance requirement on organizational outcomes, non-
CHC grantees were omitted from the sample. CHC grantees who also received one of the other FQHC grants 
remained in the sample and binary variables were created to indicate which type of additional FQHC grant 
program funding a center received. 
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2) have at least two FTE staff persons at least one of whom is a medical  
provider; 
3) report at least 1 patient and 5,000 patient encounters per year; and 
4) be located in 1 of the 50 United States or the District of Columbia 
Using these criteria, 592 centers were excluded because they did not receive a CHC 
grant and another 21 were excluded because they received no federal funding from the BPHC. 
Fifteen health centers were excluded because they had fewer than two FTE staff persons, and 
an additional 158 centers were excluded because they had fewer than 5,000 patient 
encounters per year. Two health centers reporting negative total costs were also dropped 
from the sample, because no fully operational center could accurately report negative total 
costs. Lastly, 164 health centers operating in the U.S. territories were excluded.  
This left a starting sample of 4,716 FQHC-Years for FQHC-level analyses 
representing 907 unique health centers. However, as shown in Table 3, the sample is 
ultimately constrained by the availability of grant application data, which was only received 
for 71.4% of the total number of FQHCs operating in each year. 
 
Table 3. Annual Number of FQHCs in Operation, 2002 – 2007 
Year Total Number of  
FQHC Grantees  
Number 
Excluded 
Total FQHC  
Sample 
Total Number of  
Grant Applications 
2002    843 156    687 Not Requested 
2003    890 154    736             397 (54%) 
2004    914 146    768             297 (39%) 
2005    952 155    797             767 (96%) 
2006 1,002 160    842              784 (93%) 
2007 1,067 181    886 Not Requested 
Total 5,668 952 4,716 2,245 
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Because centers for which data are available may differ from centers for which data 
are unavailable, it is important to determine how representative the sample is, which may 
limit the generalizability of the results beyond the centers studied here. To do so, a binary 
variable was created as an indicator of observations that were missing FQHC grant data. A 
logistic regression of this binary variable on the full set of available dependent and 
independent variables for all 3,143 FQHCs in the sample between 2003 and 2006 indicated 
that the sample was largely representative, with a few notable exceptions. 
Most importantly, compared to the 2,245 FQHC-years in the sample, the 898 FQHC-
years without data are likely to have a higher operating margin, a lower average medical cost 
per medical encounter, and a lesser degree of financial self-sufficiency. In other words, 
health centers with missing data are likely to be more financially efficient and have lower 
costs relative to revenues, but a greater share of their revenue is likely to come from grant 
funding.  
Specifically, using the average of the probabilities method to generate average 
marginal effects from the probit model on sample exclusion, each ten percentage point 
increase in operating margin is associated with a 1.5 percentage point increase in the 
probability of having missing data, each ten percentage point increase in financial self-
sufficiency is associated with a 3.1 percentage point decrease in the probability of having 
missing data, and each $10 increase in the average medical cost of a visit is associated with 
an 0.5 percentage point decrease in the probability of having missing data.  
While statistically significant, the magnitude—and therefore practical significance—
of these differences is small, as very large changes in these variables are required to generate 
small changes in the probability of missing data. For example, a 30 percentage point increase 
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in self-sufficiency, which is a very large change, only changes the probability of missing data 
by 9.3 percentage points.  
Additionally, FQHCs that receive grant funding under the health care for the 
homeless program are 5.9 percentage points more likely to have missing data, while those 
receiving school-based grants are 6.7 percentage points more likely to have missing data. 
There were also county-level differences between FQHCs with and without missing data. For 
instance, each $1,000 increase in per capita income is associated with an 0.6 percentage point 
increase in the probability of missing data and each one percentage point increase in the 
unemployment rate is associated with a 3.2 percentage point increase in the probability of 
missing data. Each additional doctor per capita is associated with a 3.6 percentage point 
increase in the probability of missing data and each one percentage point increase in the rate 
of uninsured persons is associated with a 1.4 percentage point decrease in the probability of 
missing data. It is important to keep these differences in mind when interpreting the study 
results. 
Missing data were not a concern in the ARF or the UDS. In fact, according to the 
BPHC, blank entries in the UDS are not missing data and are to be considered synonymous 
with zero. Therefore, all “missing” values in the UDS data were recoded to zero. The effect 
of this ranged from 1 observation missing a value for physician FTEs to 1,174 observations 
missing a value for unreported race. 
 
Measures 
 The measures for Aims 1 and 2 are summarized in Table 4. As the key independent 
variables (the proportion of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers on the board) have 
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already been discussed in an earlier section, the remainder of this section defines the 
dependent variables, identifies each of the control variables, and motivates their inclusion in 
the econometric models. 
 
Table 4. FQHC-Level Measures for Analyses of Aims 1 and 2 
Key Independent Variable Aim Model Source 
% Descriptive Consumers 
% Non-Descriptive Consumers 1,2 1 – 8   FQHC Grant Applications 
Dependent Variables Aim Model Source 
Scope of Enabling Services (% out of 15) 1 1 UDS 
Volume of Enabling Services / 1,000 Consumers 1 2 UDS 
Enabling FTEs / 1,000 Consumers 1 3 UDS 
$ Uncompensated Care / $ BPHC Grants 1 4 UDS  
Operating Margin 2 1 UDS 
Average Medical Cost per Medical Encounter 2 2 UDS 
% of Costs Attributable to Enabling Services 2 3 UDS 
Financial Self-Sufficiency 2 4 UDS 
Control Variables Aim Model Source 
County-Level Context Factors 1,2 1 – 8  ARF 
FQHC-Level Context Factors 1,2 1 –  8  UDS 
FQHC-Level Design Factors 1,2 1 – 8   UDS & FQHC Grant Applications 
 
 
 
Mission-Oriented Outcomes 
The mission-oriented outcomes are so named because they measure core aspects of 
the FQHC mission and mandate to provide services to the underserved that are not typically 
associated with significant reimbursement or the generation of revenue. They include the 
scope and volume of enabling services an FQHC provides, the number of FTE staff an 
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FQHC maintains to provide those enabling services, and the amount of uncompensated care 
an FQHC provides relative to the amount of its federal health center grant. 
[1.1] Scope of Enabling Services is a count variable measuring the number of 
enabling services a health center offers of the 15 enabling services reported 
by the UDS. These include: case management, child care (during visit to the 
center), discharge planning, eligibility assistance, environmental health risk 
reduction (via detection and/or alleviation), health education, 
interpretation/translation services, nursing home and assisted-living 
placement, outreach, transportation, out stationed eligibility workers, home 
visiting, parenting education, special education programs, and “other.” The 
measure captures the variety of enabling services an FQHC provides or 
refers and pays for. Enabling services for which the FQHC provides referral 
but does not pay are not counted. Values of this variable range from 0 to 14 
with a mean of 8.2. 
[1.2] Volume of Enabling Services is a continuous variable equal to the number 
of patient encounters for enabling services that a center has in a calendar 
year standardized per 1,000 unique patients. This measure provides an 
additional dimension to the scope of enabling services provided, by focusing 
on the quantity of enabling services provided. Values of this variable range 
from 0 to 7,560 with a mean of 245.8, which is roughly the equivalent of 
providing 1 enabling service a year to one-fourth of patients. 
[1.3] Enabling FTEs is a continuous variable equal to the number of full-time 
equivalent staff employed to provide enabling services standardized per 
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1,000 patients. This variable provides information on the amount of 
personnel resources an FQHC devotes to providing enabling services. 
Values of this variable range from 0 to 16.2 with a mean of 0.64. 
[1.4] Uncompensated Care Ratio is the ratio of the total financial costs of 
uncompensated care provided by the FQHC (reported as bad debt and 
sliding fee discounts in the UDS) to the total amount of federal BPHC grant 
funding the FQHC received in the same year. This measure, constructed 
from UDS data, is used by the BPHC to ensure that FQHCs are using grant 
funds appropriately to provide care to the uninsured (Health Resources and 
Services Administration, 2006b). Values of this variable range from 0 to 
11.1 with a mean of 1.08. An FQHC that provides an amount of 
uncompensated care exactly equal to the amount of its federal grant will 
have a value of 1 for this variable. 
 
Margin-Oriented Outcomes 
 The margin-oriented outcomes include the percentage of costs attributable to enabling 
services, the average medical cost per medical encounter, operating margin, and financial 
self-sufficiency. These measures were selected because they are commonly used to measure 
the efficiency, self-sufficiency, and profitability of FQHCs (Finkler et al., 1994; Finkler, 
1995; Shi, Collins, Aaron, Watters, & Shah, 2007). Taken collectively, these measures can be 
used to predict the likelihood of organizational survival (Shi et al., 1994) and have been used 
in the construction of an FQHC comparative performance scorecard (Radford, Pink, & 
Ricketts, 2007). 
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[2.1] Percentage of Costs Attributable to Enabling Services is a continuous 
variable constructed directly from UDS data by dividing the total costs of 
enabling services by total program costs. Because these services are poorly, 
if at all, reimbursed, centers with a greater proportion of their costs 
attributable to the provision of enabling services are likely to prioritize 
mission over margin. Values of this variable range from 0 to 59.8% with a 
mean of 7.4%. 
[2.2] Average Medical Cost per Medical Encounter is a continuous measure 
constructed by dividing the total accrued medical costs by the total number 
of annual medical encounters. It is useful as a measure of the efficiency of 
health center operations. A center with a lower average medical cost per 
medical encounter can be considered to be more efficient. Indeed, this 
measure is used by the BPHC to track financial performance and program 
efficiency (Health Resources and Services Administration, 2006c). Values 
of this variable range from $38.81 to $676.84 with a mean of $117.70. 
[2.3] Operating Margin is a continuous measure constructed by dividing total 
revenue minus total costs by total revenue. As such, it contains both positive 
and negative values. It provides a measure of profitability, which is 
important because while FQHCs are non-profit entities, they must generate 
enough total revenue (inclusive of grants) to remain operational. This 
measure is frequently used as an indicator of an organization’s financial 
health (McAlearney, 2002; Radford et al., 2007) and may be reduced by a 
focus on mission-oriented services (Breyer, 1977; Feldman et al., 1978). 
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Values of this variable range from -140.2% to 56.7% with a mean of -4.5%. 
An FQHC that “breaks even” would have a value of zero, while positive 
values indicate revenues in excess of costs, and negative values indicate 
costs in excess of revenues. 
[2.4] Financial Self-Sufficiency is a continuous measure constructed by dividing 
total non-grant revenues by total costs. It is a valuable measure of how much 
revenue a center is able to generate from its patients. Centers with low levels 
of self-sufficiency are potentially at a greater risk of ceasing operations, 
because they depend more heavily on grant funding, which has the potential 
to be reduced or eliminated for a variety of reasons, some of which are 
unrelated to the performance of the center (Ricketts et al., 1984). This 
measure is used by BPHC to track financial performance (Health Resources 
and Services Administration, 2006a) and has also been used in other FQHC 
studies (Feldman et al., 1978; Wells et al., 2009). Values of this variable 
range from 0.9% to 152.1% with a mean value of 53.8%. 
 
Control Variables 
 In addition to the key independent and dependent variables, each of the econometric 
models controls for a variety of other factors at both the county and FQHC level. County-
level factors include: a binary indicator of metropolitan area, which has been both positively 
(Wells et al., 2009) and negatively (Martin et al., 2009) associated with self-sufficiency; the 
per capita number of active non-federal office-based physicians, which has been negatively 
associated with operating margin (Rosko, 2001); the number of short-term general hospitals 
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and the number of FQHCs, which may drive demand and need for care as well as represent 
competition for the FQHC; and several measures of county demographics (% male, % non-
white, % Hispanic) and socioeconomic status (per capita income, % uninsured, % 
unemployed), which have been positively associated with the amount of enabling services 
(Wells et al., 2009) and uncompensated care (Rosko, 2001) provided by FQHCs, but 
negatively associated with their self-sufficiency (Feldman et al., 1978). 
 At the FQHC level, context factors include caseload, which has been positively 
associated with self-sufficiency (Wells et al., 2009) and aggregate case-mix by age, 
gender, % non-white, and income (defined relative to the poverty level), which are likely to 
have a direct effect on organizational outcomes. A measure of chronic disease burden (% of 
encounters for diabetes, asthma, and/or hypertension), which has been negatively associated 
with self-sufficiency, is also included (Wells et al., 2009). Finally, the proportion of an 
FQHC’s caseload by insurance status, which has been positively associated with self-
sufficiency (Radford et al., 2007; Wells et al., 2009), but negatively associated with operating 
margin, is included (Gurewich, 2002).  
 The models also control for other FQHC-level design factors such as board size, 
which has been negatively associated with consumer influence (Latting, 1983); the number 
of delivery sites an FQHC operates, which may have implications for organizational 
outcomes (Wells, Vasey, Lawrence, & Politzer, Unpublished manuscript); the number of 
FTE staff, which has been negatively associated with operating margin (Gurewich, 2002); 
and the number of physicians as a percentage of total staff, which has been positively 
associated with self-sufficiency (Wells et al., 2009). 
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 Specific to the composition of the governing board, a binary variable is included to 
indicate the presence of at least one physician on the board. This variable is included because 
of the possibility that boards with a physician presence may operate differently than boards 
without physicians. An alternative model specifying the number of physicians on the board 
was also estimated, but as shown in Table 5, a comparison of the R-squared values in each 
case indicated that the physician count variable did not increase the explanatory power of the 
model, so the binary physician variable is used.  
 
 
Table 5. Specification of Board Physician Variable 
Model Binary Variable 
(Model R2) 
Ordinal Variable 
(Model R2) 
1.1 0.122 0.122 
1.2 0.129 0.129 
1.3 0.158 0.158 
1.4 0.074 0.074 
2.1 0.072 0.068 
2.2 0.291 0.292 
2.3 0.052 0.050 
2.4 0.124 0.124 
 
 
 
 To assess the moderating role of the executive committee on the relationship between 
board composition and organizational outcomes, the composition of the board’s executive 
committee was initially modeled using three alternate specifications. The first used two 
binary variables to indicate the presence of at least one descriptive and at least one non-
descriptive consumer on the executive committee. A second, similar specification used two 
binary variables to indicate whether the board chair was a descriptive or non-descriptive 
consumer. The third specification used two ordinal variables to count the number of 
descriptive and non-descriptive consumers on the executive committee. As shown in Table 6, 
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the R-squared values from each model specification were compared, and modeling executive 
committee composition using the count of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers 
contributed the most explanatory power to the model. 
 
 
Table 6. Specification of Executive Committee Variable 
Model Binary Committee Variable  
(Model R2) 
Binary Chair Variable  
(Model R2) 
Ordinal Committee Variable 
(Model R2) 
1.1 0.122 0.122 0.122 
1.2 0.125 0.121 0.129 
1.3 0.157 0.152 0.158 
1.4 0.073 0.067 0.074 
2.1 0.050 0.052 0.072 
2.2 0.281 0.282 0.291 
2.3 0.053 0.051 0.052 
2.4 0.112 0.117 0.124 
  
 
 
Analytic Methods 
 To test the Aim 1 and Aim 2 hypotheses, I estimated a series of fixed effects models 
at the FQHC level using board composition to predict eight different organizational outcomes. 
Four of the eight organizational outcomes modeled are considered mission-oriented 
outcomes specific to Aim 1, while the other four are considered margin-oriented outcomes 
specific to Aim 2. As described in the measures section, each of these eight dependent 
variables is modeled as a function of board composition, executive committee composition, 
the interaction between them, general time trends, other FQHC-level design factors, and 
several county-level and FQHC-level context factors (Marathe, Wan, Zhang, & Sherin, 2007), 
and can be represented by Y in the equation: 
Main Regression Equation 
Yijt = αo + Consumeri(t-1)β + Officei(t-1)χ + Consumer*Officei(t-1)δ + Witγ + Ttλ + µi + εit 
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where j is one of the eight dependent variables of interest, i identifies the health center and  
t = 1,…,T indicates the year between 2004 and 2007. Consumer is a matrix containing the 
categorically constructed measure of the proportion of the board consisting of descriptive 
consumers, non-descriptive consumers, and non-consumers (reference group). Office is a 
matrix of two variables indicating the number of (a) descriptive and (b) non-descriptive 
consumer board members on the executive committee. Consumer*Office is a matrix 
containing a total of four interaction terms between the variables represented by Consumer 
and Office. W is a matrix of FQHC-level and county-level controls, T is a matrix of binary 
year indicator variables, µ is a matrix of FQHC-level fixed effects, and ε represents the 
unobserved time-varying error.  
 The set of coefficients on the consumer and consumer-office interaction variables 
gives the relationship between the composition of consumers on the board and the 
organizational outcome being modeled. The set of coefficients on the interactions can be 
interpreted as the moderating effect of executive committee composition on the relationship 
between board composition and organizational outcomes. Because a delay between the 
composition of the board at any given time and the appearance of measurable outcomes 
resulting from the board’s decisionmaking is to be expected, the key explanatory board 
composition variables are lagged by one year, as indicated by the t-1 subscript. 
 
Specification Tests 
 Before running the final models, a number of specification tests were conducted for 
the purpose of model selection. This section discusses analytical issues of concern including 
multicollinearity, heteroskedasticity, autocorrelation, normality, functional form, and 
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endogeneity. It describes the specification tests used to test for each of these concerns, 
presents the results of these specification tests, and discusses the steps taken to correct the 
biased estimates and loss of efficiency that can result from ignoring these issues. 
Pairwise correlations between all explanatory variables were examined to assess the 
extent of pairwise associations, which can reduce the efficiency of the models to be estimated. 
This is a problem insofar as it produces lower t-statistics, which may lead to the conclusion 
that there is no statistically significant effect when in fact, there might be. Exploration of the 
data revealed no cases of perfect collinearity and, while some variables were highly 
correlated with each other as shown in Table 7, the relationships observed were as expected. 
This loss of efficiency, while less than ideal, is preferable to the biased coefficients that 
would result if these variables were eliminated from the model. 
 
 
Table 7. Correlation Coefficients in Select Variable Pairs 
Variable 1 Variable 2 Correlation Coefficient 
FQHC FTEs  FQHC Patient Encounters 0.94 
% Patients in Medicare  % Patients Age 65 and Older 0.85 
# Hospitals # FQHCs 0.77 
Per Capita Income  Total Physicians per Capita in County 0.75 
FQHC Patient Encounters FQHC Delivery Sites 0.70 
FQHC FTEs  FQHC Delivery Sites 0.69 
% Descriptive Consumers  % Non-Descriptive Consumers -0.68 
% Uninsured in County  % Hispanic in County 0.67 
 
 
 
Theory suggests that two variables (board size and site count) in the general model 
for Aims 1 and 2 may have non-linear effects. Both smaller board size and larger board size 
may convey distinct advantages to an organization, because smaller boards have been shown 
to work more efficiently, while larger boards have been shown to benefit from the 
availability of a wider range of personal resources (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 
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1999). Consequently, boards that are “too small” or “too large” may be less ideal than a more 
moderately-sized board, leading to an inverse U-shaped trend (provided more positive 
outcomes are labeled on the y-axis), or conversely, moderately-sized boards may fail to 
realize the benefits associated with either smaller or larger boards, in which case the 
relationship between board size and organizational outcomes would appear U-shaped. A 
similar non-linear relationship might be reasonably expected with regard to the number of 
delivery sites an FQHC grantee operates. 
 
Table 8. Results of Tests of Functional Form 
Model Variable Tested Result Conclusion 
1.1 Board Size
2
 z = 0.08 p = 0.940 Safe to exclude 
Site Count2 z = -0.27 p = 0.786 Safe to exclude 
1.2 Board Size
2
 t = 0.74 p = 0.458 Safe to exclude 
Site Count2 t = -1.96 p = 0.05 Include in model 
1.3 Board Size
2
 t = 0.27 p = 0.787 Safe to exclude 
Site Count2 t = -1.25 p = 0.213 Safe to exclude 
1.4 Board Size
2
 t = 1.28 p = 0.199 Safe to exclude 
Site Count2 t = -0.82 p = 0.412 Safe to exclude 
2.1 Board Size
2
 t = 0.99 p = 0.325 Safe to exclude 
Site Count2 t = -1.69 p = 0.092 Safe to exclude 
2.2 Board Size
2
 t = -2.16 p = 0.031 Include in model 
Site Count2 t = 1.59 p = 0.111 Safe to exclude 
2.3 Board Size
2
 t = 0.07 p = 0.947 Safe to exclude 
Site Count2 t = -0.55 p = 0.580 Safe to exclude 
2.4 Board Size
2
 t = 0.61 p = 0.541 Safe to exclude 
Site Count2 t = 0.29 p = 0.772 Safe to exclude 
 
 
Therefore, an alternate version of each of the eight models was run to test the 
functional form of board size and site count by including the square of each term. The t-
statistic on each squared term in each model was examined to determine whether or not to 
include the higher order term in the final model. Site count squared was significant for model 
1.2 (volume of enabling services), while board size squared was significant for model 2.2 
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(average medical cost per medical encounter). The null hypothesis of no effect could not be 
rejected for any of the other quadratic terms tested were able to be safely excluded from the 
remaining models. These results appear in Table 8.  
The first model estimates the number of enabling services a health center offers, and 
because the values of this variable can never be less than zero, a count model is often the 
preferred choice. While it is also possible to model this outcome using ordinary least squares 
regression (OLS), the linear model may generate negative predicted values that cannot 
technically exist, and many of the OLS assumptions may be violated by the data, leading to 
biased, inconsistent, and inefficient coefficient estimates. 
 Count models are often estimated using either Poisson regression or negative 
binomial regression. The former imposes an assumption of equidispersion (i.e., that the mean 
equals the variance). Often, this is not the case, and the data are overdispersed (i.e., the mean 
is less than the variance). In this case, the negative binomial model is appropriate (Cameron 
& Trivedi, 1998).  
The descriptive statistics for the total number of enabling services offered indicated 
that the data were actually underdispersed (i.e., the mean of 8.2 was greater than the variance 
of 4.7). In such cases, the negative binomial model is not appropriate (Cameron & Trivedi, 
1998). This was confirmed by running the negative binomial model and conducting the LR 
test on the null hypothesis that alpha = 0. The results (Chibar2(1) = 0.00, p = 1.000), failed to 
reject the null, indicating no overdispersion and suggesting that the Poisson model is 
preferred to the negative binomial. Furthermore, the variable did not contain a significant 
number of zero values, making a zero-inflated or two-part model unnecessary. After running 
the Poisson model, the results of a goodness-of-fit test (Chi2(1352) = 137.43, p = 1.000) 
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indicated that the Poisson model was appropriate. Manually including a dummy variable for 
each FQHC allows time-invariant health center characteristics to be controlled for using a 
fixed effect Poisson model. 
 However, when the model was run using OLS with fixed effects, the residuals 
appeared to be normally distributed with a mean of 0.000004 and a 95% confidence interval 
between -1 and 1. To decide between the Poisson and the OLS model, both with fixed effects, 
I generated the predicted values of the dependent variable after estimating each model. The 
predicted values from the fixed effect Poisson model ranged from 1.53e-7 to 13.74. This 
range lies within the range of possible values for this variable (0 to 15) and very close to the 
actual range of values for this variable in the data (0 to 14). By contrast, the predicted values 
from the OLS model ranged from 2.64 to 17.91. The upper end of this range exceeds the 
maximum possible value for this variable and only partially overlaps the true range in the 
data (0 to 14). Therefore, based on the predicted values generated, the Poisson distribution 
seemed to model the data better than the normal distribution assumed by OLS. Therefore, the 
scope of enabling services is modeled using Poisson regression.  
 However, the Poisson model is heteroskedastic by definition, and in the case of 
underdispersion, the standard errors are likely to be too large (Cameron & Trivedi, 1998). 
Left unaddressed, this may lead to underestimation of significant results. Using clustered 
standard errors at the FQHC-level corrects for this as well as any serial correlation between 
repeated observations of a given FQHC over time. Because the count data include zero 
values, logging the dependent variable was not considered. 
The remaining seven models, which are now discussed, all estimate continuous 
dependent variables. Because there is data available for each FQHC grantee over multiple 
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years, I ran a model that controls for unobserved time-invariant heterogeneity by including 
fixed effects dummy variables at the FQHC level. Thus, all of the characteristics of a health 
center that do not change over time and that might be associated with the other explanatory 
variables and/or the dependent variable, will be pulled out of the error term and explicitly 
included in the model. Such unobserved time-invariant center characteristics have been 
shown to be strong predictors of FQHC outcomes (Gurewich, 2002).  
After running each of the eight models and including fixed effects, a series of F-tests 
indicated that the fixed effects variables were jointly significant, meaning that fixed effects is 
preferred over ordinary least squares (OLS) in each case. These results are shown in Table 9.  
 
Table 9. Results of Joint F-Test of FQHC-Level Fixed Effects 
Model Result Conclusion 
1.2 F(816, 1354) = 15.67, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over OLS 
1.3 F(816, 1354) = 14.53, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over OLS 
1.4 F(816, 1354) = 10.20, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over OLS 
2.1 F(816, 1354) = 13.59, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over OLS 
2.2 F(816, 1354) = 11.76, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over OLS 
2.3 F(816, 1354) =   3.50, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over OLS 
2.4 F(816, 1354) =   6.85, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over OLS 
 
 
 
However, because fixed effects models include a binary indicator variable for each 
group, it is not necessarily an efficient model. An alternative is random effects, which differs 
from fixed effects by assuming that the time-invariant error component is uncorrelated with 
the other explanatory variables in the model. If this assumption is true, the random effects 
model is both consistent and efficient. However, if this assumption is violated, random 
effects yields inconsistent estimates, and fixed effects is preferred.  
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While the existence of unobserved time-invariant FQHC characteristics that are 
associated with the included explanatory variables seemed highly likely, a confirmatory 
series of Hausman tests were performed to decide whether to use a fixed or random effects 
model. As expected, the results shown in Table 10 indicate that the fixed effects model is 
clearly preferred over not only OLS, but also random effects.  
 
 
Table 10. Results of Hausman Test for Fixed vs. Random Effects 
Model Result Conclusion 
1.2 Chi2(41) = 92.28, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over random effects 
1.3 Chi2(41) = 224.09, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over random effects 
1.4 Chi2(42) = 69.66, p = 0.0046 Fixed effects preferred over random effects 
2.1 Chi2(42) = 103.39, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over random effects 
2.2 Chi2(42) = 177.39, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over random effects 
2.3 Chi2(42) = 64.00, p = 0.0159 Fixed effects preferred over random effects 
2.4 Chi2(42) = 173.20, p < 0.0000 Fixed effects preferred over random effects 
 
 
 
Two other issues that often arise, especially in panel data, are heteroskedasticity and 
autocorrelation. While they do not bias coefficient estimates, they do bias standard errors 
thereby making the models less efficient and potentially invalidating the results of hypothesis 
tests. Therefore, it is important to test and control for the presence of both in the data. 
The presence of heteroskedasticity in all eight models was confirmed by the results of 
a series of White tests as shown in Table 11. Before deciding on a remedy for this, the 
Wooldridge test for serial correlation in panel data was used to check for autocorrelation in 
each model (Drukker, 2003; Wooldridge, 2002). The results, shown in Table 12, indicate that 
all models in Aims 1 and 2 with the exception of equation 1.4 suffer from some unspecified 
form of autocorrelation. 
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Table 11. Results of White Test for Heteroskedasticity 
Model Result Conclusion 
1.1 Poisson model is heteroskedastic by definition 
1.2 Chi2(45) = 115.08, p = 4.67e-08 Heteroskedastic error 
1.3 Chi2(45) = 355.04, p = 8.74e-50 Heteroskedastic error 
1.4 Chi2(45) = 193.65, p = 2.39e-20 Heteroskedastic error 
2.1 Chi2(45) = 164.93, p = 1.37e-15 Heteroskedastic error 
2.2 Chi2(45) = 226.74, p = 4.45e-26 Heteroskedastic error 
2.3 Chi2(45) = 90.44, p = .00007 Heteroskedastic error 
2.4 Chi2(45) = 106.75, p = 6.25e-07 Heteroskedastic error 
 
 
 
Table 12. Results of Wooldridge Test for Serial Correlation in Panel Data 
Model Result Conclusion 
1.1 Test not conducted because robust clustered standard errors used  
1.2 F(1, 272) = 60.15, p < 0.0000 Error terms serially correlated 
1.3 F(1, 272) = 22.06, p < 0.0000 Error terms serially correlated 
1.4 F(1, 272) = 0.618, p = 0.4324 No autocorrelation detected 
2.1 F(1, 272) = 24.96, p < 0.0000 Error terms serially correlated 
2.2 F(1, 272) = 9.098, p = 0.0028 Error terms serially correlated 
2.3 F(1, 272) = 10.954, p = 0.0011 Error terms serially correlated 
2.4 F(1, 272) = 11.614, p = 0.0008 Error terms serially correlated 
 
 
 
While Huber-White robust standard errors are an effective correction for 
heteroskedasticity, they do not account for serially correlated error terms. However, clustered 
standard errors can control for both heteroskedasticity and serial correlation that occurs 
within the cluster, although they do not control for serial correlation between clusters. It 
seems likely, however, that the error terms will be correlated within the FQHC over time 
rather than across different FQHCs, especially because fixed effects are used to control for 
all of the time-invariant unobserved heterogeneity between FQHCs that would otherwise be a 
sizeable component of the error. Therefore, the model uses clustered standard errors at the 
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FQHC level, which improves the efficiency of the model by controlling for both the 
heteroskedasticity and the autocorrelation by estimating consistent standard errors. 
 After conducting a visual inspection of the residuals from each model using Stata’s 
qnorm procedure, which suggested that the errors in all models are likely to be normally 
distributed, a series of Wooldridge tests were conducted to determine whether or not to use 
the logged form of the dependent variable in each case. The results, shown in Table 13, 
indicated that the unlogged form of the dependent variable was preferred for all but one of 
the models. The Wooldridge test could not be meaningfully conducted on models 1.1 or 2.3, 
because the dependent variables contain negative values or zeroes which, by definition, 
cannot be logged. Therefore, these models also use an unlogged form of the dependent 
variable. The Wooldridge test results for model 2.4 (financial self-sufficiency) indicated that 
the logged form of the dependent variable was preferred. 
 
 
Table 13. Results of Wooldridge Test for Functional Form of Dependent Variable  
Model Result Conclusion 
1.1 Dependent variable “Scope of Enabling Services” 
contains values of zero which cannot be logged. 
1.2 Unlogged R2:                0.0358 
Logged Pseudo-R2:       0.0036 
Unlogged DV preferred 
1.3 Unlogged R2:                0.0253 
Logged Pseudo-R2:       0.0052 
Unlogged DV preferred 
1.4 Unlogged R2:                0.0916 
Logged Pseudo-R2:       0.0306 
Unlogged DV preferred 
2.1 Unlogged R2:                0.0804 
Logged Pseudo-R2:       0.0285 
Unlogged DV preferred 
2.2 Unlogged R2:                0.0195 
Logged Pseudo-R2:       0.0072 
Unlogged DV preferred 
2.3 Dependent variable “Operating Margin” contains 
negative values which cannot be logged. 
2.4 Unlogged R2:                0.0002 
Logged Pseudo-R2:       0.0014 
Logged DV preferred 
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 It is possible that some unobserved factor(s) may be associated with both board 
composition and organizational performance leading to omitted variable bias. For example, a 
powerful chief executive officer (CEO) might exert influence on the board member selection 
process and also be responsible for the health center’s performance through day-to-day 
administration of the center as shown in Figure 7 (Hermalin & Weisbach, 1998). 
 
 
Figure 7. An Example of Omitted Variable Bias 
 
 
  
 This form of endogeneity represents a potentially problematic model specification 
error that can lead to biased estimates at best and completely spurious correlation at worst. 
The direction of bias depends on the direction of the correlation between the omitted variable 
and the dependent variable and the omitted variable and the included right hand side variable. 
However, eliminating as many sources of bias as possible is preferable to interpreting the 
potential magnitude and direction of bias in a post-estimation context. 
 While I do estimate fixed effects models to control for all time-invariant unobserved 
heterogeneity at the FQHC-level and higher (e.g., city, county, state, region, etc.), these 
models do not control unobserved time-varying heterogeneity. In this case, one approach is 
to use an instrumental variable to conduct two-stage least squares (2SLS). The difficulty here 
is identifying a good instrument, which must be both strong and valid. That is, an 
Powerful 
CEO 
Board  
Composition 
Organizational 
Outcomes 
Spurious 
Correlation 
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instrumental variable must be correlated—preferably highly—with the endogenous 
explanatory variable (i.e., be strong) and it must be uncorrelated with the error of the 
structural equation of interest (i.e., the instrument should only be related to the dependent 
variable through its effect on the endogenous variable.) In panel data, identifying a strong 
and valid instrument is even more of a challenge, because the instrument must predict 
variation in the endogenous variable over time. 
The model contains several potentially endogenous explanatory variables. They are: 
the percentage of FQHC patients uninsured, the percentage of descriptive and non-
descriptive consumers on the board, board size, and the presence of one or more physicians 
on the board. The percentage of FQHC patients who are uninsured would typically be 
considered exogenous. However, I spoke with the CEO of one FQHC during model 
development who suggested turning away uninsured patients as a strategy that, though 
unlikely, could conceivably be employed to help the bottom line. The other elements all 
relate specifically to the composition of the board itself and are treated as endogenous 
because board members are identified and selected for service by other board members and 
senior health center staff.  
Therefore, an attempt was made to identify variables in the available data that could 
potentially serve as instruments for each of these endogenous variables. Several potential 
instruments were identified, and their strength was determined in a series of first stage 
regressions of the endogenous variable on the instrument and the other exogenous 
explanatory variables in the model. For instance, an indicator of metropolitan area was 
considered as an instrument for board size, with the thinking that FQHCs in more urban areas 
might have both a greater need for a larger board, as well as more potential board members to 
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choose from. The key results of these regressions, shown in Table 14, indicate that none of 
the variables made for very strong instruments. While some of the potential instruments were 
significant predictors of the endogenous variables according to the results of a series of t-tests, 
the explanatory power of the first stage regressions was considerably lower than ideal. 
 
 
Table 14. Results of First Stage Regressions of Potentially Endogenous Variables 
Endogenous Variable Potential Instruments T-test F-test† R2 
% Patients Uninsured % Uninsured  
in community 
t = 1.66 
p = 0.10 
--- 0.572 
% Descriptive 
Consumers 
Per capita income t = -0.98 
p = 0.33 
F(3, 2196) = 7.9 
p = 0.000 0.112 
Unemployment t = 4.14 
p = 0.00 
% Non-white t = 0.33 
p = 0.74 
% Non-Descriptive 
Consumers 
Per capita income  t = 0.33 
p = 0.74 
F(3, 2196) = 1.7 
p = 0.167 0.230 
Unemployment t = -0.31 
p = 0.76 
% Non-white t = 2.23 
p = 0.03 
Board Size Metro area dummy t = -0.58  
p = 0.56 
--- 0.093 
Physician on board # of physicians in 
community 
t = 6.10 
p = 0.00 
--- 0.117 
† The F-test results for single variables are not shown, as they are equal to the square of the T-test. 
 
 
Despite the usefulness of 2SLS, significant problems can arise from the selection of a 
weak instrument. In fact, sometimes a simple model is best, especially when the alternative is 
a weak instrument (Murray, 2006). Furthermore, it is possible to argue that each of the 
potential instruments may have a direct effect on the dependent variables. For example, 
metropolitan area may be associated with the scope of enabling services provided, because 
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certain services like transportation may be less necessary in urban environments where 
distances are walkable or public transportation is readily available. To the extent that they 
provide care to low-income and/or uninsured persons, the number of physicians in the county 
may have a direct bearing on how much uncompensated care remains for the FQHC to 
provide. In such cases where the instrument is not validly excluded from the main equation 
(i.e., it is directly associated with the main dependent variable), the results obtained will be 
biased (Newhouse & McClellan, 1998).  
While there are tests for exclusion validity, those tests require more than one 
instrumental variable for each endogenous variable in the model. Since this overidentification 
condition is not met, exclusion validity relies solely on theoretical arguments, which are not 
strong in this case. Moreover, the potential instruments are not strong enough to be 
particularly appealing, especially given the problems presented by weak instruments—even 
validly excluded weak instruments. Therefore, I opt against using a 2SLS approach, and use 
fixed effects to control for all of the endogeneity that would otherwise result from time-
invariant unobserved variables at the level of the health center. 
This approach comes at its own cost, however, as omitting any unobserved variables 
whose values change over time and are correlated with the other explanatory variables in the 
model will lead to biased coefficient estimates. For example, some unobserved factor or set 
of factors may explain how board members are selected, making the proportion of descriptive 
and non-descriptive consumers on the board endogenous. To the extent that those factors do 
not vary for the duration of the study period, the fixed effects will adequately control for 
them. For example, if the powerful CEO depicted in Figure 7 held that office in all years of 
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the study, the effect of his or her selection of board members would be controlled for with the 
fixed effects.  
However, if there was a change in CEO during the study period, the fixed effects 
would no longer be sufficient, and the coefficients might be biased. The direction of that bias 
can be inferred from careful consideration of the anticipated association between the omitted 
variable and the included explanatory variable and the association between the omitted 
variable and the dependent variable. The implications of this are discussed in more detail in 
Chapter 7.  
The final models for Aims 1 and 2 are estimated using OLS regression with fixed 
effects at the FQHC level and clustered standard errors at the FQHC level. In addition to t-
tests on individual parameters of interest, a series of F-tests were conducted on constructs of 
interest including poverty level of FQHC patients, insurance status of FQHC patients, and 
other (i.e., non-CHC) BPHC grant type. These results, together with an interpretation of 
marginal effects, are reported in Chapter 4. 
 
Auxiliary Regressions 
While the general models in Aims 1 and 2 suppose that board composition determines 
organizational performance via board function, it is possible as shown in Figure 8, that 
organizational performance may determine board composition (e.g., an FQHC that is 
struggling financially may recruit board members to the board who are skilled in the area of 
finance) (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Davidson III & Rowe, 2004; Hermalin & Weisbach, 
2003). 
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Figure 8. An Example of Intertemporal Endogeneity 
 
 
 
While fixed effects are able to control for a substantial amount of endogeneity in the 
model, the issue of inter-temporal endogeneity depicted in Figure 8 remains a concern, and is 
not addressed by the use of the fixed effects model. Instead, the issue of temporality and the 
direction of possible causation between board composition and organizational outcomes is 
tested using a cross-lagged regression technique (Davidson III & Rowe, 2004; Hermalin & 
Weisbach, 2003; Rogosa, 1980).  
This method works by reversing the econometric model as follows: 
Equation R1 
% Descriptive Consumerit = αo + Outcomesi(t-1)β + Ttλ + µi + εit 
  
Equation R2 
% Non-Descriptive Consumerit = αo + Outcomesi(t-1)β + Ttλ + µi + εit 
 
where i indexes the health center and t = 1,…,T indexes the year between 2003 and 2006. 
The proportions of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers on the board initially used as 
independent variables are now used as dependent variables in two separate regressions. 
Outcomes is a matrix containing the original set of mission and margin outcomes now being 
Time Period 1 
Time Period 2 
Time Period 3 
Board  
Composition 
Board  
Composition 
Board  
Composition 
Organizational 
Performance 
Organizational 
Performance 
Organizational 
Performance 
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used as explanatory variables. T is a matrix of binary year indicator variables, µ is a matrix of 
FQHC-level fixed effects, and ε represents the unobserved time-varying error.  
To estimate a model wherein organizational outcomes predict changes in the 
composition of the board, the key explanatory variables are lagged by one year, as indicated 
by the t-1 subscript. If the coefficients on lagged outcomes are found to be significant, it will 
suggest that organizational performance is a determinant of FQHC board composition. 
However, if these coefficients are not significant, it is safe to conclude that board 
composition is not the result of organizational performance. The set of coefficients on the 
year dummies can be interpreted as the effects of general time trends on board composition.  
These models are estimated using fixed effects with FQHC-level clustered standard 
errors. This specification was selected in both cases based on the results of an F-test that 
indicated that the fixed effects were jointly significant (% Non-Descriptive: F(783, 1350) = 
7.27, p < 0.001; % Descriptive: F(783, 1350) = 5.99, p < 0.001), a White test indicative of 
heteroskedasticity (% Non-Descriptive: Chi2(45) = 69.264, p = 0.012; and % Descriptive: 
Chi2(45) = 96.05, p = 0.00001) and a Wooldridge test indicative of serial correlation (% 
Non-Descriptive: F(1, 273) = 34.085, p < 0.001; % Descriptive: F(1, 273) = 12.929, p = 
0.0004). Additionally, a Wooldridge test for the functional form of the dependent variable 
indicated that both variables should be modeled in logged form (% Non-Descriptive: R2 = 
0.0025, Wooldridge Pseudo-R2 = 0.0033; and % Descriptive: R2 = 0.0000, Wooldridge 
Pseudo-R2 = 0.0001). 
 The results, shown in Table 15, strongly suggest that organizational outcomes in one 
time period do not predict board composition in a subsequent time period one year later. 
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Only one of the eight coefficients estimated on the organizational outcome variables (scope 
of enabling services) was statistically significant. 
  
Table 15. Results of a Reverse Fixed Effects OLS Regression Model 
 Coefficients 
 Log 
(% Non-Descriptive 
Consumers) 
Log 
(% Descriptive 
Consumers) 
Outcomes (Lagged One Year)   
 Scope of Enabling Services -0.00629 0.0806* 
 (0.0231) (0.0367) 
 Volume of Enabling Services 9.38e-05 5.54e-05 
 (0.000124) (0.000117) 
 Enabling FTEs per Capita -0.0294 -0.00802 
 (0.0656) (0.0963) 
 Uncompensated Care Ratio 2.99e-05 0.0286 
 (0.0269) (0.0327) 
 % Costs from Enabling Services 0.00305 -0.00212 
 (0.0103) (0.0148) 
 Avg. Medical Cost per Medical Encounter 0.000958 -0.00247 
 (0.00195) (0.00201) 
 Operating Margin 0.00251 0.000366 
 (0.00248) (0.00341) 
 Financial Self-Sufficiency -0.00112 0.00198 
 (0.00391) (0.00499) 
Year 2003 0.0961 -0.0448 
 (0.0850) (0.111) 
Year 2004 0.146* -0.0201 
 (0.0692) (0.0763) 
Year 2005 0.183** -0.174* 
 (0.0686) (0.0859) 
Constant 3.299*** 2.369*** 
 (0.373) (0.499) 
   
Observations 2145 2145 
Number of Groups 784 784 
R2 0.011 0.015 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
  
  
81 
 According to this result, for each additional enabling service an FQHC offers in year 
one, it will decrease the proportion of descriptive consumers on its governing board by 8.1%. 
It is important to note that this is a relative percentage change and not an absolute percentage 
point change. With the exception of a board that is composed entirely of descriptive 
consumers, when they are equal, the former is a smaller effect than the latter. However, this 
result might be driven by an outlier(s). When the same regressions were run on a limited 
sample in compliance with laws regarding board size and proportion of consumers on the 
board (described in the next section), the statistically significant association disappeared. 
Therefore, it seems reasonable to conclude that organizational performance does not factor 
greatly, if at all, into determining board composition. 
 
Sensitivity Analyses 
 In addition to the eight main models of interest and the two auxiliary models 
estimated to assess the presence of reversely causal relationships between consumer 
governance and organizational outcomes, two sensitivity analyses were conducted. First, 
because the conceptual framework considers the consumer composition of the executive 
committee as a potential moderator of the relationship between board composition and 
organizational outcomes, eight regressions were estimated which were identical to the main 
models of interest with the exception that they omitted all six of the board leadership 
variables (two executive committee composition variables and their corresponding four 
interaction terms). 
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The alternate specification models the four mission-oriented and four margin-oriented 
outcomes as a function of board composition, general time trends, other FQHC-level design 
factors, and several county-level and FQHC-level context factors: 
 
Alternate Model Specification 
Yijt = αo + Consumeri(t-1)β +  Witγ + Ttλ + µi + εit 
 
 The set of beta coefficients gives the relationship between the composition of 
consumers on the board and the organizational outcome being modeled in the absence of any 
controls for executive committee composition. Like the main models, the key explanatory 
board composition variables are lagged by one year, as indicated by the t-1 subscript. 
Comparisons of the adjusted-R-squared values between the main models and these alternate 
models were made to see how much explanatory power the executive committee composition 
variables contributed to the model.  
Second, because not all FQHC governing boards in the data were fully compliant 
with the legal requirements concerning board size and consumer representation, another set 
of regressions was estimated using the original eight main models of interest, but excluding 
these “non-compliant” centers. The purpose of this sensitivity analysis was to assess how 
robust the coefficient estimates were to removing outliers from the sample.  
A total of 186 boards were excluded (46 with fewer than 9 members, 3 with more 
than 25 members, and 137 with a proportion of consumers below 51%). Thus, the sample 
size for this set of regressions was 1,976 FQHC-years representing 791 unique FQHCs. 
Apart from slight expected changes in the coefficients, few meaningful differences were 
detected. Notable changes are summarized along with the rest of the quantitative results in 
Chapter 5.  
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Analyses for Aim 3 
The third aim of the study was to determine the association between a board 
member’s consumer status and their likelihood of (a) serving on the executive committee and 
(b) serving as board chair. Using status generalization theory, I hypothesized that descriptive 
consumer board members would be less likely than other board members to hold any 
executive committee office (defined as chair, vice-chair, secretary, or treasurer) or the board 
chair position. 
 
Data and Measures 
The Aim 3 analyses use available data from Exhibit D of FQHC grant applications for 
the years 2003 through 2006. To receive federal grant funds, primary care organizations must 
demonstrate that they meet all FQHC program requirements by filing a standardized section 
330 grant application. In Exhibit D of these FQHC grant applications, each FQHC provides 
information on its governing board including the total number of governing board members 
and their name, occupation, board tenure, position on the board (e.g., chair), and consumer 
status. These applications are processed and maintained by HRSA, and are publicly available 
through the FOIA request process. However, these records are provided in hard copy. 
The hard copies of these grant applications from 2003 through 2006 were manually 
scanned using a high-speed digital scanner with an automatic feed, which converted the 
paper documents into Adobe PDF files. Because the PDF files were not editable, the data 
was extracted from the files one at a time and converted into Microsoft Excel format using 
the software program Able2Extract (Investintech.com, 2010). Finally, the data was read into 
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Stata (StataCorp, 2007) to create a single electronic dataset, which was subsequently cleaned 
and coded. 
Table 16. Aim 3 Sample by Year 
Year Board Members 
2003 6,117 
2004 3,968 
2005 10,547 
2006 10,536 
Total 31,168 
 
The dataset includes 31,168 board members from 963 FQHCs. Many, but not all, 
health centers are observed in more than one year, resulting in a total of 2,517 FQHC-year 
observations. The number of board members represented in each year is shown in Table 16. 
The variation in the sample from year to year reflects both the growth in the number of 
FQHCs over time and, more importantly, the fact that only 71.4% of the data requested via 
the FOIA process were received as previously discussed. Using these data, I model the 
likelihood of serving on the board’s executive committee and holding board chair as a 
function of board members’ consumer status and tenure, while controlling for time-invariant 
FQHC-level effects as shown in Table 17.  
 
Table 17. Board Member-Level Measures for Aim 3 Analyses 
Key Independent Variable Dependent Variables Control Variables 
Consumer status 
- Non-consumer 
- Descriptive consumer 
- Non-descriptive 
consumer 
Board chair held 
Executive committee office held 
- Chair 
- Vice-chair 
- Secretary 
- Treasurer 
Board member tenure 
FQHC fixed effects 
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 Board member tenure was included as a covariate, because it has previously been 
positively associated with board member influence (Latting, 1983). In addition, the bivariate 
association between tenure and board office was significant as shown in Table 18. For this 
analysis, board member tenure is converted to months. Board members who have been on the 
board less than 1 year, and for whom no specific month value is reported, are given an 
imputed value of 6 months (N = 87). If a board member’s tenure is reported as greater than 
some number of years, they are top-coded to the highest known value (e.g., >1 year = 12 
months, or >10 years = 120 months). In addition, 301 board members with missing data for 
tenure are given an imputed value of 6 months. No meaningful differences were detected 
between a model that omitted observations with missing data for tenure and the model that 
imputed a value of 6 months for observations with missing tenure. 
 
Table 18. Board Member Tenure by Board Office Held 
Board Office Held Mean Tenure (months) 
Chair 92.9 
Vice-Chair 78.2 
Secretary 74.9 
Treasurer 73.5 
Non-Officer 52.0 
 
 
Analytic Methods 
To test the Aim 3 hypotheses, I estimated the following two equations (3.1 and 3.2) 
using Chamberlain’s conditional (fixed effects) logit model. Analyses were conducted at the 
individual board member level with FQHC-year fixed effects. 
 
 
  
86 
Equation 3.1 
Pr(Executive Committee Officerit = 1) = f(Consumer Status, Board Tenure, FQHC-Year Level Fixed Effects) 
 
Equation 3.2 
Pr(Chairit = 1) = f(Consumer Status, Board Tenure, FQHC-Year Level Fixed Effects) 
 
 While fixed effects logistic regression is typically thought of as modeling repeated 
observations of an individual over time, the motivation is slightly different here. The fixed 
effects logistic model using FQHC-year fixed effects is used because the number of positive 
outcomes per board per year is known to be fixed. For example, in these data, which are 
collected at a single point in time, each FQHC board has exactly one chairperson in any 
given year. While there may be a change in the chair during the year, that change will be 
reflected when the next year’s data are reported.  
 By creating a unique identifier for each FQHC in each year and using this as the 
grouping variable (analogous to the individual), only variation between board members 
within each FQHC-year (analogous to repeated observations over time) is used in the 
analysis. In short, only the differences between board members at a given FQHC in a given 
year are used to predict the likelihood of a board member holding a board leadership position 
at that FQHC in that year. Other variables (e.g., board size) that might ordinarily vary over 
time within an FQHC are dropped from the model as there is no variation in these variables 
when the group is defined at the FQHC-year level. However, such factors are still controlled 
for in the model, as they are treated as fixed effects across individual observations. 
An alternate modeling approach using either a bivariate probit or multinomial logit at 
the board member level that failed to group observations by FQHC-year would neglect the 
fact that board members are first selected to join the board and that executive committee 
officers are subsequently elected from among the current members to occupy a fixed number 
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of positions. Instead, such approaches would treat all board members as vying equally for 
some number of board leadership positions. In essence, this would pool all board members 
together and fit a model that maximizes the likelihood of observing whatever the number of 
chairs and other executive committee officers happens to be in the data, without regard for 
how many health centers or how many years of data the observations represent. This 
limitation could be addressed by manually including a series of dummy variables to estimate 
FQHC-year fixed effects, which could then be integrated out to maintain model efficiency, 
but, by not estimating a separate coefficient for each center, Chamberlain’s conditional logit 
streamlines this process. 
 
Specification Tests 
  Before the final models were estimated, I conducted several specification tests. I 
examined the pairwise correlations between variables in the model, which indicated no cases 
of perfect collinearity, and no significant associations between independent variables greater 
than -0.5, which was observed between the descriptive and non-descriptive consumer 
variables as expected. 
 To specify the correct functional form of board member tenure, three competing 
models were estimated for the model predicting the likelihood of holding executive 
committee office and the Akaike Information Criteria (AIC) values from each were 
compared. The first included board member tenure (AIC = 4.590), while the second model 
also included the quadratic form of the variable, tenure squared (AIC = 4.428). The third 
model treated tenure by using splines with knots at intervals that created quintiles containing 
equal numbers of board members in each (AIC = 4.276). The model with the greatest 
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explanatory power, which modeled tenure using splines, was selected. The same analysis was 
repeated to confirm the correct specification for tenure in the model to predict the likelihood 
of serving as board chair. The results were similar (Tenure only: AIC = 11.025; Tenure 
squared: AIC = 10.667; Splines: AIC = 10.279) and tenure is modeled using quintile splines. 
 The results of a White test (Chi2(3, 4.72), p = 0.19) did not find evidence of 
heteroskedasticity in equation 3.2. A similar test could not be conducted on equation 3.1, 
because the data were not 1-k matched (i.e., each group contained four positive outcomes). 
However, there was concern that the model might suffer from serial correlation. Therefore, 
two versions of the model were run, one with clustered standard errors at the FQHC-level 
and one without. Because post-estimation correction of the standard errors in conditional 
logistic regression is controversial and no changes in the statistical significance were 
observed with the use of clustered standard errors, the final model uses unadjusted standard 
errors. 
 A small number of observations (approximately 1%) were missing data on the board 
office variable. Specifically, 30 FQHCs (315 board members) failed to identify their board 
chair and 10 of these 30 (87 board members) also failed to identify any executive committee 
officers. As a result, the value of the dependent variable was zero for all of these observations 
and they were dropped from the analysis. The final estimate of equation 3.1 was based on 
31,081 board members grouped into 2,507 FQHC-years, while the final estimate of equation 
3.2 was based on 30,853 board members grouped into 2,487 FQHC-years.  
 In both cases, after estimating each model, model fit was assessed using a 
specification link test, which provided no evidence of specification error in either model. 
However, this test cannot identify misspecification in the case of omitted variables, and it 
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seems possible that certain individual level factors such as race, gender, and education 
level—for which data are unavailable—may be important omitted variables. To the extent 
that these factors are correlated with both the included right hand side variables and the 
dependent variable of interest, the coefficient estimates will be biased.  
 It is impossible to know for certain the magnitude of any potential bias, but the 
direction of the bias can be reasoned. For instance, the coefficient on descriptive consumer 
status would be biased downward by the omission of years of education, which is likely to be 
negatively correlated with descriptive consumer status, but positively correlated with serving 
as board chair. The same is true of male gender. In the case of non-white race, which is likely 
to be positively associated with descriptive consumer status, but negatively associated with 
serving as board chair, downward (i.e., negative) bias would also be expected. For all of 
these measures, the reverse is true for non-descriptive consumer status, which would then 
suffer from upward (i.e., positive) bias. 
 The magnitude of the bias depends on the strength of the associations between the 
omitted variables and the variables in the model. For instance, because the categorical 
construction of consumer status relies on occupation and income data, it is likely to be highly 
correlated with years of education. However, education tends to explain much of the 
variation in income (Crissey, 2009). Therefore, while the direct effect may be biased, the 
indirect effect is not biased. Another way of saying this is that the occupation and income 
data used to distinguish descriptive and non-descriptive consumers is really a proxy for other 
closely related, but omitted factors. 
 To interpret the magnitude of the effects after estimating each model, it is necessary 
to determine the probability of the outcome conditional on the number of successes per group. 
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This is straightforward for equation 3.2, because there is one and only one chair, and the 
default predicted probability in Stata is conditioned on a single successful outcome.  
For equation 3.1, however, it is necessary to obtain the predicted probability 
conditional on a maximum of four successful outcomes. Doing this is computationally 
complex. An algorithm designed to obtain this probability by calculating all possible 
combinations of board member positions and executive committee positions ran on a 
university server with four processors operating in parallel and was terminated by the server 
after running for one month without calculating a solution. Therefore, in Chapter 4, results 
are reported as odds ratios and marginal effects are discussed in terms of changes in 
predicted probabilities only for the board chair model. The next section discusses the 
qualitative methodology employed in Aim 4 used to provide context for the results of the 
methods described for Aims 1 through 3. 
 
Qualitative Methods for Aim 4 
Qualitative methods are useful both for obtaining information in cases where 
quantitative data is lacking, and for contributing meaning and deeper understanding to 
available quantitative data (Sofaer, 1999). Because of concerns that the available quantitative 
data might prove insufficient for answering the research questions, Aim 4 sought to 
complement the quantitative analysis of Aims 1 through 3 through the use of semi-structured 
interviews.  
Interviews were designed to explore board members’ perceptions of the advantages 
and disadvantages of consumer governance, the degree of influence the board has vis-à-vis 
the executive director on decisionmaking about FQHC service provision and finances, the 
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role of the health center’s mission in decisionmaking, and organizational responses to 
budgetary constraints and adverse conditions. Specifically, the qualitative phase of the study 
helps to address each of the specific aims by supplying additional data on board function that 
may help to explain the relationship between board composition and health center outcomes 
as shown in Figure 9.  
 
Figure 9. Use of Qualitative Interviews to Complement Quantitative Aims 
 
 
 
 
 
Sampling Strategy 
Interviews were conducted with board members from a purposive stratified sample of 
FQHCs in order to reflect a wide variety of viewpoints, ensure that different realities were 
uncovered, and produce more generalizable results. Using quantitative descriptive statistics, 
FQHCs were stratified into one of four categories as described below. Additionally, centers 
were selected to ensure adequate representation by geographic region, rural/urban location, 
and patient load. Geographic strata were based on the 4 U.S. census regions, which each 
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consist of between 9 and 16 states (plus the District of Columbia) per region as shown in 
Table 19. 
 
Table 19. U.S. Census Regions 
Census Region States within Region 
Northeast CT, ME, MA, NH, NJ, NY, PA, RI, VT 
South AL, AR, DE, DC, FL, GA, KY, LA, MD, MS, NC, OK, SC, TN, TX, VA, WV 
Midwest IA, IL, IN, KS, MI, MN, MO, NE, ND, OH, SD, WI  
West AK, AZ, CA, CO, HI, ID, MT, NV, NM, OR, UT, WA, WY 
Source: U.S. Census Bureau. Available at: http://www.census.gov/popest/geographic/  
 
 
 
After constructing the previously described dependent variables for Aims 1 and 2, all 
FQHCs in the UDS meeting previously discussed inclusion criteria for years 2004 – 2007 
(the years of data corresponding to the outcomes of interest in the primary regression models) 
were combined (N = 3,702 FQHC-years). In addition, only centers operating solely with 
CHC grants were retained. Consequently, 393 non-CHC grantees, 471 migrant health center 
grantees, 356 healthcare for the homeless grantees, 141 school-based health center grantees, 
and 60 public housing grantees were dropped from the sample. This was done to eliminate 
any possibility that centers with governance waivers—non-CHC grantees that are not 
required to have consumer-majority boards—would remain in the sample. 
Summary statistics on each of the eight dependent variables (4 mission, 4 margin) 
provided the median values for each. A binary variable was created for each dependent 
variable, which was equal to 1 if the FQHC’s value for that variable was above the median, 
and 0 otherwise, with the exception of two variables. Because a lower average medical cost 
per medical encounter and a lower percentage of costs attributable to enabling services are 
considered indicators of stronger margin orientation, the binary variable created for these two 
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variables was equal to 1 if the FQHC’s value for that variable was below the median, and 0 
otherwise.  
Next, two summary variables (“mission” and “margin”) were created that were equal 
to the sum of each of the 4 binary mission variables and the sum of each of the 4 binary 
margin variables, respectively. In other words, the value of these variables could range from 
0 to 4. Centers with scores of 3 or 4 for these summary mission and margin variables were 
labeled as “High Mission” and “High Margin” respectively, and as “Low Mission” and “Low 
Margin” otherwise. Then, each center-year was classified into one of four cells as shown in 
Table 20. 
 
Table 20. Mission versus Margin Sampling 
  
Mission  
Low High Total 
M
ar
gi
n
 High N = 602 N = 190 792 
Low N = 744 N = 745 1,489 
 Total 1,346 935 2,281 
 
 
 
Recruitment of Interview Participants 
Once all FQHCs were stratified into one of the four cells, random samples were 
generated via a random number generator available at www.random.org. Four centers were 
selected within each cell, and the CEO at selected centers was contacted by email with a 
personalized copy of the invitation letter shown in Appendix A. The letter asked the CEO to 
voluntarily identify up to two board members (one consumer and one non-consumer, if 
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possible) for participation in the study. If a center declined to participate, it was replaced and 
another center was randomly selected and contacted. This process was continued as needed 
within each stratum until a sufficient number of centers willing to participate in the study 
were identified.  
A balance of census regions, urban and rural locations, and large and small centers 
(cutoff of 9,293 users) was sought over time as respondents agreed to participate. Once a 
quota had been filled, a randomly selected center that would exceed the quota was replaced 
and another center was randomly selected. If a selected center had been classified in more 
than one “mission-margin” cell (possible because FQHC-years were sampled), that center 
was not eligible to be contacted and another center was chosen at random. This occurred 
twice. The final sample of 30 board members from 16 FQHC governing boards was not 
perfectly balanced, but does adequately reflect the diversity of FQHC programs across the 
country.  
 
Data Collection 
Once an FQHC had agreed to participate in the study, the board members were 
contacted by email and/or telephone to schedule a mutually convenient time for the 
interviews. Telephone interviews were conducted and digitally recorded, and were kept semi-
structured through the use of an interview guide containing a mixture of open-ended and 
fixed-response questions. A copy of the interview guide is contained in Appendix B.  
The specific questions were formulated based on the literature review and were 
designed to complement the quantitative aims of this study. Early drafts of the interview 
guide were revised to arrange questions in a logical order that would help the interview to 
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flow smoothly. The interview began with relatively straightforward questions to help 
respondents feel more comfortable, proceeded to ask the most challenging questions in the 
middle of the interview, and concluded with demographic information, which would be easy 
for the participants to answer at a time when they might be growing fatigued. In practice, the 
interview guide was closely followed, although the question order was sometimes altered as 
the interview evolved and not all participants were asked all questions. 
At the conclusion of each interview, the digital audio file was uploaded to a secure 
file hosting site and professionally transcribed by Pierce Group Atlanta, LLC. The interviews 
generated approximately 23 hours of recorded audio and 363 pages of transcribed data. Each 
interview participant was sent a copy of their transcript by email along with a $10 gift card to 
Amazon.com and invited to review and approve their transcript. Instructions included in this 
email indicated that participants could provide me with any edits or clarifications that they 
wished. Only 5 of the 30 interview participants responded by providing corrections for 
typographical errors—none of which significantly altered the substantive content of their 
comments.  
 
Data Analysis 
All transcripts were reviewed once for editing and where there was any question 
about the accuracy of the transcripts, the transcript was compared against the original audio 
file to resolve the discrepancy. Transcripts were reviewed a second time for substance, with a 
goal of increasing familiarity with the general content of the interviews and beginning to 
better understand the data. In a third review of the transcripts, a set of start codes was applied 
to the data using Atlas.ti, with additional codes being created as dictated by the data in a 
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quasi-open coding approach. Responses were not aggregated by health center. Rather, each 
individual board member’s responses were considered independently. 
As a validity check, a subsample of 6 randomly selected transcripts (representing 
20% of all interviews) was independently coded by a research assistant who was provided a 
copy of the codebook shown in Appendix C. Discrepancies in coding were resolved by a 
process of discussion until consensus was reached. Additional codes were created as needed, 
some codes were consolidated, and other sections of the transcripts were recoded. Following 
the consensus process, these changes were applied to all transcripts as appropriate. Then, 
using Atlas.ti, the codes were linked to one another in an axial coding process to build a 
conceptual framework for understanding the interview data, which was used to craft a 
storyline memo that formed the outline of the qualitative results which are presented in 
Chapter 6 (Corbin & Strauss, 2008).
 CHAPTER 5 
 
QUANTITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 
 This chapter presents the findings from Aims 1, 2, and 3 of the study. It provides an 
overview of descriptive statistics, presents the results of the multivariate regression models 
that were estimated, and interprets marginal effects of interest. Finally, it addresses each of 
the research questions posed at the end of Chapter 1, and discusses the results of the tests 
used to evaluate each of the hypotheses generated in Chapter 3. 
 The results of the empirical models estimated in Chapter 4 find that the majority of 
consumer board members on federally qualified health center (FQHC) boards are not 
descriptively representative of the typical FQHC patient. They also find that while the 
proportion of consumers on the board does not have a significant effect on the provision of 
mission-oriented services, there is some evidence that agenda setting may be important, as 
the proportion of descriptive consumers on the executive committee is associated with the 
increased provision of mission-oriented services. However, a greater proportion of 
descriptive consumers on the board is associated with poorer financial performance as 
measured by operating margin. Finally, the results confirm that descriptively representative 
consumer board members are less likely than other board members to hold a position on the 
executive committee or serve as board chair.  
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Descriptive Statistics 
 Before presenting the results in the context of each specific research question, it is 
important to examine the descriptive statistics for the study sample. Because the exclusion 
criteria used to limit the sample for Aims 1 and 2 were not used for Aim 3 and the datasets 
were constructed at different levels, there are two sets of descriptive statistics.  
 The descriptive statistics for the sample used for Aims 1 and 2 appear in Table 21. 
During the study period, an average health center with a staff of just over 100 employees 
working at one of six delivery sites saw almost 16,000 patients and nearly 62,000 encounters 
annually. Of these, 70% were either uninsured or enrolled in Medicaid, almost half (48%) 
had asthma, diabetes, or hypertension and nearly half (49%) had incomes below poverty. 
 These data are broken out by year to reveal the stability of the variables and identify 
any readily apparent trends over time. From these data, it appears that there may be a slight 
decrease in the scope and volume of enabling services being provided by health centers over 
the study period. It also appears that health center grant funding is not keeping pace with the 
amount of uncompensated care FQHCs are providing, as evidenced by the increase in the 
uncompensated care ratio from 2003 to 2006. The nearly $16 increase in the average medical 
cost per medical encounter from 2003 to 2006 is likely reflective of medical inflation, rather 
than any change in the efficiency of health centers, although this cannot be confirmed from 
the data. There is almost no change in either the average operating margin, which is just 
slightly negative, or financial self-sufficiency, which hovers just above 50%, over the study 
period. 
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Table 21. Sample Specific Mean Descriptive Statistics for Select Variables 
Variable 2003 2004 2005 2006 Overall 
Scope of Enabling Services 8.29 7.85 8.23 8.18 8.17 
Volume of Enabling Services 270.25 208.95 254.30 239.16 245.83 
Enabling FTEs per capita 0.68 0.61 0.66 0.63 0.64 
Uncompensated Care Ratio 0.93 1.09 1.11 1.12 1.08 
% of Costs from Enabling Services 7.36 7.43 7.50 7.29 7.39 
Average Medical Cost per Medical 
Encounter 
106.82 119.22 117.95 122.40 117.70 
Operating Margin (%) -3.96 -4.93 -4.43 -4.58 -4.47 
Financial Self-Sufficiency (%) 53.55 51.98 53.79 54.59 53.78 
Delivery Sites per FQHC 5.89 4.79 5.77 5.98 5.73 
Unique Patients 16,707 12,590 16,258 16,214 15,837 
Unique Encounters 65,234 49,150 63,472 63,487 61,894 
Total FTEs 106.42 80.27 103.88 105.74 101.85 
Total FQHC Grantees in County 6.72 6.85 8.25 8.81 7.99 
Board Size 12.60 12.40 12.57 12.36 12.48 
% Descriptive Consumers on Board 27.77 27.46 26.66 25.42 26.53 
% Non-Descriptive Consumers on 
Board 
40.80 40.98 42.73 43.94 42.58 
% of Boards with at least one 
Physician 
33.50 30.30 32.59 30.48 31.71 
Descriptive Consumers on  
Executive. Committee 
0.74 0.75 0.74 0.74 0.74 
Non-Descriptive Consumers on  
Executive Committee  
1.73 1.75 1.80 1.86 1.80 
% of Patients < 100% FPL 49.10 49.24 49.02 47.67 48.59 
% of Patients 101 – 150% FPL 12.22 11.16 11.54 11.87 11.73 
% of Patients 151 – 200% FPL 5.34 5.59 5.53 5.54 5.51 
% of Patients > 201% FPL 9.21 8.03 7.24 6.61 7.47 
% of Patients FPL Unknown 24.13 25.98 26.66 28.31 26.70 
% of Patients, Male 40.72 40.20 40.64 40.40 40.51 
% of Patients, Non-White 54.58 55.06 56.00 55.40 55.42 
% of Patients, Uninsured 37.84 38.21 39.16 39.09 38.77 
% of Patients, Medicaid 31.64 33.71 31.85 31.31 31.87 
% of Patients, Medicare 8.81 8.83 9.03 9.17 9.01 
% of Patients, Other Public 
Insurance 
2.20 1.69 1.80 1.75 1.84 
% of Patients, Private Insurance 19.52 17.57 18.17 18.68 18.51 
% of Patients, Chronic Illness 45.32 48.05 48.92 48.55 48.04 
Observations (N) 397 297 767 784 2245  
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 The descriptive statistics for the Aim 3 sample are shown in Table 22. It is worth 
noting that despite the legal requirement that FQHC boards have between 9 and 25 members, 
not all boards are compliant with the law. While the typical board has 13 members, some 
boards, it turns out, have as few as 5 members (barely enough to form an executive 
committee), while others have as many as 29 members. The same is true of the proportion of 
consumers on the board. While the law stipulates that at least 51% of the board must be 
consumers, approximately 6.5% of FQHCs in the sample were not in compliance with the 
requirement. 
 
 
Table 22. Descriptive Statistics of FQHC Board Members in Aim 3 
Mean Board Size (# members) 13.2  
Median Board Size (# members) 13 
Range Board Size (# members) 5 – 29 
Hold Board Office 29.2% 
Hold Board Chair 8.0% 
Mean Board Tenure (months) 60.3  
Median Board Tenure (months) 36 
Boards with > 1 Physician 33.7% 
Board with > 1 Descriptive Consumer on Exec. 
Cmte. 
51.6% 
Board with > 1 Non-Descriptive Consumer on 
Exec. Cmte. 
81.1% 
Expertise  
 Business / Management 24.8% 
 Consumer 17.4% 
 Other White Collar 11.2% 
 Other Blue Collar 9.8% 
 Education   9.7% 
 Other Health Care  9.3% 
 Government  5.6% 
 Social Work  4.3% 
 Law  4.3% 
 Physician  3.3% 
 N = 31,168 board members   
(963 Unique FQHCs) 
   (2,517 FQHC-Years) 
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 The average tenure for a board member is just over 5 years, however this average is 
pulled upward by a small number of board members who have served for more than 20 or 
even 30 years. Most board members have not served such lengthy terms, as the median board 
tenure of 3 years indicates. 
 Board members are drawn from a variety of backgrounds, but the majority of board 
members have experience in business and/or management, which likely serves them well in 
overseeing the governance of an organization. Board members also come from other 
professional backgrounds, including education, law, and health care. In fact, one-in-three 
FQHC governing boards have at least one physician member. Finally, while more than 17% 
of board members identified their expertise as “consumer,” it is important to note that this 
response is ambiguous and not necessarily synonymous with that board member being a 
consumer at the FQHC. While the latter may be true, in the board data many individuals self-
identified as non-consumers, but listed “consumer”—rather than their own occupation—as 
their area of expertise, possibly to signify that their knowledge of the community’s needs is 
the basis for their service on the board. 
   
The Magnitude of Descriptive Representation 
The first research question sought to identify the level of descriptive representation 
present on FQHC governing boards with regards to socioeconomic status. The average health 
center board had between 12 and 13 members. Using the four years of board composition 
data to classify respondents into one of three categories revealed that 30.9% of board 
members were non-consumers, while 69.1% were consumers. However, slightly more than 
60% of self-reported consumers also self-identified occupations or areas of expertise that 
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placed them in a socioeconomic class that is considerably higher than that of the typical 
health center patient. As a result, 42.6% of board members are classified as non-descriptive 
consumers, while only 26.5% of board members are classified as descriptive consumers. 
Together, non-consumers, non-descriptive consumers, and descriptive consumers represent 
the total population of health center board members. The distribution of health centers by the 
proportion of descriptive consumers on the board is shown in Figure 10, while the 
distribution of health centers by the proportion of non-descriptive consumers is shown in 
Figure 11. 
 
Figure 10. Distribution of Health Center Boards by  
Proportion of Descriptive Consumer Members 
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Figure 11. Distribution of Health Center Boards by  
Proportion of Non-Descriptive Consumer Members 
 
 
 
A look at the data shows not only that descriptive consumers are in the minority on 
most FQHC boards, but  also suggests that the consumer board member population is slowly 
becoming less descriptive over time, as seen in Figure 12. 
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The Relationship between Consumer Governance and Mission-Oriented Outcomes 
 The second research question sought to understand if a greater proportion of 
descriptive consumers on the board was positively associated with a health center providing 
more mission-oriented services. Hypothesis 1.1 predicted that the percentage of board 
members who are descriptive consumers would be positively associated with the scope and 
volume of enabling services provided by FQHCs, the per capita number of full-time 
equivalent enabling staff (FTEs), and the ratio of uncompensated health care spending to 
federal grant funding.  
 Hypothesis 1.2 predicted that there would be no relationship between any of the 
mission-oriented outcomes and the proportion of non-descriptive consumers on the board. 
While the proportion of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers on the board were not 
significant predictors of the amount of mission-oriented services provided, some aspects of 
board composition, as well as certain other county and FQHC factors were significant. 
 
Scope of Enabling Services 
 The results of the model to predict the scope of enabling services appear in Table 23. 
While the coefficient on the proportion of descriptive consumers on the board is not 
statistically significant, the results of a Wald test (Chi2(3) = 8.17, p = 0.0426) indicate that 
the construct of descriptive consumer board composition, which also includes interactions 
with executive committee composition, is significantly associated with the scope of enabling 
services provided. However, at the mean, the magnitude of the marginal effect (-0.00068) is 
trivial. Similarly, while the proportion of non-descriptive consumers on the board is not 
statistically significant, the results of a Wald test (Chi2(3) = 9.27, p = 0.0259) indicate that 
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the construct of non-descriptive consumer board composition is also significantly associated 
with the scope of enabling services provided. Again, at the mean, the magnitude of the 
marginal effect (-0.00059) is trivial.    
 
 
Table 23. Results of a Fixed Effect Poisson Model to Predict Scope of Enabling Services 
 Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition (Lagged One Year)  
 % Descriptive Consumers -0.000980 
 (0.000890) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers -0.000167 
 (0.000756) 
 Board Size 0.000722 
 (0.00138) 
 Physician on Board -0.0104 
 (0.0135) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 0.0522* 
 (0.0225) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -0.00400 
 (0.0192) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.000459 
(0.000403) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.000353 
(0.000343) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.000726* 
(0.000330) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
5.88e-05 
(0.000269) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs 0.000495 
 (0.000276) 
 Physicians as % of Staff -0.00181 
 (0.00298) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee 0.0881* 
 (0.0393) 
 Homeless Grantee 0.0371 
 (0.0271) 
 Public Housing Grantee 0.0200 
 (0.0332) 
 School-Based Grantee 0.250 
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 (0.239) 
 # Delivery Sites -0.00321 
 (0.00215) 
FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters -4.72e-07 
 (4.27e-07) 
 Metro Area 0.311 
 (0.254) 
 Geographic Region (Northeast Omitted)  
 South -1.928 
 (1.269) 
 Midwest 0.228 
 (0.302) 
 West -0.397 
 (0.267) 
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 -0.000626 
 (0.00205) 
 % Age 5 – 18 0.00164 
 (0.00156) 
 % Age > 65 -0.000782 
 (0.00375) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male 0.00108 
 (0.00222) 
 % Non-White 0.000888 
 (0.000520) 
 % with Chronic Illness -0.000479 
 (0.000369) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL -8.75e-05 
 (0.000354) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL -0.00111 
 (0.000646) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL -0.000294 
 (0.000911) 
 % with Income > 201% FPL 0.000646 
 (0.000618) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured 0.00111 
 (0.00105) 
 % Medicaid 0.000265 
 (0.00113) 
 % Medicare 0.000391 
 (0.00298) 
 % Other Public Insurance -0.000418 
 (0.00276) 
County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals -0.00816 
 (0.00813) 
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 Physicians  
per capita 
-0.00301 
 (0.0272) 
 # FQHCs -0.00187 
 (0.00128) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male 0.000484 
 (0.0122) 
 % Non-White -0.00135 
 (0.00644) 
 % Hispanic -0.00816 
 (0.00889) 
 Per Capita Income -2.11e-06 
 (1.32e-06) 
 % Uninsured 0.0730 
 (0.0636) 
 % Unemployed 0.0127** 
 (0.00430) 
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
 Year 2005 0.0173 
 (0.0101) 
 Year 2006 0.0306* 
 (0.0120) 
 Year 2007 0.0446** 
 (0.0151) 
Constant 0.924 
 (1.249) 
Fixed-Effects  N = 819 
Pseudo-R2 0.1218 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 The significance of the constructs seems driven by the number of descriptive 
consumers on the board’s executive committee, which is positively associated with the scope 
of enabling services. Because this is a non-linear model, the marginal effect depends on both 
the variable and the cross-derivative of its interaction with the proportions of descriptive and 
non-descriptive consumers on the board. 
 Calculating such interaction effects in non-linear models can be challenging and 
difficult to interpret (Ai & Norton, 2003). Therefore, I opted to generate differences in 
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average predicted values to obtain incremental effects for changes in the descriptive 
consumer composition of the executive committee. I first conducted a Wald test to determine 
if the coefficients on these three terms were different from zero. Consistent with hypotheses 
3.1a and 3.1b, the results (Chi2(3) = 9.85, p = 0.0199) confirmed that the three terms were 
jointly significant. Conversely, and contrary to hypotheses 3.2a and 3.2b, the Wald test for 
the number of non-descriptive consumers on the executive committee indicates that they are 
not jointly significant (Chi2(3) = 3.35, p = 0.3405). 
 A change from no descriptive consumers on the executive committee to one 
descriptive consumer on the executive committee increased the predicted scope of enabling 
services by 0.42 additional types of services offered. As more descriptive consumers sat on 
the executive committee, this incremental effect increased slightly, such that a change from 
three descriptive consumers on the executive committee to the maximum of four descriptive 
consumers on the executive committee was associated with an increase of 0.49 in the 
predicted number of enabling services a center offers. In the extreme case, a health center 
with an executive committee composed entirely of descriptive consumers provides 1.4 
additional types of enabling services compared to a health center with no descriptive 
consumers on its executive committee. 
 Using the average of the probabilities method, the incremental and marginal effects of 
other significant variables in the model on the scope of enabling services are calculated. 
Compared to health centers that receive solely community health center (CHC) grant funding, 
health centers that receive funding through the migrant health center program (whether or not 
they receive additional funding from other sources) provide an average of 0.77 additional 
types of enabling services. The unemployment rate in the county where the health center is 
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located is also associated with the scope of enabling services. Specifically, each one 
percentage point increase in the unemployment rate is associated with a health center 
providing 0.1 additional types of enabling services. Therefore, a ten percentage point 
increase in county unemployment translates into a health center offering one additional type 
of enabling service. 
 General time trends indicate that FQHCs are providing an increasing scope of 
enabling services over time, although the effect is slight. From 2004 to 2007, for example, 
the scope of enabling services increased by 0.39 additional services. At this rate, the average 
FQHC would add an additional enabling service every 8 years. 
 In the sensitivity analysis that omits the executive committee leadership variables and 
their interactions, no significant changes in the coefficients were detected. In the sensitivity 
analysis run on the limited sample of fully compliant FQHCs, the coefficient on Year 2006 
was no longer significant although the magnitude of the effect decreased only slightly from 
0.031 to 0.022. Meanwhile, the proportion of non-white patients changed sign and became 
significant, going from -0.0014 to 0.0013. No other changes in significance were detected. 
 
Volume of Enabling Services 
 The results of the model to predict the volume of enabling services appear in Table 24. 
Contrary to hypothesis 1.1, but consistent with hypothesis 1.2, the results of two F-tests 
indicate that neither the proportion of descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 1.57, p = 0.196) nor 
the proportion of non-descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 2.09, p = 0.101) on the board is 
significantly associated with the volume of enabling services provided. The t-tests on the 
individual coefficients are also insignificant. 
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 Furthermore, while the coefficient for the number of descriptive consumers on the 
board’s executive committee is statistically significant (t = 2.36, p = 0.019), the full construct, 
which includes interaction terms, is not jointly significant (F(3, 818) = 2.03, p = 0.108). 
Because the marginal effect of the number of descriptive consumers partially depends on 
both the proportion of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers on the board, and because 
the proportion of descriptive consumers cannot equal zero if there is at least one descriptive 
consumer on the executive committee, it does not make sense to interpret the lone significant 
coefficient independently. 
   
 
Table 24. Results of a Fixed Effect OLS Model to Predict Volume of Enabling Services  
 
Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition (Lagged One Year)  
 % Descriptive Consumers 1.791 
 (1.265) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers 1.410 
 (1.123) 
 Board Size 0.282 
 (2.034) 
 Physician on Board -2.373 
 (11.87) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 98.27* 
 (41.64) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 25.97 
 (20.98) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-1.366 
(0.719) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.721 
(0.463) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-1.525* 
(0.669) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.347 
(0.334) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs -2.204*** 
  
111 
 (0.476) 
 Physicians as % of Staff -13.77** 
 (4.186) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee -20.27 
 (29.97) 
 Homeless Grantee 23.68 
 (33.35) 
 Public Housing Grantee -245.6 
 (170.9) 
 # Delivery Sites 6.000 
 (6.811) 
 # Delivery Sites2 -0.247 
 (0.160) 
FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters 0.00569*** 
 (0.00133) 
 Metro Area 104.3 
 (147.6) 
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 0.291 
 (2.711) 
 % Age 5 – 18 -5.532* 
 (2.602) 
 % Age > 65 -0.302 
 (5.273) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male 1.098 
 (2.746) 
 % Non-White 0.197 
 (0.543) 
 % with Chronic Illness 0.586 
 (0.466) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL 0.470 
 (0.417) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL 1.293 
 (1.512) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL 0.370 
 (1.046) 
 % with Income > 201% FPL -0.403 
 (0.486) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured 2.080 
 (1.293) 
 % Medicaid 1.226 
 (1.388) 
 % Medicare 3.100 
 (3.721) 
 % Other Public Insurance -0.944 
 (2.257) 
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County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals 49.16** 
 (16.63) 
 Physicians per capita -64.20 
 (47.08) 
 # FQHCs -4.912 
 (2.787) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male 2.539 
 (12.22) 
 % Non-White 6.093 
 (7.610) 
 % Hispanic -16.99 
 (14.55) 
 Per Capita Income 0.00567 
 (0.00619) 
 % Uninsured 4.513 
 (34.96) 
 % Unemployed 8.558 
 (6.285) 
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
 Year 2005 -34.62 
 (19.39) 
 Year 2006 -30.63 
 (24.30) 
 Year 2007 -28.03 
 (27.47) 
Constant -608.7 
 (755.3) 
Fixed-Effects  N = 819 
R2 0.129 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
Several of the control variables in the model are significant. The total number of 
encounters, the proportion of patients ages 5 to 18, the size of the FQHC staff, the proportion 
of the staff who are physicians, and the number of short term general hospitals in the area 
were all significant predictors of the volume of enabling services per 1,000 patient 
encounters. Specifically, each 1,000 additional encounters an FQHC has in a given year is 
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associated with an increase of 5.7 additional enabling service encounters provided. 
Conversely, each 1 percentage point increase in the proportion of patients ages 5 to 18 is 
associated with a decrease of 5.5 enabling service encounters provided. 
Health centers with a larger staff and health centers where more of the staff are 
physicians tend to provide a lower volume of enabling services per 1,000 encounters. Each 
additional FTE staff person is associated with a decrease of 2.2 enabling service encounters, 
while each percentage point increase in the proportion of staff who are physicians is 
associated with a decrease of 13.8 enabling service encounters. Finally, each additional short-
term general hospital operating in the county where the FQHC is located is associated with 
the FQHC providing 49.2 more enabling services per 1,000 encounters per year. No other 
variables in the model were statistically significant. 
 
Enabling FTEs per Capita 
 The results of the model to predict per capita enabling staff appear in Table 25. 
Contrary to hypothesis 1.1, but consistent with hypothesis 1.2, the results of two F-tests 
indicate that neither the proportion of descriptive (F(3, 818) = 0.73, p = 0.535) nor the 
proportion of non-descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 1.62, p = 0.184) on the board is 
significantly associated with the number of full-time equivalent enabling service staff per 
capita. In addition, the composition of the executive committee does not have a significant 
direct effect on per capita enabling FTEs. The composition of descriptive consumers on the 
executive committee does appear, however, to significantly diminish the effect that the 
proportion of non-descriptive consumers has on per capita enabling staff (t = -1.98, p = 
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0.048), but again, the construct of the proportion of non-descriptive consumers is not jointly 
significant as described above. 
 
Table 25. Results of a Fixed Effect OLS Model to Predict Enabling FTEs per Capita 
 Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition (Lagged One Year)  
 % Descriptive Consumers 0.00176 
 (0.00195) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers 0.00168 
 (0.00145) 
 Board Size 0.00255 
 (0.00327) 
 Physician on Board -0.0331 
 (0.0222) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 0.0873 
 (0.0690) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 0.0325 
 (0.0365) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.000660 
(0.00124) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.00119 
(0.000871) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.00198* 
(0.00100) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.000689 
(0.000510) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs 0.00353*** 
 (0.000752) 
 Physicians as % of Staff -0.0128* 
 (0.00635) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee 0.0573 
 (0.0718) 
 Homeless Grantee 0.163 
 (0.137) 
 Public Housing Grantee -1.422 
 (1.130) 
 # Delivery Sites -0.000455 
 (0.00594) 
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FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters -5.32e-06*** 
 (1.42e-06) 
 Metro Area 0.583 
 (0.332) 
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 -0.00541 
 (0.00588) 
 % Age 5 – 18 -0.00795 
 (0.00490) 
 % Age > 65 -0.0101 
 (0.00820) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male -0.00411 
 (0.00386) 
 % Non-White -0.000990 
 (0.000893) 
 % with Chronic Illness 0.00214* 
 (0.000835) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL 0.000713 
 (0.000750) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL -0.000380 
 (0.00301) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL 0.00641 
 (0.00938) 
 % with Income > 201% FPL -0.000686 
 (0.00265) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured 0.000625 
 (0.00195) 
 % Medicaid 0.00121 
 (0.00204) 
 % Medicare 0.0105* 
 (0.00511) 
 % Other Public Insurance 0.00419 
 (0.00361) 
County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals -0.0322 
 (0.0291) 
 Physicians per capita -0.0826 
 (0.0582) 
 # FQHCs -0.0196* 
 (0.00881) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male -0.0969** 
 (0.0326) 
 % Non-White 0.00432 
 (0.0141) 
 % Hispanic -0.00301 
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 (0.0216) 
 Per Capita Income 2.85e-07 
 (6.55e-06) 
 % Uninsured 0.0309 
 (0.0557) 
 % Unemployed 0.0106 
 (0.00905) 
  
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
 Year 2005 0.00598 
 (0.0256) 
 Year 2006 -0.0124 
 (0.0285) 
 Year 2007 -0.00300 
 (0.0314) 
Constant 5.196** 
 (1.625) 
Fixed-Effects  819 
R2 0.158 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 Several other variables were statistically significant, but practically small. For 
example, an increase in annual patient encounters of 100,000 translates into only an 0.53 
increase in the number of enabling FTEs per 1,000 patients, which is likely to be relevant for 
only the largest of health centers with extremely high patient volume. Similarly, for each 100 
additional FTE staff persons an FQHC hires, there is, on average, an increase of 0.35 
additional enabling service FTEs.  
 Additional small effects are seen for the proportion of patients with chronic illness 
and the proportion of patients with Medicare as well as the proportion of the staff comprised 
of physicians. A health center where all of the patients have a chronic illness is likely to 
employ only 0.2 additional enabling FTEs compared to a health center where none of the 
patients have a chronic illness. A ten percentage point increase in the proportion of patients 
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with Medicare is associated with an increase of only 0.1 additional enabling staff per capita, 
although this effect got slightly smaller (0.09) and became insignificant in the sample of 
fully-compliant health centers.  
 A ten percentage point increase in the proportion of the staff comprised of physicians 
is associated with a decrease of 0.13 enabling staff per capita, although this effect decreased 
and became insignificant in the sample of fully-compliant health centers. Each additional 
FQHC operating in the county is also associated with a slight decrease of 0.02 full-time 
equivalent enabling staff persons. A more substantial effect is observed for FQHCs with a 
greater proportion of male patients. A ten percentage point increase in the proportion of male 
patients is associated with 1 fewer full-time enabling service employee.  
 
Uncompensated Care Ratio 
 The results of the model to predict the uncompensated care ratio appear in Table 26. 
An uncompensated care ratio of 1 indicates that an FQHC provides an amount of 
uncompensated care exactly equal to the amount of its federal grant award. It follows that a 
ratio below 1 is indicative of an FQHC using some portion of its federal grant for purposes 
other than providing uncompensated care, while a ratio greater than 1 indicates that an FQHC 
provides more uncompensated care than its federal grant can cover. With respect to the 
notion of mission and margin, an FQHC with an uncompensated care ratio of 1 can be 
considered “balanced” while a ratio below 1 can be considered margin oriented and a ratio 
above 1 can be considered mission oriented. 
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Table 26. Results of a Fixed Effect OLS Model to Predict Uncompensated Care Ratio 
 Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition (Lagged One Year)  
 % Descriptive Consumers 0.00228 
 (0.00346) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers -0.00358 
 (0.00360) 
 Board Size -0.00324 
 (0.0100) 
 Physician on Board 0.0394 
 (0.0483) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -0.172 
 (0.124) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -0.0177 
 (0.0811) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.00167 
(0.00166) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.000995 
(0.00146) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.00234 
(0.00173) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.00151 
(0.00125) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs -0.00180 
 (0.00139) 
 Physicians as % of Staff 0.00149 
 (0.0109) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee -0.135 
 (0.101) 
 Homeless Grantee -0.0599 
 (0.0790) 
 Public Housing Grantee -0.744** 
 (0.245) 
 # Delivery Sites -0.0117 
 (0.00769) 
FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters 7.71e-06** 
 (2.47e-06) 
 Metro Area 0.153 
 (0.292) 
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 -0.00434 
 (0.00766) 
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 % Age 5 – 18 0.00518 
 (0.00595) 
 % Age > 65 -0.0241* 
 (0.0117) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male -0.00875 
 (0.00902) 
 % Non-White -0.000521 
 (0.00197) 
 % with Chronic Illness -0.00163 
 (0.00135) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL 0.000547 
 (0.00108) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL 0.000503 
 (0.00235) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL -0.00280 
 (0.00253) 
 % with Income > 201% FPL 0.000180 
 (0.00141) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured 0.0125*** 
 (0.00357) 
 % Medicaid 0.000736 
 (0.00359) 
 % Medicare 0.00561 
 (0.00876) 
 % Other Public Insurance -0.0143 
 (0.00910) 
County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals -0.00243 
 (0.0360) 
 Physicians per capita 0.0223 
 (0.0860) 
 # FQHCs -0.0129 
 (0.0112) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male 0.00402 
 (0.0330) 
 % Non-White 0.0188 
 (0.0150) 
 % Hispanic 0.0267 
 (0.0269) 
 Per Capita Income -6.33e-06 
 (5.28e-06) 
 % Uninsured -0.0523 
 (0.0610) 
 % Unemployed 0.00719 
 (0.0180) 
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
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 Year 2005 -0.00178 
 (0.0395) 
 Year 2006 0.0528 
 (0.0317) 
 Year 2007 0.0997* 
 (0.0395) 
Constant 0.996 
 (1.855) 
Fixed-Effects  819 
R2 0.074 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 Contrary to hypothesis 1.1, but consistent with hypothesis 1.2, the results of two F-
tests indicate that neither the proportion of descriptive (F(3, 818) = 0.85, p = 0.466) nor the 
proportion of non-descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 0.74, p = 0.527) on the board is 
significantly associated with the amount of uncompensated care a health center provides. 
However, the construct for the number of non-descriptive consumers on the executive 
committee is jointly significant (F(3, 818) = 2.90, p = 0.0343).  
 Contrary to hypotheses 3.2a and 3.2b, at mean values of descriptive and non-
descriptive representation, each additional non-descriptive consumer on the executive 
committee is associated with an 0.02 unit increase in the uncompensated care ratio. For the 
average health center, this represents a 1.9% increase. 
 In addition, a few significant control variables were identified, which suggest that the 
growth in the amount of uncompensated care FQHCs are providing is outpacing the growth 
in the amount of their federal grants, that FQHCs with higher volume provide relatively more 
uncompensated care, and of course, that FQHCs that see a greater proportion of uninsured 
patients are providing more uncompensated care. Conversely, health centers with a greater 
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proportion of patients age 65 or older and health centers that receive a public housing health 
center grant tend to provide relatively less uncompensated care. 
 Specifically, from 2004 to 2007, the average health center’s uncompensated care ratio 
increased by 0.1 units. For a health center that provided an amount of uncompensated care 
equal to the amount of its federal grant in 2004, this is the equivalent of a health center 
providing 10% more uncompensated care in 2007 than in 2004, holding its grant funding 
constant. For health centers that were already providing more uncompensated care relative to 
their grant funds in 2004, the effect in percentage terms is smaller, while for health centers 
that provided less uncompensated care relative to their grant funds in 2004, the effect in 
percentage terms is greater. 
 FQHCs that receive a grant from the health care for residents of public housing 
program have an uncompensated care ratio 0.74 units lower than that of CHC-only grantees. 
Relative to a break-even point of 1, this is a large effect. The total number of annual 
encounters is positively associated with the uncompensated care ratio. Each additional 
100,000 annual encounters is associated with an 0.77 unit increase in the uncompensated care 
ratio. While such an increase in patient encounters is likely only relevant for the largest 
health centers, again, relative to a break-even point of 1, this is a large effect. 
 The proportion of FQHC patients who are age 65 or older is negatively associated 
with the uncompensated care ratio. Each 10 percentage point increase in this age group is 
associated with an 0.24 unit decrease in the uncompensated care ratio. While the coefficient 
on Medicare was not statistically significant, the coefficient on the proportion of patients age 
65 and above most likely reflects the universal coverage provided to all U.S. citizens through 
the Medicare program, especially considering that the proportion of patients uninsured is 
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positively associated with the uncompensated care ratio. Each 10 percentage point increase in 
the proportion of patients without insurance is associated with an 0.13 unit increase in the 
uncompensated care ratio. However, in both sensitivity analyses, the coefficient on the 
proportion of patients age 65 and above was no longer significant. 
 
The Relationship between Consumer Governance and Margin-Oriented Outcomes 
The third research question sought to understand if a greater proportion of descriptive 
consumers on the board was negatively associated with a health center’s financial 
performance. Hypothesis 2.1 predicted that the percentage of board members who are 
descriptive consumers would be positively associated with the percentage of costs 
attributable to enabling services and the average cost per medical encounter, but negatively 
associated with operating margin and self-sufficiency.  
Hypothesis 2.2 predicted that there would be no relationship between any of the 
margin-oriented outcomes and the proportion of non-descriptive consumers on the board. A 
number of board composition variables, including in one case the proportion of descriptive 
consumers on the board, were significant predictors of health center financial performance. 
Other factors at both the county and FQHC level were also significant. 
 
Percentage of Costs Attributable to Enabling Services 
 The results of the model to predict the percentage of costs attributable to enabling 
services appear in Table 27. The percentage of costs attributable to enabling services is a 
reflection of how many relative financial resources an FQHC devotes to providing enabling 
services. While a higher percentage of costs may be indicative of an FQHC providing more 
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enabling services, it may also be the result of an FQHC having lower costs in other areas. 
Likewise, an FQHC with a low percentage of costs attributable to enabling services may 
provide a significant volume of enabling services, while providing an even greater amount of 
clinical care, which lowers the percentage without any change in the absolute amount 
provided.  
 
Table 27. Results of a Fixed Effect OLS Model to Predict the Percent of Costs 
Attributable to Enabling Services  
 Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition (Lagged One Year)  
 % Descriptive Consumers 0.0107 
 (0.0217) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers 0.0272 
 (0.0204) 
 Board Size 0.0232 
 (0.0388) 
 Physician on Board -0.677* 
 (0.281) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -0.216 
 (0.831) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 0.307 
 (0.428) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.0129 
(0.0176) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.0157 
(0.00909) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.0101 
(0.0101) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.00519 
(0.00649) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs 0.00250 
 (0.00577) 
 Physicians as % of Staff -0.122* 
 (0.0486) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee -0.386 
 (0.684) 
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 Homeless Grantee 0.794 
 (0.707) 
 Public Housing Grantee -0.938 
 (1.065) 
 # Delivery Sites 0.0232 
 (0.0508) 
FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters -1.93e-05* 
 (9.61e-06) 
 Metro Area -4.544 
 (2.798) 
  
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 0.0484 
 (0.0405) 
 % Age 5 – 18 0.0374 
 (0.0603) 
 % Age > 65 0.0578 
 (0.0657) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male 0.00466 
 (0.0371) 
 % Non-White 0.00115 
 (0.00723) 
 % with Chronic Illness 0.00541 
 (0.00847) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL -0.00588 
 (0.00646) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL 0.00717 
 (0.0180) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL 0.0138 
 (0.0264) 
 % with Income > 201% FPL 0.00206 
 (0.00865) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured 0.0259 
 (0.0233) 
 % Medicaid 0.0215 
 (0.0194) 
 % Medicare 0.00484 
 (0.0509) 
 % Other Public Insurance 0.0333 
 (0.0273) 
County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals 0.0192 
 (0.221) 
 Physicians per capita 0.242 
 (0.577) 
 # FQHCs -0.00973 
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 (0.0370) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male -0.325 
 (0.275) 
 % Non-White 0.143 
 (0.0878) 
 % Hispanic 0.295 
 (0.262) 
 Per Capita Income 7.36e-05 
 (4.42e-05) 
 % Uninsured -0.120 
 (0.612) 
 % Unemployed 0.0445 
 (0.0820) 
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
 Year 2005 -0.0529 
 (0.252) 
 Year 2006 -0.467 
 (0.247) 
 Year 2007 -0.684* 
 (0.296) 
Constant 15.34 
 (17.22) 
Fixed-Effects  819 
R2 0.072 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 Contrary to hypothesis 2.1, but consistent with hypothesis 2.2, the results of two F-
tests indicate that neither the proportion of descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 1.20, p = 
0.309) nor the proportion of non-descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 0.77, p = 0.509) on the 
board is significantly associated with the percentage of a health center’s total costs 
attributable to enabling services. In fact, only one of the board composition variables, an 
indicator of whether a physician served on the board, was significantly associated with the 
percentage of costs attributable to enabling services. An FQHC with at least one physician on 
the board spends 0.68 percentage points less of their total costs on enabling services 
compared to FQHCs without a physician on the board. At the mean, this is the equivalent of 
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spending $58,584 less on enabling services, although the range in the data was quite broad, 
going from a low of $3,956 to a high of approximately $1 million. 
 A similar effect was seen regarding the proportion of FQHC staff who are physicians. 
Each additional percentage point increase in this variable is associated with an 0.12 
percentage point decrease in the percentage of costs attributable to enabling services. 
Together, having relatively more physicians on the staff and at least one physician on the 
board has a cumulative effect of reducing the percentage of costs attributable to enabling 
services. It is unclear whether this is the result of physicians emphasizing clinical care, de-
emphasizing enabling services, or both. 
 While not statistically significant in the main regression, the coefficient on the 
variable indicating whether a health center was located in a metro area became significant in 
the sensitivity analysis limited to the sample of fully-compliant FQHCs. Specifically, in that 
analysis, the percentage of costs attributable to enabling services is 4.7 percentage points 
lower for FQHCs in metro areas than in non-metro areas, which may reflect that certain 
enabling services, like transportation, are provided less often in densely populated urban 
areas with available means of public transportation or where walking to the health center is a 
viable option. 
 Some of the costs associated with providing enabling services appear to be somewhat 
fixed costs, which can be spread over a larger number of patients as caseload increases. This 
might explain why each additional 10,000 annual patient encounters is associated with an 0.2 
percentage point decrease in the percent of costs attributable to enabling services. The 
practical impact of this effect in large health centers is considerable, as 100,000 additional 
patient encounters translates into a 2 percentage point decrease in the amount of total costs 
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spent on enabling services. Given that the mean of this variable is just under 7.5%, a 2-
percentage point drop would represent a 26.7% decrease. However, in both of the sensitivity 
analysis conducted, the coefficient on total encounters was no longer significant. 
 The general time trend suggests that enabling services are occupying a smaller part of 
the budget over time, decreasing by nearly 0.7 percentage points from 2004 to 2007. While 
this reflects a relative decline in the amount of financial resources being allocated to the 
provision of enabling services, it is unclear from these data alone, whether that reflects a 
relative decline in the amount of enabling services provided, an absolute decline in the cost 
of providing enabling services, a relative increase in the amount of other services provided, 
or an absolute increase in the cost of other services a health center provides. Of course, it 
may also be a combination of some or all of those things. In the sensitivity analysis limited to 
the fully-compliant sample, the coefficient on this variable decreased to 0.52 and was no 
longer statistically significant. No other variables were statistically significant. 
 
Average Medical Cost per Medical Encounter 
 The results of the model to predict the average medical cost per medical encounter 
appear in Table 28. The average medical cost per medical encounter is a measure of health 
center efficiency. First, it should be noted that the general time trend indicates a significant 
increase in this variable over time. The $8.98 increase from 2004 to 2007 most likely 
represents general inflation and the rising cost of health care, though it may also indicate that 
some FQHCs have grown less efficient over time. 
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Table 28. Results of a Fixed Effect OLS Model to Predict Average Medical Cost per 
Medical Encounter 
 Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition (Lagged One Year)  
 % Descriptive Consumers 0.0589 
 (0.113) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers 0.00968 
 (0.0873) 
 Board Size 1.694 
 (0.962) 
 Board Size2 -0.0445 
 (0.0325) 
 Physician on Board 2.655* 
 (1.219) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 8.794 
 (4.527) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -1.774 
 (2.362) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.194* 
(0.0943) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.0432 
(0.0507) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.0845 
(0.0514) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.0169 
(0.0316) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs 0.435*** 
 (0.0477) 
 Physicians as % of Staff 0.231 
 (0.393) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee -1.027 
 (4.624) 
 Homeless Grantee -8.408* 
 (3.673) 
 Public Housing Grantee 14.53 
 (12.20) 
 # Delivery Sites 0.0909 
 (0.300) 
FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters -0.000716*** 
 (7.62e-05) 
 Metro Area 16.69 
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 (16.20) 
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 -0.0668 
 (0.284) 
 % Age 5 – 18 -0.461 
 (0.241) 
 % Age > 65 -0.943 
 (0.540) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male 0.202 
 (0.248) 
 % Non-White -0.116 
 (0.0733) 
 % with Chronic Illness -0.0601 
 (0.0599) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL -0.00146 
 (0.0440) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL -0.0699 
 (0.125) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL -0.0394 
 (0.157) 
 % with Income > 201% FPL 0.0501 
 (0.0730) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured -0.125 
 (0.146) 
 % Medicaid 0.208 
 (0.141) 
 % Medicare 1.038* 
 (0.512) 
 % Other Public Insurance 0.0544 
 (0.192) 
County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals 4.217** 
 (1.494) 
 Physicians per capita -1.933 
 (3.060) 
 # FQHCs -0.473** 
 (0.173) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male -2.578 
 (1.844) 
 % Non-White -0.769 
 (0.682) 
 % Hispanic 0.275 
 (1.271) 
 Per Capita Income 0.000903*** 
 (0.000226) 
 % Uninsured -0.201 
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 (2.881) 
 % Unemployed 0.0409 
 (0.581) 
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
 Year 2005 0.951 
 (1.412) 
 Year 2006 4.083** 
 (1.264) 
 Year 2007 8.979*** 
 (1.716) 
Constant 188.1 
 (97.45) 
Fixed-Effects  819 
R2 0.291 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
 Contrary to hypothesis 2.1, but consistent with hypothesis 2.2., the results of two F-
tests indicate that neither the proportion of descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 1.44, p = 
0.231) nor the proportion of non-descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 1.15, p = 0.327) on the 
board is significantly associated with a health center’s average medical cost per medical 
encounter. Furthermore, while the interaction between the proportion of descriptive 
consumers on the board and the number of descriptive consumers on the executive 
committee is statistically significant, the full construct of executive committee composition is 
not significant for either descriptive (F(3, 818) = 1.43, p = 0.233) or non-descriptive 
consumers (F(3, 818) = 0.25, p = 0.862). 
 Larger FQHCs face a tradeoff with regards to efficiency, although bigger tends, 
overall, to be better. On the one hand, hiring more staff drives costs up as each additional 
FTE is associated with a $0.44 increase in the average cost of medical care per medical 
encounter. On the other hand, having more annual encounters appears to invite economies of 
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scale, which make the FQHC more efficient. Each additional 10,000 annual encounters is 
associated with a $7.16 decrease in the average cost of a medical encounter. 
 FQHCs also appear to compete with each other, or perhaps to share resources, 
resulting in lower costs. Each additional FQHC operating in the community is associated 
with a $0.47 decrease in the average cost of a medical encounter. The same is not true of 
hospitals. Each additional hospital operating in the community is associated with a $4.22 
increase in the cost of a medical encounter. In the fully-compliant sample, the health center 
effect declined to $0.32 and was no longer significant. 
 Other factors that increase the average cost of care include the per capita income level 
in the community and whether or not a physician sits on the FQHC board. The former is 
associated with an $0.90 increase for every $1,000 increase in per capita income, while the 
latter is associated with a $2.66 increase. In the sensitivity analysis excluding executive 
committee variables and interactions, the coefficient on the physician dummy variable was 
no longer significant, but the coefficient on board size became significant and suggested that 
each additional board member was associated with a $2.01 increase in the average medical 
cost per medical encounter. 
 Older and/or disabled patients also appear to be more expensive, as each percentage 
point increase in the population of patients with Medicare is associated with an increase of 
$1.04 in the average medical cost per medical encounter. In the sensitivity analysis excluding 
executive committee composition variables, this Medicare effect decreased by one cent to 
$1.03 and was no longer significant, indicating that it was only marginally significant to 
begin with. 
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Operating Margin 
 The results of the model to predict operating margin appear in Table 29. Operating 
margin is a measure of organizational profitability, where a value of zero indicates that the 
health center’s costs equal its revenues, while positive values indicate that revenues exceed 
costs and negative values indicate that costs exceed revenues.  
 As hypothesized, the proportion of descriptive consumers on the board is negatively 
associated with health center operating margin, while there is no significant relationship 
between the proportion of non-descriptive consumers and operating margin. Specifically, for 
a health center with no consumers—either descriptive or non-descriptive—on the executive 
committee, each ten percentage point increase in the proportion of descriptive consumers on 
the board is associated with a 1.7 percentage point decrease in operating margin. 
 
 
Table 29. Results of a Fixed Effect OLS Model to Predict Operating Margin 
 Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition (Lagged One Year)  
 % Descriptive Consumers -0.169* 
 (0.0765) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers -0.0253 
 (0.0662) 
 Board Size -0.0353 
 (0.158) 
 Physician on Board 2.151 
 (1.272) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -1.780 
 (2.190) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -2.023 
 (1.776) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.0637 
(0.0366) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.0725* 
(0.0322) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  0.00958 
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(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) (0.0319) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.0184 
(0.0248) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs -0.0884*** 
 (0.0240) 
 Physicians as % of Staff 0.0772 
 (0.295) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee 0.928 
 (4.688) 
 Homeless Grantee 0.628 
 (1.626) 
 Public Housing Grantee 8.373** 
 (3.010) 
 # Delivery Sites 0.0822 
 (0.182) 
FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters 5.72e-05 
 (4.71e-05) 
 Metro Area 4.952 
 (12.18) 
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 -0.188 
 (0.228) 
 % Age 5 – 18 0.0270 
 (0.172) 
 % Age > 65 0.504 
 (0.392) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male -0.108 
 (0.250) 
 % Non-White 0.0946* 
 (0.0482) 
 % with Chronic Illness -0.0798 
 (0.0407) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL -0.0505 
 (0.0329) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL 0.0411 
 (0.0753) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL -0.0126 
 (0.118) 
 % with Income > 201% FPL 0.0969 
 (0.0684) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured -0.0260 
 (0.120) 
 % Medicaid 0.142 
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 (0.154) 
 % Medicare 0.173 
 (0.307) 
 % Other Public Insurance 0.220 
 (0.283) 
County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals 1.140 
 (0.928) 
 Physicians per capita -1.488 
 (2.143) 
 # FQHCs 0.0829 
 (0.148) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male -2.193 
 (1.188) 
 % Non-White 0.507 
 (0.545) 
 % Hispanic 1.746 
 (0.900) 
 Per Capita Income -3.53e-05 
 (0.000247) 
 % Uninsured 2.457 
 (2.641) 
 % Unemployed 0.415 
 (0.403) 
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
 Year 2005 -1.672 
 (1.208) 
 Year 2006 -0.905 
 (1.266) 
 Year 2007 -0.151 
 (1.456) 
Constant 25.91 
 (67.69) 
Fixed-Effects  819 
R2 0.052 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
  
 
 
 Given an average operating margin of approximately -4%, this is a very sizable effect, 
which could possibly make the difference between a health center earning a small profit, 
breaking even, or operating a deficit. What is more, in the sample limited to fully-compliant 
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centers, the magnitude of this effect increased, such that a ten percentage point increase in 
the proportion of descriptive consumers is associated with a 2.6 percentage point decrease in 
operating margin. When executive committee composition was omitted from the model, 
however, the coefficient no longer remained significant. 
 The effect of the proportion of descriptive consumers on the board is not so 
straightforward, however, if there are also consumers on the executive committee. 
Specifically, the effect of the proportion of descriptive consumers on the board on operating 
margin depends on the number of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers on the 
executive committee. However, the results of an F-test indicate that for boards with at least 
one consumer—either descriptive or non-descriptive—on the executive committee, the effect 
of the proportion of descriptive consumers on operating margin is no longer significant (F(3, 
818) = 1.90, p = 0.128). 
 In addition to these board composition variables, three other variables were 
significant predictors of operating margin. These were the size of health center staff, whether 
a health center received public housing grant funds, and the proportion of non-white patients. 
In particular, each 10 additional FTE staff persons hired was associated with an 0.88 
percentage point decrease in operating margin. This likely reflects the increased cost of 
hiring additional staff. Operating margin was 8.4 percentage points higher among health 
centers that received public housing grant funds as compared to health centers that received 
only CHC grant funds. It is not clear from these data whether this reflects an increase in 
revenue or a decrease in costs.  
 Lastly, each 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of non-white patients was 
associated with a 0.95 percentage point increase in operating margin. In a sensitivity analysis 
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excluding executive committee variables, the coefficient on the proportion of non-white 
patients decreased slightly to 0.089 and was no longer significant, while the coefficient on 
the proportion of the county population that is Hispanic became significant. This coefficient 
had a value of 1.89, indicating that for each 10 percentage point increase in the proportion of 
the county’s Hispanic population, the health center’s operating margin increases by nearly 19 
percentage points. 
 
Financial Self-Sufficiency 
 The results of the model to predict financial self-sufficiency appear in Table 30. 
Before presenting the results, it is important to keep in mind that financial self-sufficiency 
was modeled in logged form, so the interpretation of these results is slightly different. Unit 
changes in the explanatory variables are interpreted as percentage changes in the dependent 
variable. While the relationship is linear, the percentage interpretation results in different 
absolute values at different points in the distribution of the variable. 
 
 
Table 30. Results of a Fixed Effect OLS Model to Predict Financial Self-Sufficiency  
 Coefficient 
FQHC-Level Design Factors  
 Board Composition  
 % Descriptive Consumers -0.00228 
 (0.00121) 
 % Non-Descriptive Consumers -0.000117 
 (0.00100) 
 Board Size -0.00319 
 (0.00231) 
 Physician on Board 0.00722 
 (0.0169) 
 # Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. 0.0208 
 (0.0291) 
 # Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte. -0.0364 
 (0.0241) 
 (% Descript. Consumers) x 0.000653 
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(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) (0.000519) 
  
 (% Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.00118* 
(0.000470) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
-0.000587 
(0.000417) 
  
 (% Non-Descript. Consumers) x  
(# Non-Descript. Consumers on Exec. Cmte.) 
0.000261 
(0.000346) 
  
 FQHC Staffing  
 Total FTEs -0.00168*** 
 (0.000394) 
 Physicians as % of Staff 0.00215 
 (0.00382) 
 Funding Source  
 Migrant Grantee 0.0771 
 (0.0504) 
 Homeless Grantee -0.000516 
 (0.0277) 
 Public Housing Grantee 0.117* 
 (0.0502) 
 # Delivery Sites 0.000531 
 (0.00263) 
FQHC-Level Context Factors  
 # Annual Patient Encounters 3.15e-06*** 
 (7.31e-07) 
 Metro Area 0.313* 
 (0.126) 
 Patients by Age (19 – 64 Omitted)  
 % Age < 5 0.00259 
 (0.00305) 
 % Age 5 – 18 0.00225 
 (0.00323) 
 % Age > 65 0.0117* 
 (0.00510) 
 Patients by Other Characteristics  
 % Male 0.00163 
 (0.00295) 
 % Non-White 0.00109 
 (0.000652) 
 % with Chronic Illness -0.000414 
 (0.000512) 
 Patients by Poverty Status (% Unknown Omitted)  
 % with Income < 100% FPL 4.51e-05 
 (0.000478) 
 % with Income 101 – 150% FPL 0.000186 
 (0.00116) 
 % with Income 151 – 200% FPL 0.00159 
 (0.00149) 
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 % with Income > 201% FPL 0.00128 
 (0.000669) 
 Patients by Insurance Status (% Private Omitted)  
 % Uninsured -0.00238 
 (0.00158) 
 % Medicaid 0.00426* 
 (0.00199) 
 % Medicare -6.06e-05 
 (0.00351) 
 % Other Public Insurance 0.00478 
 (0.00303) 
County-Level Context Factors  
 Health Care Supply  
 # Hospitals 0.0108 
 (0.0129) 
 Physicians per capita 0.0418 
 (0.0439) 
 # FQHCs 0.00172 
 (0.00216) 
 Population Characteristics  
 % Male -0.00326 
 (0.0158) 
 % Non-White 0.000245 
 (0.00637) 
 % Hispanic 0.0301* 
 (0.0132) 
 Per Capita Income 1.12e-06 
 (3.96e-06) 
 % Uninsured 0.117*** 
 (0.0293) 
 % Unemployed -0.00126 
 (0.00602) 
 Time Trends (Year 2004 Omitted)  
 Year 2005 -0.0453** 
 (0.0164) 
 Year 2006 -0.00526 
 (0.0191) 
 Year 2007 -0.00721 
 (0.0216) 
Constant 1.170 
 (0.960) 
Fixed-Effects  819 
R2 0.124 
Observations 2230 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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 Contrary to hypothesis 2.1, but consistent with hypothesis 2.2, the results of two F-
tests indicate that neither the proportion of descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 2.22, p = 
0.084)  nor the proportion of non-descriptive consumers (F(3, 818) = 1.70, p = 0.165) on the 
board is significantly associated with health center financial self-sufficiency. The interaction 
between the proportion of descriptive consumers on the board and the number of non-
descriptive consumers on the executive committee is significant (t = 2.51, p = 0.012), but the 
full construct including this interaction was not jointly significant (F(3, 818) = 2.51, p = 
0.058). However, the results of an F-test on the construct of descriptive consumers on the 
executive committee (F(3, 818) = 5.77, p = 0.0007) indicates that for an average board with 
26.5% descriptive and 42.6% non-descriptive consumers, each additional descriptive 
consumer on the executive committee is associated with a 1.3% increase in self-sufficiency. 
 The strongest explanatory factors are related to community and FQHC-level context 
factors. Specifically, FQHCs in a metro area have 31.3% greater self-sufficiency than those 
in non-metro areas. Each percentage point increase in the proportion of the county’s Hispanic 
population is associated with a 3% increase in self-sufficiency. Each percentage point 
increase in the proportion of uninsured in the population is associated with an 11.7% increase 
in self-sufficiency.  Each additional 10,000 patient encounters is associated with a 3.2% 
increase in self-sufficiency. FQHCs that receive a health care for residents of public housing 
grant are 11.7% more self-sufficient than CHC-only grantees.  
 The proportion of patients age 65 and up and the proportion of patients with Medicaid 
coverage are both positively associated with financial self-sufficiency. Each additional 
percentage point increase in the patient population age 65 and up is associated with a 1.2% 
increase in self-sufficiency. Each additional percentage point increase in the patient 
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population with Medicaid coverage is associated with an 0.4% increase in self-sufficiency. 
More staff also meant less self-sufficiency. Each 10 additional full-time staff hired was 
associated with a 1.7% decrease in self-sufficiency. 
 Compared to 2004, health center self-sufficiency decreased by 4.5% in 2005. This 
trend did not continue into 2006 and 2007, indicating a one-year shock, which might be 
related to the small sample size of 2004 board data, which—because of the one-year lag—are 
modeled with the 2005 data. 
  
The Moderating Role of Executive Committee Leadership 
The fourth research question sought to understand whether the composition of the 
board’s executive committee moderated the relationship between board composition and 
health center outcomes. This potential moderating effect was assessed by including a series 
of interaction terms in the regressions for models 1.1 through 1.4 and 2.1 through 2.4.  
 The interaction terms have the effect of estimating four different slopes that can be 
interpreted as the difference, by executive committee consumer composition, in the effect of 
the proportion of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers on health center outcomes. 
Individual t-tests on the coefficients of these interaction terms find that 6 out of 32 of them 
are statistically significant as shown in the results tables from all eight primary regressions. 
 Notably consistent with hypothesis 3.1b, for 3 of the 4 mission-oriented variables, the 
interaction between the proportion of non-descriptive consumers on the board and the 
number of descriptive consumers on the executive committee was significant and negative, 
suggesting a conflicting dynamic wherein descriptive consumers on the executive committee 
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are able, through agenda setting, to moderate the effect of non-descriptive consumers on the 
board and increase the provision of mission-oriented services.  
 Similarly, consistent with hypothesis 3.2a, for 2 of the 4 margin-oriented variables, 
the interaction between the proportion of descriptive consumers on the board and the number 
of non-descriptive consumers on the executive committee was significant and positive, 
suggesting that while descriptive consumers may otherwise negatively affect health center 
operating margin and financial self-sufficiency, non-descriptive consumers on the executive 
committee are able to provide the necessary financial competence to help the board make 
more appropriate decisions, from which the heath center is able to benefit.  
 Finally, consistent with hypothesis 3.1a, for the model on average medical cost per 
medical encounter, the interaction term between the proportion of descriptive consumers and 
the number of descriptive consumers on the executive committee is significant and negative. 
This suggests that descriptive consumers strive to keep the cost of a visit to the health center 
low, and are able to achieve this when they have the backing of the executive committee. 
While the interaction terms included in the model were mostly insignificant, they were still 
helpful in explaining variation in the dependent variables, as shown in Table 31. 
 
Table 31. Explanatory Power Contributed by Board Leadership Variables 
Model R-Squared Without 
Board Leadership Variables 
R-Squared With 
Board Leadership Variables 
2.1 Not calculated for Poisson Model 
2.2 0.118 0.129 
2.3 0.147 0.158 
2.4 0.064 0.074 
3.1 0.040 0.072 
3.2 0.273 0.291 
3.3 0.047 0.052 
3.4 0.112 0.124 
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The Relationship between Consumer Governance and Executive Committee Leadership 
The fifth research question sought to predict the likelihood of an individual board 
member holding an office on the executive committee (chair, vice-chair, secretary, or 
treasurer) and the likelihood of an individual board member holding the specific office of 
board chair based on their consumer status. Hypothesis 4.1 predicted that descriptive 
consumer board members would be less likely than other board members to hold any 
executive committee office, while Hypothesis 4.2 predicted that descriptive consumer board 
members would be less likely than other board members to hold the board chair position. The 
results from two fixed effects logistic regressions are shown in Tables 32 and 33. Significant 
Wald tests are indicated by asterisks on the corresponding odds ratios. 
  
 
Table 32. Results of Chamberlain’s Conditional Logit Model to Predict Holding 
Executive Committee Office 
 Odds Ratios 
 Pr(Executive Committee Officer = 1 | X) 
Non-Descriptive Consumer 1.097** 
 (0.0371) 
Descriptive Consumer 0.580*** 
 (0.0223) 
Tenure 1 (1 – 12 months) 1.196*** 
 (0.0186) 
Tenure 2 (12 – 24 months) 1.078*** 
 (0.00559) 
Tenure 3 (24 – 48 months) 1.036*** 
 (0.00232) 
Tenure 4 (48 – 96 months) 1.007*** 
 (0.00110) 
Tenure 5 (96 – 420 months 1.002*** 
 (0.000398) 
Pseudo-R2 0.1284 
Observations 31081 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
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Table 33. Results of Chamberlain’s Conditional Logit Model to Predict Serving as 
Board Chair 
 Odds Ratios 
 Pr(Chair = 1 | X) 
Non-Descriptive Consumer 1.187** 
 (0.0646) 
Descriptive Consumer 0.552*** 
 (0.0370) 
Tenure 1 (1 – 12 months) 1.216*** 
 (0.0515) 
Tenure 2 (12 – 24 months) 1.094*** 
 (0.0133) 
Tenure 3 (24 – 48 months) 1.054*** 
 (0.00435) 
Tenure 4 (48 – 96 months) 1.010*** 
 (0.00171) 
Tenure 5 (96 – 420 months 1.003*** 
 (0.000543) 
Pseudo-R2 0.1422 
Observations 30853 
Clustered standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.001, ** p<0.01, * p<0.05 
 
 
 
As hypothesized, descriptive consumer board members are less likely than non-
consumer board members both to hold a position on the executive committee (OR = 0.58) 
and even less likely to hold the position of board chair (OR = 0.55). Based on the results of a 
Wald test, they are even less likely to hold either position when compared to non-descriptive 
consumers (Chair: Chi2(1) = 147.99, p < 0.0001; Any Executive Committee Position: Chi2(1) 
= 299.48, p < 0.0001). Conversely, while no directional hypothesis was made, non-
descriptive consumer board members are more likely than non-consumer board members to 
hold a position on the executive committee (OR = 1.1) and even more likely to hold the 
position of board chair (OR = 1.19). 
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In terms of predicted probabilities, using the average of the probabilities method, non-
consumers have an 8.9% chance of being chair, non-descriptive consumers have a 10.3% 
chance of being chair, and descriptive consumers have a 5.2% chance of being chair, which 
is roughly one-half the probability of their non-descriptive counterparts. For context, on the 
average 13-member board a given individual’s  probability of being chair by chance alone is 
7.7% (1 out of 13).  
For all board members, tenure was positively associated with the likelihood of 
holding office. However, the marginal effect of tenure decreased at successively higher levels 
of tenure. For instance, for board members who have served on the board for less than one 
year, each additional month of tenure is associated with nearly a 22% increase in the odds of 
being chair. For board members who have served at least one year, but less than two years, 
each additional month of tenure is associated with a 9.4% increase in the odds of being board 
chair. Between two and four years of board service, each additional month of tenure is 
associated with a 5.4% increase in the odds of being board chair. Then, between four and 
eight years of board service, the marginal effect of each additional month of tenure has 
diminished to a 1% increase in the odds of being board chair. After a board member has 
served for more than eight years, each additional month spent on the board increases the odds 
of serving as board chair by just 0.3%. The effects of tenure were similar, but not quite as 
large, in the model predicting holding any executive committee office. 
The sixth and final research question was more general. It sought to understand how 
health center governing boards function, and how their function might explain the 
relationship between board composition and health center outcomes. This research question 
was addressed using qualitative interviews, the results of which are presented in Chapter 6.
 CHAPTER 6 
 
QUALITATIVE RESULTS 
 
 
The qualitative portion of this study was conducted to explore the themes of mission, 
margin, and consumer governance from the perspective of the federally qualified health 
center (FQHC) board member, gain an understanding of board function in practice, and 
provide meaningful context for understanding the results of the quantitative portion of the 
study. While the quantitative results in Chapter 5 are able to partially explain board 
composition and its association with organizational outcomes, interviews with health center 
board members revealed much about board function that explains the relationship between 
board composition and organizational outcomes.  
 
Description of Interview Participants 
Telephone interviews were conducted with a total of 30 FQHC board members from 
14 different states representing each of the four geographic U.S. Census regions. Board 
members from health centers in Alaska, California, Florida, Illinois, Kentucky, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New York, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Virginia, and 
Wisconsin participated in the interviews.  
The sample consisted of 12 men and 18 women ranging in age from 28 to 75, with a 
mean age of 56 years. The majority of respondents were white (N = 16) or black (N = 12), 
although 1 Asian and 1 Hispanic individual also participated. The participants were highly 
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educated, with 29 of the 30 having at least some college education. In particular, 12 
respondents had college degrees, 5 possessed a master’s degree, and 6 had earned a doctorate 
(either a Ph.D. or J.D.). Of the 7 remaining respondents, 6 had attended some college without 
earning a degree, and 1 was a high school graduate.  
 
Figure 13. Interview Respondents by Household Income Level 
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The respondents possessed a range of FQHC board experience, with tenures ranging 
from 3 months to 21 years, with a mean of 6.5 years. Six of the respondents were board chair, 
three were vice chair, seven were secretary, one was treasurer, and the remaining thirteen did 
not hold office.   
The respondents were predominantly (80%) patients of the health center (N = 24). 
However, two of these patients also indicated that they did not consider the health center to 
be their usual source of care, and three additional patients identified themselves solely as 
users of dental services. In essence, 19 board members (63%) were consumers who 
considered the health center to be their usual source of primary care, while 11 board 
members (37%) were either not consumers or consumers who used the health center 
infrequently or for ancillary services only. Of the 24 respondents who indicated that they 
N = 30 
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were consumers, the length of time for which they had been a consumer ranged from 1 to 30 
years, with a mean of 9.7 years. Comparing individual respondents’ consumer tenure to their 
board tenure revealed that 6 of the 24 (25%) joined the board prior to becoming consumers.  
Using information on respondents’ income, education, occupation, and consumer 
status, interview participants were labeled as descriptive consumers, non-descriptive 
consumers, and non-consumers in order to parallel the quantitative analysis. Interview 
participants commented extensively about themselves, the boards on which they serve, and 
the FQHCs they govern. Several important themes emerged and are described here along 
with excerpts from the interviews that allow the data to speak for themselves. All excerpts 
are provided as block quotes, with the interviewer’s remarks shown in bold. 
 
Navigating the Mission-Margin Tension 
Nearly all respondents spoke about how their health center responds to a variety of 
circumstances and navigates the tension between mission and margin. They described a 
process that involves the actions of the governing board, staff, and even patients.  
An exclusive focus on the mission, while ignoring the finances, would quickly run the 
health center into the ground. On the other hand, a health center that focuses on finances to 
the exclusion of its mission is likely to come under scrutiny from the Health Resources and 
Services Administration (HRSA) for failure to provide care without regard for ability to pay 
and may lose its funding. While a more balanced approach is likely to avoid such extreme 
outcomes, there were a few examples given of both “mission-dominant” and “margin-
dominant” approaches. For example, several board members reported that there are services 
that their health center provides even though they lose money on them, because providing the 
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service is consistent with their mission. According to two non-descriptive consumers from 
two different health centers: 
“Has the board ever judged an effort to be successful even if it lost money? 
Yes, we have done several things; we’ve done the mammogram, which is one 
thing that comes to mind, that’s what we’ve been discussing recently.  There’s 
a lot of cancer in this particular area. We have been successful in getting a 
new digital mammography machine, and so we’ve been doing outreach and 
letting people know that we are going to do mammograms for a minimal fee.  
They were $25, which is a loss, but it’s worth it to get these patients in to take 
it.  The very first one we did had cancer, so we felt like that was 
worthwhile....Flu shots are another thing. This year we had to take a loss in flu 
shots, but its better in the long run to do these things as a service to the 
public.” 
 
“Have they ever done something in order to be successful but they lost money?  
I think I probably would say yes but put a caveat with that.  Yes, but to ensure 
that the mission of the center was carried out….” 
 
In these examples, the health center’s mission was prioritized above the 
organization’s finances, but that does not necessarily mean that the organization as a whole 
favors mission over margin. It may be that these costly efforts can be offset with revenues 
from other areas. Still, some respondents indicated that their board considered the financial 
aspect to be integral in making decisions. Said one non-descriptive consumer from a health 
center in rural Florida: 
“I don’t think we have ever approved anything knowing it was going to lose 
money to start with.  I don’t recall any incidents like that, that we would ever 
approve anything that was going to put us in the red from the beginning.” 
 
A similar view was expressed by a descriptive consumer from the same health center: 
“Has there ever been anything that’s been done and you know you’re 
losing money on it, but you think “Hey, it’s a successful thing anyway?” 
Not yet. 
Usually the bottom line has to kind of be there? 
Yes.” 
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The majority of the time, however, board members indicated a more balanced 
approach to navigating the mission-margin tension and discussed how this principle was at 
work in a number of areas including revenue collection strategies, decisions about if and 
when to expand the health center, and responses to adverse conditions. According to two 
non-descriptive consumers, one from a Chicago health center and another from a health 
center in rural Maine: 
“[W]e’re serving a population of people that don’t have a lot of money.  We 
have to be very, very frugal and we have to pay a lot of attention to our 
bottom line because we don’t have huge profit margins.  We’re not going to 
have a million dollars in reserve or something.  We know that this is a 
proposition where you’re not making any money…We’re not in the business 
to make money. We’re in the business to provide services and provide 
ministry…We’re not necessarily going to cut a program because it isn’t 
making any money…I think what we try to do is we try to look at the bottom 
line and we try to look at the mission.” 
 
“Oh yeah, I mean we aren’t in the business to make money so-to-speak, we’re 
in the business to provide the best patient care that we can, but we have to 
remain financially stable or we would be unable to accomplish our mission.  
We don’t look to make money on each and every segment of the services that 
we provide.” 
 
While FQHCs do receive federal and other grant funding to offset some of the costs 
of providing uncompensated care, they also depend heavily on third-party payments from 
Medicaid, Medicare, and private insurers. Amounts from self-paying patients also contribute 
a small, but non-negligible, amount to most health centers’ bottom lines. As the respondents 
described, while health centers are non-profit entities, they must remain financially viable to 
continue pursuing their service mission. Consequently, it is important that health centers 
make an effort to collect as much of their billed charges as possible.  
Various attempts to maximize revenue collection through billing and collections 
practices are permitted under the Bureau of Primary Health Care’s (BPHC) program 
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expectations for FQHCs, so long as they do not conflict with the health center’s mission to 
serve all without regard for their ability to pay. However, the point at which attempts to 
collect payment from individuals who are unable to pay actually does conflict with the 
mission is not made explicit (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a). 
When asked about the strategies employed by their health center to maximize revenue 
collection, board members described a range of practices including: making requests for 
payment “up front” before services are delivered, operating an in-house billing department to 
monitor outstanding balances and negotiate payments with patients, referring patients with 
overdue balances to an outside collection agency, analyzing “no-shows” to make more 
efficient use of the physicians’ time, and focusing on maximizing Medicaid reimbursement. 
In more extreme cases, board members reported that their health center will actually “fire” 
patients by refusing to provide care to individuals who have the ability to pay but simply 
choose not to do so. 
Although payment is often requested at the time of service, and in some cases, 
patients are offered discounts to encourage up-front payment, most board members indicated 
that their FQHC maintained a billing department that sends out invoices to patients. When 
patients fail to pay their bills, despite the best efforts of the health center’s billing department, 
their debts may or may not be sent to an external agency for collections. As one non-
consumer from a health center in Chicago reported: 
“We put them on the sliding scale depending on their income and then 
obviously send those bills out, but if they’re not paid we don’t send them out 
to an outside collection agency.  We send them [a] bill out [every] 30, 60, 90 
days and then at that point we typically…have an account for bad debts and 
we’ll just write those off once it gets so old.” 
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A non-descriptive consumer from another health center in suburban California explained: 
 
“We typically bill patients.  Some of the bills are sent to collections every 
month.  We review the total amount that bills every month that need to be sent 
to collections.” 
 
While several board members did mention the use of collection agencies to pursue 
payment from patients, it certainly did not get portrayed as a primary strategy. In fact, many 
board members, including this non-descriptive consumer from a health center in rural Alaska, 
reported the use of a collection agency to be highly undesirable and counter to their health 
center’s mission—something to be avoided at all costs: 
“I don’t believe, although we have told people that we would send them to 
collections, but I don’t believe anything has ever been sent to collections, ever.  
That’s not who we are.” 
 
Board members also stressed the importance of the enhanced Medicaid revenues they 
receive to sustaining their organization’s finances. They talked about the importance of 
identifying Medicaid-eligible patients and having staff devoted to screening and enrolling 
patients in Medicaid. They also discussed going after reimbursements from Medicaid more 
doggedly than seeking payment from a typical uninsured patient with an outstanding balance. 
That is, they indicated a propensity for pursuing Medicaid reimbursement—making sure that 
they received their payments—while being more likely to take a “bad debt” write-off in the 
case of individual patients who fail to pay their bills. 
In all cases, there appear to be two tradeoffs in attempts to collect billed charges. The 
first is that each health center must decide how to navigate the tension between collecting 
revenue and abiding by the mission to serve all patients regardless of their ability to pay. At 
some point, which each health center defines, aggressive collection efforts run counter to the 
basic health center mission. On the other hand, minimal collection efforts may harm the 
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organization’s finances and consequently threaten the health center’s ability to carry out the 
mission. This becomes a problem where the tension cannot be eliminated, but must be 
navigated.  
The second tradeoff is that attempts at collection are associated with their own 
financial costs. For example, maintaining a billing department requires salary support for 
administrative staff, and outside collection agencies do not work free of charge. As one board 
member put it, “We haven’t employed any outside collection agency because that’s just 
another layer of expense.  We try to do that all in-house.” Therefore, each health center must 
weigh the costs of pursuing payment against the amount of revenue such activities actually 
manage to collect. It is possible, in fact, for a health center to worsen its financial position if 
it spends more pursuing payment than it manages to bring in. In such cases, it would be 
better for the health center if it had simply elected to claim a bad debt write-off for all 
outstanding balances. 
Another area where the mission-margin tension arises is in the area of health center 
expansion. Expanding to serve more patients may be consistent with the organization’s 
mission, but may also put a strain on the organization’s finances. This view was expressed by 
a non-descriptive consumer from a health center in urban Maryland: 
“I think the biggest decision in the two years that I’ve been there has been 
whether or not to expand…And my understanding is that it’s the board who 
makes the final decisions. The [executive] director…is the one who sort of 
initiates and negotiates it. And with their legal folks he does, if you will, the 
behind-the-scenes work and then brings it to us to say yea or nay.  And there 
have been times when we have said no because we didn’t think that the 
particular idea was going to either fly, be cost effective, or the best 
management of resources.  That really doesn’t happen too often.” 
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A very similar view was reported by a non-consumer from an urban health center in Virginia: 
 
“The challenge that I see [us] having is the need versus capacity.  The 
problem is the clinic is really constrained by size, by square footage.  Number 
one, it hampers the number of beneficiaries that can access it.  It hampers the 
efficiency once the beneficiaries are inside the program because you can’t get 
them through the system because there’s no place for people to go.  If the 
footprint of the building could be larger, you could enhance efficiencies to see 
more patients.  Because there is such a low patient mix of covered/insured, we 
can’t get enough money to expand and have capital expansion.  It’s kind of 
like which comes first, the chicken or the egg.  The need is so great out there, 
yet the challenge is finding the monies to expand…The biggest challenge I see 
as a board member, between missions and the reality of it, is we can’t serve 
enough people.” 
 
While the mission-margin tension is an everyday reality for most health centers, 
occasionally certain adverse conditions such as budget cutbacks, provider problems, or 
inadequate utilization rates for certain services will be encountered that increase the tension 
even further. Again, the organization’s response to these adverse conditions, be they financial 
or otherwise, is extremely important. However, this response is not solely the work of the 
board, but often involves the health center chief executive officer (CEO) and other senior 
administrative staff. Looking at some of the events health centers have experienced, as well 
as the board’s response to them, can shed some light on the board’s mission-margin 
orientation and how it attempts to navigate the mission-margin tension. 
Board members reported both eliminating services and reducing staff. Sometimes 
staff cuts were across the board, while at other times retaining clinicians was prioritized and 
only administrative staff were let go. In some cases, no staff members were actually let go, 
but their hours were reduced. In most cases when services were eliminated, it was because 
those services were not financially sustainable—because they cost too much to operate, were 
underutilized, and generated very little revenue. According to one non-descriptive consumer 
from a health center in rural Massachusetts: 
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“I know that there are some funds that were available in the past that are not 
going to be available in the upcoming fiscal year.  As a result of that they have 
not so much as gotten rid of staff, but cut back on what was called full time, 
such that salaries may be lowered somewhat because of the hours.” 
 
A slightly more aggressive response to adversity was reported by a non-descriptive consumer 
from a health center in New York City: 
“Having multiple sites as we do one of the benefits is that you can carry an 
underperforming location if you’re in the black or doing well at your other 
sites.  It’s almost like an investment portfolio where you balance it out and 
you have time to invest the resources to try to turn a situation around.  Now I 
can remember…at one point, three things I think we have shut down were 
pharmacy, dental, and podiatry…Again, this was years ago, but we, at 
different points, closed clinics when we faced severe budget cuts or staff was 
replaced, but who those people would be is not the board’s decision.” 
 
The strongest response came from a non-consumer at a health center in rural Michigan: 
“Well, again, the board responds to initiatives from management. There was a 
period a few years ago when things were tight and some people were said 
goodbye to and some programs were either deferred or cutback.   
Was there an effort to maintain clinical care or were they let go off office 
administrative staff more so?   
It was across the board as I remember.  
The reason I’m looking at enabling services so much is that those services 
tend to not be reimbursed well or at all. When there are concerns about 
revenue, breaking even, and that kind of thing it can be one of the first 
things to be looked at. 
Yeah, that stuff tends to go first. 
You would say that is one of the areas. 
Yeah.” 
 
 It becomes apparent from these scenarios that FQHC boards and senior administrators 
frequently face a variety of difficult decisions regarding the continued provision of services 
and the maintenance of the organization’s finances. Accordingly, respondents were asked to 
discuss the role of the board and the executive director in organizational decisionmaking 
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related to issues of both mission and margin. Their responses were suggestive of a process 
wherein the executive director—and to some extent the executive committee of the board—
sets the agenda, although some boards appear to be more influential in certain areas than 
others. 
 
CEO, Staff and Board Influence on Service Provision and Finances 
Respondents indicated that the board’s work was to provide CEO oversight, to 
represent the community, to set the budget and create policies, to ensure compliance with 
state and federal law, and to fulfill their fiduciary duty to the community, steering the 
organization generally, while leaving the day-to-day operations to the CEO. In fact, the 
BPHC specifies the governing board’s role as follows: 
“The governing board of a health center provides leadership and guidance in 
support of the health center’s mission. The board is legally responsible for 
ensuring that the health center is operating in accordance with applicable 
federal, state, and local laws and regulations and is financially viable. Day-to-
day leadership and management responsibility rests with staff under the 
direction of the chief executive or program director…A governing board is 
responsible for assuring that the health center survives in its marketplace 
while it pursues its mission (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a, pp. 23-
24).”  
 
In addition to directing and overseeing the CEO, board members also understand that 
they are legally responsible for the organization and obligated to act in the best interests of 
those who entrust it with its responsibilities. Thus, the board has a fiduciary duty to the 
federal government and others who contribute financially to the organization, to use those 
monies appropriately. The board also has a fiduciary duty to the community to ensure that the 
health center remains operational and able to provide health care services to people who 
depend on it. Several respondents indicated that the board existed to represent the best 
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interests of the community. According to two non-descriptive consumers, one from a health 
center in rural Kentucky, the other from a health center in rural Alaska:  
“[W]e’re the liaison to the public…Each of us represents an area that [the 
health center] serves. The purpose of that is to get a good cross section of 
people on the board so that we can get the right opinions and keep in touch 
with the public…” 
 
“Our number one responsibility is fiduciary; to make sure that the clinic is 
able to keep its doors open at all times to serve the needs of the community, 
and that is to make sure that we’re always financially stable to make that 
happen.” 
 
The importance of the boards’ budget and policymaking activities is indicated by the 
fact that more respondents spoke of this aspect than any other when questioned about their 
view of the board’s working role. While respondents clearly delineated the functions of the 
board and the CEO when asked explicitly about roles and responsibilities, a different 
scenario emerged when the line of questioning turned to the specifics of the decisionmaking 
process, revealing that FQHC CEOs actually wield a significant amount of power. 
As discussed earlier, power consists of two component parts: authority and influence 
(Altshuler, 1970). By law, the board is ultimately responsible for approving the health 
center’s budget, monitoring the organization’s finances, and setting policies regarding the 
health center’s provision of services. While the board also has legal authority over the 
executive director, it is often the executive director and other health center staff who are most 
influential in guiding the health center according to respondents.  
In the case of service provision, ideas for expansion and the provision of new services 
to address the unmet needs of patients tend to arise not from the board, but from the health 
center staff. Specifically, providers, through their numerous contacts with patients, are often 
in a unique position to observe individual patient needs, identify population trends, and raise 
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concerns to the chief medical officer and/or CEO. Either or both of these individuals then 
raise the issue before the board, and the board may take a vote or ask the administration to 
conduct further inquiry into the issue (e.g., identifying funding sources, creating projections 
of how many patients would use the service, etc.) Very rarely does the idea for a new service 
originate from within the board itself. In this way, the CEO is exercising Bachrach and 
Baratz’s (1962) “second face of power” by controlling what action items actually make it on 
to the board’s agenda. When asked whether the board or the executive director was more 
influential in determining which optional services the health center would provide, a non-
descriptive consumer from a health center in Chicago said: 
“We have a very effective CEO.  He is pretty forward looking and he’s out 
there seeing what needs to be done and all and he’s a very efficient guy and a 
very hardworking guy, he’s pretty dominant, he’s a guy that’s out there…I see 
him as a pretty proactive guy. 
Would you say when he sees a new service that needs to be offered, that 
he brings that to the board meeting and presents it, and then when the 
board hears that, how much deliberation is there?  Is it like, this guy has 
his act together and we trust him and if he says we need it then we need it, 
or does the board very often disagree with him? 
In the majority of cases, I would say yes, to how you just described it… 
Sometimes I think we should have a little more discussion…I just think 
sometimes we’re kind of bowled over by the amount of information.  As 
women and sometimes lower income young women are not…it’s a tough spot 
to be sitting there with four lawyers or whatever it is; two doctors and a CEO. 
Would you say that when it comes to which enabling services are going to 
be provided that it works kind of the same way? 
Yeah, I think so.” 
 
Similarly, a non-descriptive consumer from a health center in New York City reported: 
 
“I think the senior team and the individual clinics director are more involved 
in those decisions because they’re in a much better position to understand the 
needs of the different communities…The clinic directors really know, you 
know, do we need Saturday hours, do we need a late night, do we need 
childcare at this location…  Obviously, it has significant financial 
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implications that go through our financial committee and ends up being 
considered at that level, but overall I would say that’s more of an operation 
decision for the senior management team…We aren’t necessarily the initiators.  
It doesn’t originate from the board. 
Right.” 
 
The same view was also expressed by two non-descriptive consumers in rural settings, one 
from a health center in Kentucky, and the other from a health center in Maine: 
“Actually, the staff initiates that.  As the doctors providing the services here, 
when they see patients they realize what we need here to better serve the 
patients that they’re seeing….With that in mind, they began to target this, then 
that brought discussion with the CEO.  The CEO then brings that discussion to 
the board.  Then the board, we talk about it and then we assign committees to 
get a report if that is necessary.  Then that committee will come back to 
us…with their report.  Then we make a conclusion of what we should 
do…and then we make that recommendation to the CEO who then makes the 
final decision.” 
 
“I would say the executive director would clearly be more influential.  He or 
she would bring those things to the board as a suggestion as unmet needs of 
our patient base and we would discuss them and try to find a way to make our 
health center as relevant and valuable to our patient base as we can.” 
 
Similar processes to those just described were commonly reported by respondents. In 
fact, only 4 of 30 respondents indicated that the board was more influential in determining 
which optional services the health center would provide. However, as comments from 2 of 
the 4 indicate, they may actually be attempting to explain that the board has the ultimate legal 
authority—not influence—over the final decision. Said one non-descriptive consumer from a 
health center in Baltimore: 
“I think the board is because our executive director…generally runs any kind 
of auxiliary services through us before she implements them.” 
 
And a non-consumer from a Chicago health center saw things in much the same way: 
 
“The executive director obviously has a vision for the organization and 
scoping new treatment options that are available to the community and new 
business potential that enhances a type of service that we will provide to the 
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community that we serve. The board is the decision maker, so the executive 
director presents the opportunities that exist, but the board has final word on 
making the decisions and putting the vision of the executive director into 
action.” 
 
Others, like this non-descriptive consumer from a suburban California health center, 
indicated that the board and the CEO worked together as a team and that the influence was 
shared: 
“I think it’s actually a partnership.  The board and the executive director have 
to work hand-in-hand because if they don’t you’re going to have a rubber 
stamp board and that’s going to be a recipe for disaster and that’s where health 
centers actually get into some trouble.” 
 
As with service provision, most board members indicated that the CEO and other 
staff were more influential than the board in maintaining the health center’s finances. 
However, in the area of finances, there appeared to be a greater sense of shared influence 
between the board and the administrative staff than was generally portrayed regarding service 
provision decisions. This seemed to stem largely from the fact that most boards have a 
finance committee that reviews the budget carefully and resolves most of the concerns before 
the information is brought before the full board for a vote.  
As several board members described, the finance committee is where the real work 
happens, and by the time the budget or spending request comes before the full board, there is 
very little that has not already been addressed. Furthermore, the CEO and chief financial 
officer (CFO) (where applicable) are often participants in the finance committee meetings. 
Thus, quite literally, key members of the board and the executive staff are coming together at 
the table to work on the health center’s finances. While other board committees exist, none 
seem specifically geared to evaluating service provision, and none seem to explicitly involve 
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both key members of the board and executive staff in the way that the finance committee 
does. According to one non-consumer from a health center in Chicago: 
“Definitely the CEO would be a bigger influence on the finances.  
Any particular reason why you would answer that way? 
Obviously, the board members are all volunteer members and we meet once a 
month.  We have a full-time CEO and he hired a CFO.  Actually, I’m on the 
finance committee so what we’ll do is we also meet once a month, typically 
the day before our full board meeting.  After the finance meeting the members 
of the finance committee will hear reports as to what the previous month’s 
revenues and expense were.  If there are any big items we need to talk about 
or if management has a suggestion that we move money from one CD to 
another or getting through the issues of us doing some expansion…(pause)  
The question may be, all right, the board has already approved us doing this 
expansion and now the CFO has put together a couple of options, we can 
borrow all the money, we can put up some of our money here, we can do this 
and that, so that’s pretty much how that’s presented to us.  As far as actually 
maintaining the finances, that’s certainly something that management does 
and really kind of reports back to the board, this is the current state of things 
and obviously answer questions if we raised them or something doesn’t sound 
right.  That’s pretty much how we’ve operated.” 
 
Three non-descriptive consumer board members from Baltimore, Chicago, and rural 
Alaska elaborated on the partnership between the board and the executive staff in 
maintaining the finances: 
“That’s probably split a little bit better since [the CEO] obviously does the 
day-to-day stuff….But we’ve got a pretty good handle I think through the 
finance committee and through the treasurer….So it’s not 50/50 but it may be 
60/40, 60 to the executive director, 40 to the board, I’d say.” 
 
“I think it’s pretty equal.  I think our finance committee people are real 
dedicated and real on top of it.  One of the members of the finance committee 
is a doctor who has been on the board from the very beginning and he’s very 
conscientious…We’re exceptionally financially healthy now and have been 
for a few years.  I would say that the major credit for that is due to the CEO, 
but I do think our finance committee is very active and attentive and on top of 
it.” 
 
“There is a CFO and there is obviously a finance committee within the board 
itself. Which involves the big players in it; the CFO, the CEO and the 
president of the board and other members of the board are invited to take part 
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in the actual committee itself. They’re usually the ones that make the 
recommendations to the entire board about what changes, investment changes, 
or any other changes as far as what we do with our finances.” 
 
It is clear from respondents’ comments that the CEO and other senior staff can be 
quite influential in the decisionmaking process vis-à-vis the board, but what about influence 
differentials within the board itself? While the by-laws of most organizations, including 
health centers, allow the executive committee to act on behalf of the full board whenever 
necessary, the board members I spoke with stressed that this was a very rare event for their 
boards. Most estimated the percentage of board decisions made by the executive committee 
alone to be fewer than 5%. Others were less willing to quantify things, but felt comfortable 
describing how rare it was for their executive committee to make decisions on behalf of the 
full board. They discussed why such decisions might have to be made, and what efforts were 
made to avoid such scenarios. Said one non-descriptive consumer from rural Oklahoma: 
“[I]f there is some bill that’s come up or something like that that was 
unexpected that needs to be paid or something or we need to sign this.  On 
some of these grants and some of these applications that we apply for grants, 
sometimes we’ll get them and find there’s only two weeks to get things back 
in.  As far as any policy, I think it’s probably zilch.” 
 
A similar view was expressed by a non-consumer from a Chicago health center: 
 
“Very few.  Actually, I can count on my hand during the time that I’ve been 
chair that I’ve used the executive committee.  I would probably be overstating 
it to say that the executive committee makes a decision once a year.  Typically 
I’ll wait.  The kind of rule of thumb I use is if it’s something that can wait 
then we’ll wait until we can present it to the entire board.  Sometimes, 
obviously, you can’t wait. There may be some decision that needs to be made 
before the next monthly meeting.  Then I’ll call around, get a quick consensus 
of the executive board members, and then report that to the board at our next 
meeting, but very rarely do I use that body as making decisions for the board.” 
 
For some boards, however, the executive committee makes a larger proportion of the 
decisions on its own. According to one non-consumer from a health center in rural Michigan, 
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“I can guess and I can imagine that it would be about a third.” Said another non-consumer 
from a health center in an urban part of Virginia: 
“In recent memory, the executive board has been very active in two 
areas….Within that, the executive committee was very active.  If you take that, 
we’re like 90% in two small areas.  If I had to quantify that, I would say 
maybe 25%.” 
 
While it does not appear, based on board member responses, that the executive 
committee is usurping power by directly determining the outcomes of decisions, this does not 
preclude the possibility that the executive committee is exercising a disproportionate share of 
influence by setting the agenda in a way that limits the influence of consumer board members, 
the latter case being one of “non-decisions” which are incredibly difficult to observe. 
 
FQHC Boards Lack Descriptive Representation 
Continuing to focus more specifically within the board, a defining characteristic of 
the FQHC program is its consumer-majority requirement, which requires that at least 51% of 
the governing board must consist of consumers of the health center. However, no formal 
process is mandated for the identification of consumer board members, which can lead to a 
low level of descriptive representation among not only the board as a whole, but also the 
consumer board members themselves. In other words, even board members who are 
consumers of the center may not be descriptively representative of the patient population the 
health center serves.  
The lack of descriptive representation can be traced back, at least in part, to the 
process by which consumer board members are identified and selected to join the board. 
Board members spoke both to how they themselves were asked to join the board and how 
their boards select board members generally. Often, physicians identify patients whom they 
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think might serve the board well. According to one non-descriptive consumer from a health 
center in rural Florida: 
“The provider actually put my name in the hat. Then what happens is they call 
you and ask if you’re interested in serving and then you go through an 
interview process. You submit a resume and then you go to an actual board 
meeting as a guest and then the board asks you questions about yourself and 
everything like that. Then the board makes a decision whether or not to vote 
you in, it’s not up to the CEO, it’s not up to anybody but the board.” 
 
In most cases, when asked specifically how their board identified new consumer 
board members to serve on the board, board members indicated that they looked at consumer 
status as a prerequisite. In some cases, however, there were indications that non-consumers 
with particular expertise were asked about their willingness—and strongly encouraged—to 
become consumers if they were invited to join the board. Said a non-consumer from a health 
center in Chicago: 
“If you’re trying to get a user on the board, you could look at current 
users, but you could also say, “We really need someone with some 
accounting expertise” and go find that person and then say “Come to the 
clinic.”  Is that something that you ever do or think about? 
Yeah, in fact, we had someone recently who expressed some interest in 
joining the board and that was one of the things I said to her, I said, “You 
know, that’s great, but we do have this requirement that we have that a 
majority of the board members are users.  If the board were to vote you on the 
board, would you consider becoming a user? I don’t know who your current 
doctor is, but would you mind switching and we’ll give you a list of all of our 
clinics.” That is one of the strategies that I use if I have someone that I am 
really interested in bringing on is to kind of coax them to actually be a user 
and that way it just solves both issues.” 
 
A similar strategy was described by a non-descriptive consumer from a suburban California 
health center: 
“We encourage, we don’t require, we let them know that 51% is the 
benchmark and we need to meet that to be in compliance, however, it is up to 
you guys. So when our personnel chair is recruiting an individual, that’s one 
of the questions on our application: “Are you a patient of the health center?” 
We try to keep a fair balance that way; however, if we do select an individual 
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who is not a clinic user we do try to encourage them to become a clinic user in 
one of the services.” 
 
 However, some boards do cast a wide net when looking for new consumer board 
members, resorting to announcements in the lobby, advertisements in the newspaper, and the 
like. Two non-descriptive consumers, one from a health center in rural Wisconsin and the 
other from a health center in rural Kentucky, put it this way: 
“When we need board members we’ll put up a thing in the lobby…if you’re 
interested in becoming a board member to improve care and blah, blah, blah, 
then call this number or contact this person. Then we interview them and go 
from there….They’re interviewed by the board members and the executive 
committee.” 
 
“It’s regional; we try to go to the area where a board member is from. 
Actually, we advertise in the paper. It’s printed in the paper. We put it in the 
local paper and everybody likes to be a part of [our health center] because of 
its success… it’s a prestigious thing in the community.” 
 
Not all consumer board members were patients before joining the board. In fact, 25% 
of the respondents I interviewed who self-identified as consumers joined the board prior to 
becoming a patient. One non-descriptive consumer board member from a health center in 
New York City explained how she happened to become a consumer after having been on the 
board for quite some time: 
“I’m kind of curious about that, just in terms of was it just a coincidence-
for whatever reason you made the appointment?   
No.  A center opened up only ten blocks from my house. 
So it became convenient. 
It was a convenient location for me and I was the board chair at the time and 
we were building that center and dedicating that center, but then it also-I guess, 
we were not, at that point, a federally qualified community health center.  We 
had not been a federally qualified community health center during the 22 
years that I’ve been on the board, and so at some point it became a 
requirement for a certain number of board members to visit the health centers 
as patients, so that’s when I began doing that as well.” 
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Among those I interviewed, most respondents were much better educated and earned 
much higher incomes than the typical health center patient. Furthermore, consumer status is 
not well defined. Some board members indicated that they were consumers, but then went on 
to explain that the health center is not their usual source of care or that they only use an 
ancillary service like dental care. Other board members spoke of their consumer/board 
member timing and indicated that they were serving on the board before they became 
consumers, which clearly indicates that they were not selected to serve on the board because 
of their patient status. On the other hand, many board members did indicate that they were 
consumers prior to becoming board members, and that the health center was their usual 
source of primary health care. This latter group seems, at least on the surface, to be closer to 
the intent of having consumer board members on the board to serve as representatives of the 
patients and as a link between the community and the health center. 
While at least 51% of the board must be consumers of the center, this in no way 
guarantees that those consumer board members will be descriptively representative of the 
patient population as a whole, though this is often implied by proponents of the requirement. 
First, respondents were asked a multiple choice question to assess the degree to which the 
consumers on their board were representative of the patients as a whole who are served by 
their health center. Their answers appear in Figure 14. 
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Figure 14. Thinking about the consumers on your board as a whole and the 
patients served at your health center, how representative would you say that the 
consumer board members are of the patients served? 
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Then, respondents were asked to explain their choice in more detail. I was interested 
in understanding what characteristics they had in mind when they were assessing the degree 
of representativeness. I relayed a scenario to participants in which a middle-aged, Caucasian 
female with a doctoral degree was characterized as a consumer board member of a local 
community health center that serves a predominantly Latino population that is 
characteristically low-income, poorly educated, and uninsured. I used this scenario to help 
the respondents better understand what I meant by representativeness. A few respondents, 
like this non-descriptive consumer from a health center in rural Alaska, described their 
boards as being at least somewhat representative of the patients served: 
“I think we’re relatively representative.  The one thing that perhaps we may 
not be is that…most of those of us on the board are in an upper income 
bracket for the area…Many of the people on the other end of our sliding scale 
are up here in subsistence lifestyles and/or seasonal workers, sometimes 
unemployed…We’re not exactly representative of the lower end of the scale.” 
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More common, however, were responses like this one from a non-descriptive 
consumer at a New York City health center, expressing that the board members are not 
representative of the patients served: 
“Basically, most of our board is full time working professionals who have 
private health insurance and who use various private sources of care.  Our 
patients for the most part are low income people of color who live in inner-
city neighborhoods, and what’s the right balance of that?....On our board, I 
don’t believe that the nature of the “patients” is representative, but I do 
believe they are understanding of the needs of the community by virtue of 
their own life experience, professional work, or whatever…There’s a huge, at 
least on our board, there’s a big class, race, socioeconomic, educational gulf 
between people like myself and most of the patients.  I happen to have to have 
lived for 35 years in a low-income neighborhood in New York with a lot of 
public housing.  My kids went to public school.  My daughter is a New York 
City public school teacher in a low-income neighborhood, and so…I don’t 
feel I’m out of touch, I feel like I’m better informed than most of my peers, if 
you want to talk about my colleagues in the legal department where I use to 
work.  But I’m not really a patient the way the community health center 
governance requirements were set up.  Now, not everybody has to be a patient, 
you want to have some people like me, but there should be more patient-
patients, patients with a capital P as opposed to patients in quotation marks…” 
Similar responses came from a non-descriptive consumer at a Baltimore health center, 
a non-consumer at a health center in rural Michigan, and a non-descriptive consumer from a 
health center in rural Maine: 
“I think that we’re probably not quite as representative because our board is 
pretty well educated even though we’re lower to middle income.  We’re 
probably on a little better heel than most of the clients that we see…There is a 
level of articulation that exists on the board that we would probably not see in 
our general client base.  I think our client base is generally high school 
educated or less, so that’s a little different then the board because the board 
has all got some degree of academic background behind them…I suspect that 
most of our client base is from the lower economic strata and I think our 
trustee-based clients is probably middle-income, moderate-income.  Maybe 
we have a couple folks on there who are lower to middle-income, but I think 
there is a little bit of a different situation there…I guess the answer would be 
something like the regular clients, but not quite the same.” 
“Do you think that the trustees that are patients resemble the patients 
that the health center serves? 
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No, I think the new breed in particular tends to be a social economic cut or 
cuts above the typical patient.  That’s true of many governing bodies. 
Do you think that’s because of the demands of what it means to be a 
trustee? 
Yeah.  You have to understand a financial statement or a legal document.  
You need to have a little education.” 
 
“I guess my question has something to do with thinking, do the patients 
on the board really look like typical health center patients.  Then you’re 
talking about a situation where the person is probably uninsured or low 
income, poorly educated and they may not even speak English depending 
on what health center you’re at in the country.  If you had someone like 
that on your board, I guess that’s where I would see where they would 
be…much more deficient in terms of the skills needed to be on the board.  
Is your sense that those types of folks aren’t really the patients that are on 
your board?   
That’s correct.  That part of our patient population hasn’t been on the board 
since I have been there…I don’t know that they would want to be and if you 
were looking at financial statements and making decisions on employee 
handbooks and policies and things, it would be difficult for them or some of 
that group to understand, but I like to think we’re doing our best to represent 
their needs, certainly, to provide for their needs…It could be difficult for 
someone with that background to act in a capacity as a board member based 
on what is expected of a board member…” 
 
Putting aside for a moment the lack of descriptive representation among consumer 
board members, respondents were able to identify both advantages and disadvantages of 
requiring 51% of the board to be consumers of the health center. The reported advantages far 
outweighed the disadvantages in most cases. In fact, many respondents said that they could 
not conceive of any disadvantages to the requirement at all. The advantages most often 
discussed involved the role of consumer board members on the board in ensuring that the 
health center is responsive to the needs of the community. Consumer board members are 
there to represent the patients and the community being served.  
There are two aspects to this. One is the representation of the patient experience of 
the clinical encounter. The label of “consumer governance” fits well here. The other is the 
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representation of the community. While this is often referred to as consumer governance, it 
might be more accurate to label it “community governance” to describe a distinct 
phenomenon. Any health center patient on the board can contribute to consumer governance. 
Conversely, only local residents on the board can contribute to community governance. To 
the extent that health centers want to represent both the community and the patients served, 
they should seek health center patients from the local community. 
A few respondents also mentioned that having consumer board members was 
important because it conveyed symbolic confidence in the organization. By going to the 
health center for care, board members are indicating that they believe in the organization and 
the quality of care it provides. It is essentially an endorsement from the highest levels of the 
organization. The disadvantages most frequently discussed were a loss of objectivity in 
decisionmaking when, for example, a consumer board member did not want to acknowledge 
complaints about their particular physician at the center, and a professional expertise deficit 
that descriptive consumers might exhibit. 
 
Consumer Board Members Display Symbolic Confidence 
A few respondents spoke of consumer board members as signaling a sort of symbolic 
confidence in the quality of services the health center provides. However, while only a few 
respondents mentioned this, the theme crossed all consumer categories. The following quotes 
are from a non-descriptive consumer and a non-consumer at a health center in rural Michigan, 
as well as a descriptive consumer from a health center in rural Florida. 
“If I’m on [our] board and go down to [another clinic], it certainly displays a 
lack of confidence in the operation. It’s like the guy working for Ford driving 
a Volkswagen, it shouldn’t happen. If I’m not satisfied with the services 
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provided there well enough to use it then I certainly should not be on a 
governance board.” 
 
“The majority of governance should be from the community and should be 
people who use the facility. If that’s not the case then what are people from 
the community doing on that board if they don’t have some skin in the game 
for those facilities themselves.” 
 
“I don’t think you should be on the board and want other people to attend a 
facility that you won’t attend.” 
 
These comments point, at least indirectly through the idea of patient satisfaction, to 
the quality of the services the health center provides, and suggest that health centers do not 
wish to operate a second-class facility. In other words, the care provided to every patient 
should be of sufficiently high quality so as to satisfy the expectations of a board member who 
most likely comes from a higher socioeconomic background. How the quality of that care is 
assessed is revealed by the next advantage of consumer governance discussed by respondents. 
 
Consumer Board Members as Secret Shoppers 
Respondents frequently discussed how consumer governance was advantageous 
because it provides the board with important feedback about the quality of the service 
provided during the clinical encounter. In essence, the consumer board members are able to 
get periodic snapshots of the health center’s operations at the most basic level and this, 
according to many respondents, provides a mechanism for ensuring that the health center is 
providing patients with high quality care—or at least addressing problems. Based on one 
respondent’s remarks below, I applied the in vivo code “secret shoppers” to describe this 
important dynamic of consumer governance in FQHCs, which other respondents referred to 
as being “mystery shoppers” or “mystery consumers.” This view was expressed by both 
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consumers and non-consumers. Non-descriptive consumers in urban areas like Baltimore and 
Chicago said: 
“[W]e can, in fact be secret shoppers, if you will.  We’ve employed that 
technique where we’ve had board members go to particular sites that have had 
some type of issue and we ask them to test it.” 
 
“As a user, you’re just watching the sausage being made. I think that you are 
the person that is just-you can give perfect feedback…You are calling up and 
using the phone system, you are getting the treatment, and you are meeting the 
staff, giving your urine sample or whatever personal things you’re doing.  So I 
think the fact that I, as a non-professional, you know, I’m not a lawyer, I’m 
not a doctor, I think it’s just to be instant feedback to them.  I feel like I’m the 
voice for the clinic users who…I wouldn’t say have no voice, but who 
wouldn’t have the opportunity, or perhaps the courage, or maybe even the 
words to ever give that kind of feedback…I think having users on the board 
keeps everybody’s feet to the fire and it certainly would keep the board from 
ever becoming an elitist group of doctors, lawyers and accountants who, “this 
is what’s good for this clinic.”…I mean, you’re sitting at the table with users 
of this clinic and that keeps that mission right in front of you all the time, and 
respect.” 
 
While non-descriptive consumers in rural parts of Alaska, Kentucky, South Carolina, and 
Wisconsin said: 
“On the plus side, I think it very much helps because you see what the internal 
workings actually are for someone who is coming in for care. While you may 
not catch some of the things…you still get an idea of whether or not you’ve 
had to wait or what the providers are like and just what the general care is…If 
there is a problem, you can direct the executive director to do something to 
change it. That kind of thing, that’s where I think being a patient is a plus 
because you can see perhaps where some of those issues lie where if you 
weren’t you might not.” 
 
“It helps having patients on the board in that, they come to the clinic regularly 
and they can see for themselves how things are operating, not that that’s why 
they come. But I know myself I have come and when I am sitting in the 
waiting room I listen to other patients comments and most of them don’t know 
that I’m a board member. But I listen to their comments about the clinic and 
about how things are working, about their doctor, about the nurses and what 
have you. You’d be surprised that there are many good comments.  There are 
also comments about why do we have to wait so long and things like that.” 
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“Oh, I think it's very…beneficial, because it lets you know what is happening.  
Usually when I come in, I don't announce who I am. Or when I call to make 
an appointment, I just say my name. And we've had…new personnel…at 
the…in the front office, so they don't know who I am…and so…I'm just 
treated like a regular patient.” 
 
“I think it's based on their actual clinical encounter.  That's why I think it's a 
good idea. I mean, our patient board members are not shy people. You know?  
If…if they were having a problem getting in to see a doctor, or the phone 
system wasn't working properly or this or that happened, these people speak 
up.  And it's based upon their experience at the clinic.” 
 
“[Y]ou would be surprised how much you can learn just sitting in their 
waiting room. You hear people discuss different things. Some people, when 
they get mad, they just get real verbal, especially when they’ve been waiting a 
while, so you pick up on all of this while you’re sitting there, so I think that’s 
good. Then you bring it back to the board and they try to reduce the wait time 
for the people. I think there was an issue one time where some of the doctors 
were being double booked and probably triple booked and so the patients were 
being-the wait time was a little longer. That has been cut down quite 
drastically.  This is the point of me sitting in the waiting room…” 
 
Non-consumers expressed a very similar view. One non-consumer from a health center in 
rural South Carolina said: 
“If you don’t have people there that are patients they don’t really understand 
what’s going on. They don’t understand, nor can they provide for the other 
board members insight on the needs and how things are being handled. You 
know, I’ve walked in there and the staff doesn’t know…that I’m a board 
member. They don’t have a clue. Therefore, I get to see things. Now, I don’t 
get involved with it, but if there’s something, I need to tell the CEO, I’ll tell 
her. Or if there is something that I learned from it that will help me at the 
meeting, then I notice it. If I notice…that they have people standing outside 
because there’s no room in the lobby, I know I have to go get a bigger facility 
now.” 
 
While a non-consumer from a health center in Chicago felt the same way: 
 
“It’s beneficial to have someone on the board who actually uses the health 
center. Typically, what they do is they bring up problems that the management 
didn’t present to us…That puts pressure on the CEO and other management 
who may be at the meetings. That gets action right away versus the committee 
studying it and then coming back with recommendations like you need to do 
something about this now. That, to me, is the biggest benefit to having users 
on the board.  Obviously, when it comes to making decisions about the type of 
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services that we offer, it’s helpful to have someone who is actually going to be 
taking advantages of those services to say, “Hey, I think this is great, this 
really applies to my situation.”  Or the opposite, for them to say, “Listen that 
sounds great in theory, but here’s why I don’t think that’s going to work.” 
They can give their own personal testimony as to why that’s not the greatest 
idea. It certainly helps.” 
 
While the phenomenon of secret shoppers focuses on the consumer board members’ 
ability to inform the board of the operations within the health center, this is not the aspect of 
consumer governance that is touted by health center advocates, who focus instead on the 
consumer board members’ role in identifying community needs, which requires the health 
center to interact with its external environment. It was clear from the interviews that I 
conducted, that consumer board members do occasionally play a role in identifying the 
community’s needs, but the process often involves the health center staff and patients as well.  
 
How FQHCs Identify the Needs of the Community 
Respondents described a number of ways in which health centers become aware of 
the needs of the community. Several of the processes they described involved the board, 
while others involved the staff or even the patients themselves. Each of these pathways for 
the identification of community needs is described here. 
First, because many consumer board members are not descriptively representative of 
the patient population, some respondents indicated that working and living in the community 
trumps patient status when it comes to a board member’s ability to identify community 
needs—although patient status was still described as being of some added value. Essentially, 
identification of the community’s needs may originate with the board because of common 
knowledge about the community or knowledge the board member acquires specifically 
through his or her work and life interactions in the community, rather than his or her patient 
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status. Of course, the more descriptively representative a consumer board member is of the 
patient community, the more likely that the board member will interact with other patients 
regularly in the community.  
When the board members bring the needs of the community up at a meeting, it is 
usually the result of something they have managed to observe or overhear, or they are 
approached directly by patients out in the community. Examples of the importance of living 
and working in the community were plentiful, but occurred almost exclusively among 
respondents from rural areas. Non-descriptive consumers from health centers in Alaska, 
Maine, Massachusetts, and Michigan said: 
“One lady is a pastor’s wife and she is a homemaker, not really working, but 
she is a highly educated woman and she and her husband have just chosen that 
she would be home with their children and she is expecting again.  They have 
several children.  I think the role that she has is a very good one and that’s 
because their congregation is within the community that is being served by the 
health center.  So she gets to see and meet and know the population and can 
give feedback from that perspective.” 
 
“[P]eople know in the community that I’m on the board and I get told a lot of 
things which I take back to the board. Patients that are on the board are going 
to bring real, every day issues as well as community perceptions to the board.” 
 
“I think people talk about their health care and their health insurance; it’s a 
major topic of conversation in the coffee shop or wherever these days. If they 
have had a negative experience, I think you would still hear about that if you 
weren’t a patient and still would bring it to the board.  What you probably 
wouldn’t be able to do as well is, perhaps, give some response to this outside 
contact in the same fashion. In other words, if you were to say something to 
me about an experience at the [health center] that you weren’t totally satisfied 
with to the degree that I could answer without breeching my need to maintain 
confidentiality…I feel being a patient I would perhaps be in a better position 
to explain to the person why they might have had that experience.” 
“That has its pros and cons.  What I can tell you is, people in the community, 
if they’re unhappy with something, feel like they can come directly to the 
board, which is not what we do. Although, if somebody comes to me directly 
and has a complaint I give them [the CEO’s] number and tell them they 
should call her directly…and discuss their issues with her.” 
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 “But I do, if you’re out playing cards or out to dinner, at St. Vincent’s or 
whatever, you do hear things about the clinic because not everybody knows 
that I’m on the board…You do hear some things and I think those are 
important considerations, not that they all need to be acted on, but they all do 
need to be considered.” 
 
Similarly, a descriptive consumer from a health center in rural Florida had this to say: 
“When people in the community people know that you’re on the board they 
will come to you and make complaints too. We can’t do anything about it.  
The only thing we can do is inform the CEO. We can’t talk to the people at 
that clinic, that’s his [the CEO’s] responsibility. That’s something that he has 
his medical officer or clinic manager handle. By people in the community 
knowing that you are on the board, you do get feedback and they’re more 
likely to come to you if they know that you’re a patient too. You’ll know 
exactly what they’re talking about.” 
 
The majority of respondents indicated that community needs are identified not by the 
board, but by the health center staff. Community needs identification that originates with 
staff is typically the result of health center clinicians encountering a number of patients with 
a common need, observing these patterns, and reporting them either directly or through the 
chief medical officer to the CEO, who then brings that information to the board for 
consideration. Most of the respondents’ comments about this process are discussed in the 
earlier section that focused on influence over service provision, because the end result of 
identifying the specific needs of the community is the implementation of new services 
provided by the FQHC in an attempt to meet those needs. However, a couple of additional 
comments from two non-descriptive consumers at a rural Kentucky health center describe the 
role of the staff in identifying community needs: 
“When you take two or three hundred employees, they’re going to hear a lot 
going on out there on the street.  It’s their responsibility to bring that to the 
CEO or one of the directors and we’ll bring it up in the board meeting, that’s 
another source that we use for that kind of service.” 
 
“However, one of the big things that we do is outreach.  We have an outreach 
group that goes to daycare centers, senior citizen centers and to different 
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organizations, to talk about the clinic and ask if there are needs and things that 
we need to look into.  This brings a lot of attention to the things that are going 
on in the community when she comes back and says, I learned this, this, this 
and this.  The outreach has helped more than anything has.” 
 
Finally, respondents discussed how the patients and community members themselves 
also played a variety of roles—some more proactive than others—in making their needs 
known. For example, the patients themselves may identify their needs by complaining to 
board members, complaining to staff at the health center, completing surveys, attending 
community advisory board meetings, and voting with their feet (i.e., they stop coming to the 
health center until their needs are addressed). Again, according to one of the board members 
from Kentucky: 
“I think the most important person there to make us aware is always the public, 
number one. They will from time to time. You don’t have to be a board 
member to walk up to the front desk and say, why don’t you do this for me, or 
why aren’t you doing anything about this? That happens all the time. We take 
those issues that are brought in by the public, that’s the number one source is 
the public.” 
 
Patients can also make their needs known by voting with their feet. A non-descriptive 
consumer from a health center in rural Florida said: 
“On the previous experience with the health care provider that was let go and 
it created a lot of really outrage in the community. Many people wrote articles 
to the newspaper concerning this.  They quit going to the center.” 
 
Other health centers actively seek patient feedback through surveys and suggestion boxes. 
Three individuals—two non-consumers and one non-descriptive consumer all from rural 
areas in Wisconsin and South Carolina—discussed this aspect of directly identifying 
community needs: 
“We actually do…patient surveys on a regular basis…and asking patients as 
well about additional things that they…think that we need. And as we're 
monitoring what's going on at the clinic, if it’s information we're gathering, 
we can most certainly see a pattern.” 
  
177 
 
“You know, we do offer questionnaires for the clinic. They have 
questionnaires every now and then to fill out and I think in these 
questionnaires they do ask about services that they need. It’s sought out 
because once a year they have a fair and people do come around and they 
have a questionnaire that they really encourage they return to the clinic-to fill 
it out and return it.” 
 
“Well, we’ve had a suggestion box. We do patient surveys and they get to, not 
only grade the facilities on how we’re doing, but they can make 
recommendations on needs and we look at those. We recently did one and the 
statistics of how they ranked everything was there, but then all the comments, 
we didn’t see who made the comments, but we saw every comment made.” 
 
 Clearly, there are advantages to consumer governance, although they appear to have 
less to do with identifying community needs and more to do with providing the board with 
feedback on the quality of services provided at the center. However, consumer governance is 
not without its drawbacks, as several respondents discussed. 
 
Disadvantages of Consumer Governance 
Although a handful of board members claimed that they were unable to 
identify any disadvantages of having consumers on the board, several others 
expressed some concerns about the potential downsides of consumer governance. 
One of the most discussed disadvantages was the potential for consumer board 
members to occupy seats on the board that could otherwise be filled by individuals 
with more professional backgrounds and skills. This disadvantage was cited by six 
non-descriptive consumers from health centers in Baltimore, New York City, urban 
Virginia, suburban California, and rural Massachusetts: 
“Now the cons, I guess the corporate side would say they could make their 
decisions much easier if they didn’t have us making a whole bunch of noise 
about the decisions that they’d want to make that would be strictly a financial 
benefit or procedure or benefit to the actual corporate side of the medical 
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center. That’s the only cons that I can think of that might be interfering or 
might put road blocks up to what might be a policy of limitation or something 
like that.” 
 
“Personally, I don’t know how they concluded that they should have 51% 
whether federally directed or not I have no idea…I would rather like to see a 
little more than 51% or 60% or 70% of professionally qualified people to be 
on the board rather than the other way around as it is now. That’s my 
preference for the simple reason, people who are technically capable should 
be on the board, the demands of the consumers will not be distorted, and we 
don’t go into unrealistic areas of unnecessary expenditures of the center.  One 
has to be very careful about this kind of board representation. 
 
I want to make sure I understood that correctly. You’re saying you think 
that there should be some consumer representation on the board but it 
should not necessarily be 51%, it should probably be lower so that you 
make sure that you have expertise that is more professional on the board? 
 
Exactly.” 
 
“The only challenge that I think that requirement presents to you is that, you 
know, these health clinics are not simple operations. These health clinics, you 
need diligent members on the board, and not to say that low-income people 
and patients cannot be diligent - Lord knows they can be. They can be some of 
the smartest people in the world, but they…they just happen…not to have a 
lot of money…[N]ow you're really lucky if you can have a patient base where 
you can pull from that patient base some other additional professional and 
other kind of expertise that the board needs. You're fortunate if you can do 
that....[T]he only challenge with it is that sometimes, you know, if your patient 
base doesn't have the additional skills and expertise that you need on your 
board, it presents a challenge and, we struggle with that…” 
 
“I see where sometimes I just feel like people who aren’t professional and 
who are sitting at a table with professionals are oftentimes inhibited in saying, 
‘I think this…’ or ask a question. They think ‘These people are all 
professionals and they know this and I’m not going to show my 
ignorance’…The other thing is in a clinic like ours, finding user members 
whose lives are organized enough to be able to come to meetings regularly 
and serve on the committee, that’s an issue.”  
 
“I don’t think that [whether or not someone is a consumer] should be the key 
factor in placing a person on the board. I mean, just to meet the 51% I don’t 
think someone should be brought on just because they are a patient. I think 
they should have other qualities that would contribute to the well-being of the 
company. 
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Right, so there would be a need for certain types of expertise. 
 
Right.” 
 
“While the perspective they have as patients and consumers is extremely 
important and valuable for us to hear in terms of the overall corporate 
governance requirements of a board, we would be really lacking if 51% of our 
board were basically the type of patient who relies on our centers for their 
primary health care…On the other hand, I don’t think having high quality, 
knowledgeable, engaged patients on the board is an impossibility even given 
the nature of the communities which so many health centers are serving…I 
think you’ve got to have, whether it should be 51% or some other number, it’s 
kind of arbitrary. I think it’s important because I don’t think it will happen 
without some sort of requirement.  Is it the best way to do it?  No…There are 
problems with the one-size-fits-all, but you end up with compliance with the 
letter of the law but not really the spirit of it.  What you want is something that 
promotes.  Maybe it doesn’t have to be 51%.  If we had 25% of real patients 
whom the center was their and their families’ principle source of health care, I 
would rather have that than 51% of people who are just token patients.” 
 
Another disadvantage that was discussed is the lack of objectivity in decisionmaking 
that can present itself because the consumer board members are sometimes put in a position 
of having to decide what is best for the FQHC, which may not be best for them, personally, 
as patients. This was discussed most often in the context of decisions being made about 
specific health care providers at the center or specific services that the center was considering 
eliminating. This disadvantage was discussed by both a non-descriptive consumer from a 
Baltimore health center and a non-consumer from a Chicago health center: 
“[T]he fact of the matter is we’re looking at this as though it’s the level of care 
that I or my family members and people that I care about, so we can’t be as 
objective that we might need to be in order to make a dispassionate decision. 
If it’s a decision where something has to be unfunded or a decision where 
something has to be exchanged for something else, we cut some program to 
do something else; it’s probably going to be a little difficult for the board to 
make an impartial decision for those cases.” 
 
“[W]e had a situation where there was a dispute between one of the doctors 
who had been with us since forever, since the center was open. It was a feud 
between that doctor and the current CEO and…most of the sentiment was that 
the doctor was the one that needs to go. Well, one of the board members was a 
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patient of that doctor and she loved her doctor so her stance was less about 
what we thought was in the best interest of the center and more about, ‘I don’t 
want you guys to push out my doctor.’…That was an example of having a 
user on the board that was, in my mind, a detriment.” 
 The advantages and disadvantages of consumer governance were widely reported 
across respondents, but there were some exceptions. One of the most notable was the 
difference between consumer governance in small communities and larger communities. 
  
The Dynamics of Consumer Governance Differ in Small Communities 
The smaller the community, the more likely people are to know each other, to know 
each other's business, and to interact with each other. As one non-descriptive consumer from 
a health center in rural Oklahoma put it: 
“In this small community, you can hear everything but the bacon frying up 
here where we live.” 
 
The results of this are that people in small communities tend to enjoy less anonymity 
than people in larger communities, which can have some limiting effect on the ability of 
consumer board members to be “secret shoppers” as one respondent indicated: 
“It’s pretty hard for me to be a mystery shopper if you know what I mean.” 
 
Board members in small communities may also have a more difficult time being 
objective decision-makers: 
“The negative, and particularly in a community like this one, I think, is that 
we’re so small that we know these people as neighbors as well as providers 
and so forth. This just adds another layer to that. So you’re going to add some 
personal viewpoints in there that perhaps should not be when you’re dealing 
on a management issue.” 
 
In these ways, consumer governance is at a disadvantage in small communities, but 
there are other ways in which it is advantageous to be in a small community. For example, 
the smaller the community, the easier it is to achieve descriptive representation. It seems 
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much easier for the consumer board members on the board to be representative of the patient 
population of the health center when the health center is located in a small community or 
rural area, most likely because such communities are a bit more homogeneous, so there is 
less variation for the board to attempt to represent. Here is what some non-descriptive 
consumer board members from health centers in rural Alaska and Kentucky had to say: 
“Do you think it’s easier to get that very high degree of representation or 
representativeness because you’re in a small community? 
Yes.” 
 
“[W]e’re all representative of what we serve.  We’re in the mountains and we 
don’t have a black population, we don’t have a Latino population. We’re just 
all poor-folk. That’s our commonality amongst all of us. Here, even the rich 
people, even the haves are very familiar with the have-nots and we don’t 
separate. Fortunately, as a whole we don’t separate ourselves from each other. 
We’re all pretty well mixed together…We’re all so mixed in here, there’s no 
identity that we can claim.  We can’t say that we’re black; we can’t say that 
we’re white; we can’t say that we’re Latino. We can’t say anything of these 
things because we’re just mountain-folk. We don’t divide ourselves that way. 
We’re fortunate in that manner…” 
 
 
 
Comparing and Contrasting the Views of Consumers and Non-Consumers 
 At the heart of this study is the question of whether or not consumer governance has a 
tangible effect on health center outcomes. The interviews, whose results are presented in this 
chapter, were conducted to provide context for the quantitative portion of the study by 
collecting data on board function and board members’ perceptions of consumer governance 
in practice. In analyzing these data, it is worth considering how consumers’ responses 
compare to the responses of non-consumers. For this reason, the quotations included in this 
chapter are identified by the consumer status of the individual who made the remarks. 
 Reviewing this data reveals certain patterns of similarity and dissimilarity between 
consumers and non-consumers. For instance, both consumers and non-consumers reported 
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similar information about billing practices at their health center, the mission-margin tension 
that arises in decisions about expanding the size of the health center, and their health center’s 
decisionmaking processes. Both groups also tended to agree that the executive committee 
rarely acted independently of the board as a whole.  
Consumers and non-consumers also shared common views about the role of 
consumer governance. They described similar processes for recruiting new board members 
and identified the consumer board members as less than representative of the patient 
population. Both groups identified consumer board members as conveying symbolic 
confidence in the organization and described the principle role of consumers on the board as 
“secret shoppers.” They also identified similar disadvantages to consumer governance. 
The two groups did not see eye-to-eye on everything, however. For example, 
consumers and non-consumers painted a different picture about organizational responses to 
adversity, with non-consumers more likely to describe approaches including across the board 
cuts, while consumers focused more on efforts to make reductions without affecting service 
delivery. They also mentioned slightly different mechanisms for identifying the community’s 
needs, with non-consumers more focused on direct surveys of patients, and consumers more 
likely to mention interactions they have with patients out in the community. 
While there seems to be more agreement than disagreement in views between the two 
groups, it is important to note that only 2 of 30 participants were descriptive consumers. To 
the extent that non-descriptive consumers are similar to non-consumers, this may explain the 
high degree of concordance among responses. In the next chapter, I integrate these 
qualitative results with the quantitative results presented earlier and discuss how each 
informs the other.
 CHAPTER 7 
 
DISCUSSION 
 
 
The background presented in Chapters 1 and 2 makes it clear that despite their 
conflict-laden origins and the political threats to their continued existence, federally qualified 
health centers (FQHCs) have managed to provide primary care and enabling services to some 
of the most vulnerable populations in the most underserved areas of the United States. For 
the last five decades, they have successfully exemplified what it means to be core safety net 
providers, rising to the challenge of maintaining an open-door policy while relying on 
extremely limited resources. 
A quick visit to the website of the National Association of Community Health 
Centers provides a summary of the literature demonstrating that health centers increase 
access to care, provide high quality health care, and provide care that is less expensive than 
other comparable provider types.6 While there are many possible explanations, all of which 
eventually deserve to be studied, the requirement that a majority of the health center’s board 
be comprised of patients of the center is frequently cited by advocates as a factor in health 
centers’ success. At the same time, other safety net providers contend that they are able to 
serve vulnerable populations just as effectively as health centers without being governed by 
consumers. 
                                                 
6
 The National Association of Community Health Centers maintains a summary of the peer-reviewed literature 
on health centers’ cost-effectiveness, quality of care, ability to increase access to care, and ability to reduce 
health disparities. The summaries are available here: http://www.nachc.com/literature-summaries.cfm Accessed 
June 19, 2009. 
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To be sure, consumer governance is a fairly unique defining aspect of FQHCs, not 
often observed in other health care organizations, and the logic behind it is intuitive. After all, 
who better to represent a group than a member of that group? The idea of consumer 
governance as it is portrayed certainly does not lack validity on its face. 
Indeed, the representation theory outlined in Chapter 3 suggests that consumer 
governance is a plausible mechanism for generating certain aspects of health center success. 
That is, given the theoretical link between descriptive and substantive representation, 
requiring consumer participation on the health center governing board should translate into 
the board acting on behalf of patient interests and, as such, it would be one way for health 
centers to respond to the community’s needs.  
However, theory also suggests that there are varying degrees of descriptive 
representation, different contexts in which substantive representation is less reliant upon 
descriptive representation, and effective agenda setting mechanisms by which non-
descriptive consumers and non-consumers can limit the potential of descriptive consumers to 
affect outcomes. Therefore, while theory is informative, it is impossible to conclude from 
theory alone exactly what role consumer governance plays in FQHCs, necessitating the 
empirical study that was outlined in Chapter 4.  
The results of the current study presented in Chapters 5 and 6 provide new insight 
into the role of consumer governance in FQHCs and contribute to the body of knowledge on 
representation theory and agenda setting. This chapter discusses these results, elaborates on 
the implications of the findings for both theory and policy, addresses study limitations, and 
proposes appropriate next steps for future research. 
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Overview of Significant Findings 
At first glance, the results of this study seem to suggest that consumer governance has 
very little effect on health center outcomes. Of a series of eight F-tests on the construct of 
descriptive consumer representation, only one result—that for scope of enabling services—
indicated joint significance. In addition, of a series of eight t-tests on the direct effects of the 
proportion of descriptive consumers, only one result—that for operating margin—was 
statistically significant. Additionally, only two F-tests—for scope of enabling services and 
financial self-sufficiency—indicated that executive committee composition had any direct 
effect.  
While many of the coefficients on the board composition variables were not 
statistically significant, this means that I was not able to reject the null hypothesis of no 
effect, which is not necessarily synonymous with there being no effect. And, as the 
qualitative interviews revealed, the pathway between board composition and health center 
outcomes is not necessarily direct, but rather depends on board function, for which 
quantitative data were not available. Still, the results are instructive. 
 
The Lack of Descriptive Representation 
First, both the quantitative and qualitative results confirm that, despite the 
requirement that a majority of board members must be consumers, descriptive representation 
is lacking on most FQHC governing boards. While nearly two-thirds of board members are 
consumers, only about one-fourth are descriptively representative of typical FQHC patients. 
What is more, the method used to categorize consumer board members is likely to have at 
least slightly overestimated the degree of descriptive representation. It is reasonable to 
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assume that the true proportion of descriptive consumer board members may be closer to 
one-in-five. By contrast, the majority of consumer board members are not descriptively 
representative. While the board members in this group do report being health center patients, 
they can also be described as belonging to a high socioeconomic class, with physicians, 
lawyers, and other professionals frequently represented among their ranks. 
The interviews suggest that the lack of descriptive representation is driven more by 
socioeconomic gaps than by differences in race, gender, or geographic residence. They also 
indicate that self-reported consumer status may be less than ideal in other important ways, as 
some self-reported consumers did not consider the FQHC their usual source of care, did not 
utilize the FQHC for primary care, or did not become a consumer until after first joining the 
board. All of these characteristics suggest a lack of shared experiences between consumer 
board members and the typical FQHC patient that stands to make them less descriptively 
representative (Dovi, 2003; Mansbridge, 1999).  
Given the well documented struggles to achieve descriptive representation in the 
early days of the health center program, this is not surprising (Hochbaum, 1969; Hollister, 
1974; Hollister, Kramer, & Bellin, 1974; Paap, 1978; Paap & Hanson, 1982; Peterson, 1970; 
Thompson, 1980). However, more recent empirical studies did not identify deficiencies in 
descriptive representation (Bracken, 2007; Latting, 1983; Samuels & Xirasagar, 2005). This 
can be explained by the fact that these latter studies considered consumers to be a 
homogenous or nearly homogenous group.  
The results of this study clearly demonstrate that this is not a reasonable assumption 
as there are actually considerable differences between consumer board members, especially 
with regards to socioeconomic status. The reality is that some consumer board members are 
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more descriptively representative of the typical health center patient than others. As such, 
future studies of consumer governance should make an effort to identify relevant differences 
between consumer board members. 
In the case of consumer governance in a health care context, health status might be 
just as important as—if not more important than—socioeconomic status. After all, even if 
patients themselves are the most knowledgeable about how well the health center is meeting 
their needs, not all patients are created equal. As Schlesinger, Mitchell, and Elbel (2002) 
report, patients who more frequently utilize services (e.g., those with a chronic illness) tend 
to be more knowledgeable about the health care they receive and are therefore more 
comfortable voicing their concerns to decision-makers. Conversely, patients who rarely use 
services may not feel well-informed or equipped to raise their concerns (Schlesinger, 
Mitchell, & Elbel, 2002).   
Board composition is ultimately the result of board member selection. Prior 
qualitative research finds that potential consumer board members may be identified by health 
center staff or current board members, and that patient status may or may not be the primary 
consideration in their selection, because it is often hard to find the expertise needed for 
governance among the health center’s patient population (Bracken, 2007). The current study 
reinforces these findings, but also uncovers some cases where health centers advertise 
consumer board positions directly to the public. Of course, there is the possibility that the 
latter is done as a matter of course, while the only candidates actually given careful 
consideration are those identified by the board or staff. A longitudinal case study of a few 
health centers could provide valuable data on actual board member selection processes. 
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Yet, just because the level of descriptive representation is much lower than might be 
expected given the requirement of a consumer majority, it is important not to overlook the 
fact that FQHC boards are composed, on average, of 20 to 25% descriptively representative 
consumer board members. In many ways, given the obstacles to participation members of 
this group tend to face, this level of descriptive representation is a notable achievement in 
and of itself. One can imagine, for example, how different the United States Congress would 
look if it were to achieve this level of descriptive representation with regards to the electorate. 
Before turning to the ultimate question of whether this level of descriptive 
representation has any effect on health center outcomes, it should be noted that it may well 
be important in other ways. For example, there is evidence that descriptive representation can 
yield community benefits whether or not substantive representation is improved. Higher 
levels of descriptive representation have been associated with increased legitimacy of 
representatives as assessed by the constituency as well as increased participation on the part 
of constituents (Banducci, Donovan, & Karp, 2004).  
For FQHCs, this level of descriptive representation may increase patients’ faith in the 
organization and motivate them to support it in any number of ways, from making it their 
usual source of care to becoming more likely to pay their bills. Of course, this hinges on the 
degree to which the typical patient is aware of who is on the board, which is doubtful, given 
an earlier study on the subject, which found that community residents did not know who 
governed their health center (Hillman & Charney, 1974). 
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Consumer Governance Trumps Community Governance 
Beyond the level of descriptive representation lies the question of exactly who board 
members are representing. Is it the community, the patients, or both? While advocates of 
consumer governance claim that it makes the organization more responsive to community 
needs, the lack of descriptive representation seems to hinder consumer board members’ 
ability to identify community needs—most likely because there is little social interaction 
between these groups. 
As it turns out, the community’s needs are most often identified by the efforts of the 
chief executive officer (CEO) and staff as well as the patients themselves, and because the 
identification of needs originates in that way, it typically motivates the CEO to push for new 
services, which are presented to the board for their approval. In this way, the CEO wields 
influence through agenda setting. When it comes to which services to provide, most boards 
described a reactive rather than a proactive approach to governance. Consequently, it appears 
that the health center (via the board) may be responsive to the needs of the community only if 
the CEO and staff are responsive to the needs of the community. 
Overall, though, it seems that most board members have a favorable view of 
including consumers on the board, despite the fact that the majority of these consumer board 
members are not descriptively representative of the patient population and very seldom 
represent the needs of the community. Instead, they view consumer board members as a 
valuable way for the board to obtain information on the patient experience and the quality of 
care at the health center. In fact, this aspect of consumer governance was stressed far more 
often than any role of consumer board members in identifying the community’s needs.  
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Prior qualitative research finds that consumer board members are valued more for 
their role in providing patient feedback than for their role as representatives of the 
community (Bracken, 2007). The qualitative portion of the current study strongly reinforces 
these findings. According to interview participants, consumer board members can play an 
important role as “secret shoppers”—providing feedback on the quality of the services they 
receive at the center.  
In this role, less descriptively representative board members may provide an 
advantage. For example, having more professional consumer board members may prove 
beneficial to the extent that these individuals possess higher expectations for the quality of 
care they receive and a greater ability to articulate their concerns to the full board. Of course, 
to the extent that their socioeconomic status is readily perceived by others, there is also some 
concern that the clinical staff will interact differently with these board members, leading to a 
biased perception of the quality of care provided to other FQHC patients more generally. 
That is, the “secret shoppers” will not actually be “secret” any longer, which leads to the next 
point. 
There is potential for conflict between consumer board members as secret shoppers 
and consumer board members as conveyors of symbolic confidence in the organization, 
because the former requires a certain degree of anonymity that would explicitly prohibit the 
latter function. That is, to be a secret shopper, consumer board members must not be known 
to others as a board member, while to convey symbolic confidence in the organization, they 
must be known to others as both a board member and a consumer. This does not mean that a 
given consumer board member cannot fulfill both roles, but it makes it highly unlikely that 
they can fulfill both roles simultaneously.  
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For example, if the consumer board member’s physician does not know that they are 
on the board, the consumer board member is equipped to act as a secret shopper but will not 
display symbolic confidence in the organization to the physician. On the other hand, if the 
physician knows that the consumer board member is on the board, symbolic confidence may 
be conveyed, but the board member will no longer be a “secret shopper” but merely a 
“shopper.” That is, they can still provide feedback on the quality of the care they receive, but 
there is now the chance that they received preferential treatment as a known board member. 
 Finally, the extent of these findings is likely to vary depending on the size of the 
community in which the FQHC is located. Smaller communities confer both certain 
advantages, such as the increased ability to achieve descriptive representation and having the 
needs of the community more widely known, and certain disadvantages, such as the 
decreased ability for consumer board members to operate as “secret shoppers” and an 
increased likelihood that the community may lack a sufficient pool of potential board 
members to draw from, causing the board to be deficient in certain areas of expertise. 
 
Navigating the Mission-Margin Tension 
While several studies of health centers have found support for a negative relationship 
between mission and margin (Hoag et al., 2000; Martin et al., 2009; Ricketts et al., 1984; 
Roby, 2006), the quantitative and qualitative results of this study suggest that the 
composition of the board only partially explains these findings. It may well be the case that 
successfully navigating the mission-margin tension depends more heavily on the day-to-day 
operations of the health center, in which case the responsibility falls to the CEO and staff 
rather than the board, which, while ultimately responsible for the organization, is intended as 
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a policy-setting body with the authority to hire and fire the CEO. According to the 
quantitative results, other factors, such as payer-mix and economies of scale enjoyed by 
larger centers, appear to play a large role in making health centers more profitable, efficient, 
and financially self-sufficient. 
The current study also provides qualitative evidence in support of prior findings that 
health centers may occasionally respond to financial pressures and capacity constraints in 
ways that seem antithetical to their mission, such as aggressively pursuing payment or even 
turning patients away (Cunningham et al., 2008; Gusmano et al., 2002; Jacobson et al., 2005). 
Interview participants gave the impression that this is not a common practice, but an 
occasionally unavoidable one when the only alternative appears to be a long-term reduction 
in the capacity to fulfill the mission or even closure. The concept of “No margin, no mission” 
can become a harsh reality for many centers. This makes the finding that consumer 
governance is associated with a decrease in the health center’s operating margin especially 
troubling, because running a deficit is not a sustainable long-term strategy. 
Given the likelihood of a tension between mission and margin, it is reasonable to 
believe that a health center’s financial performance might be an important determinant of its 
mission-oriented outcomes. For instance, a health center with less financial resources might 
not be as able or willing to provide as many enabling services or as much uncompensated 
care as a health center with available financial slack. As such, the margin-oriented outcomes 
could be an important factor, which ought to have been controlled for in the models 
predicting the various mission-oriented outcomes. 
 At the same time, it is possible that some health centers are highly dedicated to their 
mission. Such centers may choose to provide needed services even when it is not a 
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financially-sound decision. For these centers, providing more mission-oriented services may 
be associated with poorer margin-oriented outcomes. As such, the mission-oriented outcomes 
could be an important factor, which ought to have been controlled for in the models 
predicting the various margin-oriented outcomes. 
The above scenarios indicate that it is possible to conceive of a situation in which the 
relationship between mission-oriented outcomes and margin-oriented outcomes is positive 
and one in which the relationship is negative. Furthermore, it is unlikely that the relationship 
is positive or negative for all centers. Rather, the direction of the relationship is likely to 
depend on the health center’s primary motivation. That is, does a center tend to defer to 
mission or margin when making decisions? If it defers to mission, the relationship between 
mission and margin is likely to be negative, because the center will pursue mission at the 
expense of margin. If it defers to margin, the relationship between mission and margin is 
likely to be positive, because the center will only pursue mission when a healthy margin 
permits. 
To the extent that this motivation is time invariant (or at least doesn’t change during 
the study period), such an unobserved characteristic—which might be called the center’s 
mission or margin orientation—is controlled for in the models by the use of FQHC-level 
fixed effects. In addition, the descriptive statistics indicated that both the mission and 
margin-oriented outcome variables were very stable over the study period. Therefore, a 
significant portion of these variables is already controlled for using fixed effects. While this 
approach does not allow me to estimate the effect of the margin-oriented outcomes on the 
mission-oriented outcomes, or vice versa, it does control for their effect, minimizing any 
potential omitted variable bias. 
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From the qualitative interviews, it appears that most health centers are navigating the 
tension between mission and margin with some success, although it is not clear that the 
boards are a significant determinant of that success. On the contrary, it appears that the CEO 
and other senior staff—including physicians—tend to be more influential than the board, 
especially with regards to identifying community needs and making decisions about the 
services that the health center will provide. Because the board receives most of its 
information via the CEO, it is possible for the CEO to set the agenda and effectively 
circumvent the board’s authority. This type of scenario was less commonly described with 
regards to financial decisions, where key staff and members of the board’s finance committee 
tended to work together more closely, which may explain how descriptive consumers are 
able to have the most significant effect on operating margin, while their role in other areas is 
less noticeable.
 
Agenda Setting in FQHCs 
One of the most important findings from this study is the role of agenda setting in 
determining health center outcomes. Merely including consumers on the governing board is 
not sufficient to ensure that they have a voice in the decisionmaking process. This begins 
with descriptive representation and its relationship to holding a leadership position on the 
board, as it was hypothesized that the composition of the board’s executive committee 
leadership, with respect to the number of descriptive and non-descriptive consumers, could 
have a moderating effect on the link between board composition and health center outcomes. 
The interviews confirmed that such a mechanism is plausible, but also pointed to the CEO 
and other senior administrative staff as playing an even larger role in FQHC decisionmaking.  
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Previous studies have concluded that consumers are actively involved in health center 
governance. They have found that consumers and non-consumers are equally likely to serve 
as board chair (Latting, 1983) and even that consumers are more likely than non-consumers 
to serve as board chair (Samuels & Xirasagar, 2005). What these studies have failed to take 
into account is the complexity of the self-identified consumer variable. The current study 
acknowledges that not all consumers are alike, and was able to use data on board member 
occupation to dichotomize consumers into a descriptive and a non-descriptive group, which 
reflects how descriptively similar they are to the typical health center patient in terms of 
socioeconomic status.  
The distinction is an important one, because it reveals that there are at least two 
classes of consumer board members that serve in different capacities. After accounting for 
this difference, consumer board members are no longer equally as likely as non-consumers to 
hold an executive committee office or serve as board chair. Instead, the higher class—the 
non-descriptive consumers—were more likely than non-consumers to hold these positions, 
while the lower class—the descriptive consumers—were less likely than non-consumers (and 
therefore even less likely than non-descriptive consumers) to hold these positions. This is a 
notable finding, because members of the board’s executive committee have more authority 
and influence than other board members. 
While there was no consistent moderating effect per se, the composition of 
descriptively representative consumers on the executive committee was a significant factor in 
making the organization more mission-oriented. Thus, without descriptive consumers on the 
executive committee, descriptive consumer board members are likely to find their influence 
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on decisionmaking to be limited by two rounds of agenda setting: one conducted by the CEO, 
and the other conducted by the board’s executive committee.  
These results suggest a hierarchical model of organizational agenda setting. At the top 
of this hierarchy is the CEO, who has the ability to selectively filter information to the board. 
Next is the board chair, followed by two equally important committees: the finance 
committee and the executive committee. Beneath this are other board members, who are 
unlikely to set the agenda, although they may possess differing levels of influence depending 
on factors that convey status.  
There is also evidence from prior research that demonstrates how the CEO may 
control the identification and recruitment of board members, in which case even the second 
level of agenda setting may ultimately be under the CEO’s control (Bracken, 2007). This 
raises an important consideration regarding the link between formal representation and 
descriptive representation in health centers. 
How and why individuals are selected to join the board is likely to have an effect on 
what types of individuals serve on health center boards as well as what type of influence they 
are able to exert during decisionmaking that might affect health center outcomes. In other 
words, the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation may be affected 
upstream by formal representation (i.e., the board member selection process). Unfortunately, 
no quantitative data on board member selection were available. However, I did ask several 
interview participants about how they, specifically, were asked to join the board and how 
their board identifies potential members, more generally. 
 From these interviews, it is clear that board members are not democratically elected 
by their communities. While certain processes were described that allowed individuals to 
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nominate themselves for consideration, the ultimate selection of board members appears to 
be a highly subjective, informal, and self-perpetuating process.  
Just as status generalization theory predicts that high-status individuals from among 
the board will be elected by the board members to serve in powerful board leadership 
positions, it is likely that “like will beget like” when it comes to selecting new board 
members. As a result, non-consumers may be more likely to advocate for the addition of non-
consumers, non-descriptive consumers may be more likely to advocate for the addition of 
non-descriptive consumers, and so on. 
 The issue is not that the selection of board members moderates the relationship 
between board composition and health center outcomes, it is that board member selection 
determines board composition, which in turn, has the potential to affect outcomes. In a sense, 
then, board member selection represents an important level of agenda setting, because the 
individuals who select the board members can include or exclude individuals or groups of 
individuals as they see fit. This board member selection might be a function of the current 
board, the medical staff, or the executive director.  
In the latter case, the relationship between board composition and health center 
outcomes might be biased by the “behind-the-scenes” workings of a powerful and effective 
executive director. Such a person might be an important determinant of the health center’s 
performance, and might make it a point to proactively advocate for board members with 
certain professional and technical expertise. Such board members would likely not be 
descriptive consumers. In this case, it would appear that the proportion of descriptive 
consumers on the board was negatively associated with margin measures, for example, while 
the causal factor may indeed be the executive director. 
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It can be tempting to think that the typical low-socioeconomic status FQHC patient 
does not participate in the governance of the center out of a feeling of being powerless, but 
Gaventa challenges this notion, citing the power of agenda setting to exclude not only 
choices for decisionmaking, but also participants to the decisionmaking process, going so far 
as to change the way the lower classes view the problem as a non-problem, by the 
presentation of carefully selected—and even intentionally false—information (Gaventa, 
1982).  
The idea that the non-consumer minority might wield a disproportionate share of 
power over the consumer majority is not a new one (Paap, 1978). Therefore, it is worth 
considering if what is most needed at this stage is not more inclusion of the frequently under-
represented descriptive consumers, but more exclusion of overrepresented non-descriptive 
consumers. Privileged groups may need to be excluded from representation to varying 
degrees so that the voices of the disadvantaged might actually be heard and acted upon. As 
political scientist Suzanne Dovi (2009) puts it, “Not only do some voices need to be brought 
in, some voices need to be muted (p. 1172).” 
  
Why Board Composition May Appear Not to Affect Organizational Outcomes 
Senator Edward Kennedy, a longtime supporter of health reform and a champion of 
the health center movement in Congress, once said:  
“What impresses me the most is the ability of health centers to deliver 
comprehensive primary and preventive care in a cost effective manner to 
populations in the hard-to-reach communities. Centers are able to do this, in 
part, because they are community organizations governed by consumer boards 
and operated on a local level. This puts them in touch with the needs of the 
local population (Reynolds, 1999).”  
  
199 
From this, it is important to note two things. First, consumer governance is given 
some credit for health centers’ success at providing cost-effective care to underserved 
populations. Second, and just as importantly, it is not given all of the credit in Senator 
Kennedy’s quote. In other words, consumer governance is not necessarily the sole factor in 
health centers’ success. This is an important point, which should not be overlooked in 
interpreting the findings from this study. There are four reasons why the consumer 
component of board composition may have—or appear to have—no effect on the outcomes 
studied here and each of these possible scenarios warrants further study.  
First, the law requires a consumer majority and 51% is a relatively high threshold. 
Because most centers are in compliance with the law, there are few cases available to 
examine the effect of lower levels of consumer governance. Perhaps the presence of a single 
descriptive consumer is sufficient to make the board aware of the community’s needs. This 
should not be confused with tokenism, for in this case, the single individual on the board 
would be wielding both authority and influence. If so, the variation in consumer governance 
between 51 and 100% will be of no added explanatory value.  
A study similar to this one, but which compares FQHCs with other types of safety net 
providers that lack consumer governance (e.g., free clinics, hospital outpatient departments, 
etc.) would have the potential to build on the current study by explicitly comparing 
organizations with and without consumer governance, and answering the question of whether 
consumer governance matters at all. 
Second, it may be that consumer governance is not associated with the outcomes of 
interest in this study. This could occur for two reasons. First, it may simply be the case that 
the needs of the community are widely known and understood (Dovi, 2003; Mansbridge, 
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1999). In such cases, there is indeed evidence that substantive representation can exist in the 
absence of descriptive representation (Conway, Hu, & Harrington, 1997). If everyone in the 
community knows that the patients need transportation, for example, including consumers on 
the board would not add anything to the identification of the community’s needs. 
The second reason, closely related to the first, is that consumer governance matters 
for different health center outcomes than those examined by this study. For example, 
consumer board members could still function as an important source of information about the 
quality of services provided in the center. This could be investigated by conducting a study 
similar to this one, and replacing the mission and margin outcomes with measures focused on 
the quality of care FQHCs provide to see if more consumer governance is associated with 
improvements in those areas. 
Third, it may be the case that while consumer governance is readily abundant, true 
descriptive representation is sufficiently lacking. The current study strongly suggests that, 
whether or not the lack of descriptive representation is to blame for the insignificant effect of 
consumer governance observed here, there is nonetheless a lack of descriptive representation. 
While the Bureau of Primary Health Care (BPHC) requires consumer board members, as a 
whole, to “represent the individuals served by the health center in terms of race, ethnicity, 
and gender (Bureau of Primary Health Care, 1998a, p. 22),” other factors like insurance 
status, income, and education level that would seem to be at least as important, if not more so, 
than race, ethnicity and gender are not addressed at all. If data on these aspects of board 
composition were available, it would be possible to model health center outcomes more 
accurately, and get a more detailed picture of the relationship between board composition and 
health center outcomes. 
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 Fourth and finally, it is possible that there is ample consumer governance, which is 
also sufficiently descriptive in its representation, but which is rendered ineffectual through a 
decisionmaking process heavily shaped by the decisions, non-decisions, and agenda setting 
of a CEO and/or board chair with the most power, authority, and influence. In this case, two 
lines of inquiry arise. The first approach seeks to understand how to level the playing field 
between the descriptive consumer board members and their more powerful counterparts. The 
second approach concerns itself not with rebalancing power, which presents a daunting 
challenge, but rather focuses on understanding the characteristics of the primary decision-
maker(s). For example, if the CEO typically wields the most influence over the health 
center’s decisionmaking process, it may be easier—and perhaps most amenable to change—
to understand the characteristics of good versus bad CEOs, rather than attempting to find 
ways to lessen the CEO’s power relative to that of the board. 
 
Policy Implications 
Given the findings from this study that descriptive consumer board members are less 
likely to hold leadership positions on the board, in conjunction with the finding that when 
descriptive consumers do hold board leadership positions, it can have a positive effect on 
mission-oriented outcomes and can provide a protective effect for operating margin, policies 
to strengthen the consumer governance provision and its implementation—perhaps 
mandating a certain level of descriptive representation or requiring at least one consumer 
board member on the executive committee—should be considered.  
Unfortunately, such a policy seems infeasible both technically and politically, as any 
number of groups could claim that they ought to be represented. Still, future studies might 
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focus on understanding the barriers to descriptive representation and designing ways to 
enhance levels of descriptive representation in practice. At the very least, further inquiry into 
the role and contributions of descriptively representative consumer board members is 
warranted. 
 However, before advocating too strongly for a stronger system of consumer 
governance, it is important to keep in mind that the results of this study also suggest that 
consumer governance may reduce health center operating margins. Just as the weakly 
positive effects of consumer governance are not sufficient grounds for expanding the 
requirement, this result should not necessarily be taken as evidence that policymakers should 
abolish the requirement.  
 The financial struggles faced by many health centers would be exacerbated if the 
consumer governance provision were eliminated and limited grant funds were spread over a 
greater number of organizations. Rather than reallocating current funds, serious consideration 
should be given to increasing the total amount of funding provided to all safety net 
institutions.  
 Fortunately, recently enacted health reform legislation will expand the Medicaid 
program up to 133% of the federal poverty level (FPL), which would provide coverage (and 
reimbursement) for roughly 2 million currently uninsured health center patients (D. R. 
Hawkins, 2009). Perhaps what is needed is greater education and training of board members 
to improve their financial competency. 
 Furthermore, the consumer governance provision is not the sole distinction between 
health centers and other safety net providers. Indeed, there are many substantial differences 
between health centers and other safety net facilities in the actualization of mission. For 
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example, while health centers have a legally mandated option to treat all regardless of ability 
to pay, hospitals with ambulatory clinics face no such mandate, in many cases shielding them 
from the brunt of uncompensated care, even as they enjoy the advantage of tax-exempt non-
profit status. It is for this reason that Congress is currently proposing to set a mandatory 
minimum level of charity care provision, which hospitals must provide to retain their non-
profit status (Pear, 2009).  
 Likewise, because of the exceedingly high number of uninsured patients they serve, 
health centers have far less of an ability to cost-shift than providers that enjoy a more diverse 
payer mix. In the wake of comprehensive health reform, health centers will continue to play a 
vital and expanded role. Many newly insured individuals will face non-financial barriers to 
access and will depend on the unique services that health centers provide. Given the number 
of individuals who rely on the health care safety net and the disproportionate financial burden 
safety net providers shoulder, the decision of how to allocate limited financial resources 
should be based on sound empirical research rather than untested assumptions. 
 Numerous stakeholder groups may look to this research in an attempt to justify their 
policy position, and in so doing, they may be selective in their interpretation of the results. 
Health center advocates, including the National Association of Community Health Centers, 
the various state primary care associations, and the U.S. Health Resources and Services 
Administration (HRSA) which operates the health center program, will be quick to note that 
consumer governance is positively associated with both the scope of enabling services 
provided by—and the financial self-sufficiency of—health centers. These groups are not 
likely to admit that consumer governance has some real limitations, some of which may 
actually threaten the continued existence of certain health centers. 
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 Other safety-net providers and their advocates, like the National Association of Public 
Hospitals and the Catholic Health Association of the United States will point out that 
consumer governance can harm operating margin, and therefore has the potential to 
undermine—or at least limit—the pursuit of a charitable mission to care for the underserved. 
They are likely to argue that federal funds should be awarded to those safety net providers 
that best serve the underserved, not restricted to consumer-governed organizations. In their 
view, a high-performing (i.e., high quality, high volume of uncompensated care) hospital 
outpatient department should qualify for federal funds before a low-performing health center. 
These groups are not likely to admit that consumer governance may actually be beneficial in 
some instances, that it may be the difference between a low-performing health center and 
what would otherwise be an even lower-performing health center. 
 While the various stakeholders will react differently to the findings presented in this 
dissertation, the study results strongly suggest that the consumer governance requirement, in 
its current form, should be strengthened. There is evidence that consumer governance can be 
beneficial to some elements of both mission and margin, but there is also evidence that 
consumer governance can be harmful to margin, and the deciding factor appears to be 
whether or not a board has descriptively representative consumers on its executive committee.  
 However, the results of this study indicate that most boards do not have descriptive 
consumers on the executive committee. If efforts are made to strengthen the provision, such 
that descriptive consumers are given leadership roles on the board, then it seems that 
consumer governance is beneficial enough to justify its being required as a condition of 
federal health center funding. Without such strengthening of the provision, it is doubtful that 
consumer governance will have much of an effect on the outcomes studied here. 
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Limitations and Directions for Future Research 
There are several important limitations of this study, which must be acknowledged. 
First, the Uniform Data System (UDS) data used in the study is self-reported and unaudited. 
A report from the Government Accountability Office (GAO) details several limitations of 
HRSA’s UDS data on health centers, including unclear reporting instructions, inconsistent 
data cleaning by HRSA, and reporting failures by certain centers (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2000b). There is no way to accurately assess or account for the extent 
to which the accuracy of the current UDS data may suffer from these limitations. However, it 
is worth thinking through the consequences of measurement error in the data. 
Measurement error falls into two broad categories, depending on whether the 
dependent or independent variables are measured with error. In this study, the dependent 
variables are all drawn from the UDS and may, therefore, be measured with error. Based on 
anecdotal evidence, this is more likely the case with the financial variables, where poorly 
performing health centers may be more likely to report inaccurate data. However, 
measurement error in the dependent variable does not bias the coefficient estimates unless 
that error is correlated with the explanatory variables. There is no reason to suspect this with 
these data. 
Significant measurement error in the explanatory variables drawn from the UDS is 
unlikely, but possible. For example, health centers are likely to provide rough counts of the 
proportion of their caseload by income level, insurance status, age and gender. They may 
also purposefully inflate these counts if they feel that any of them are too low. If this 
measurement error is correlated with the observed value of the variable, it will result in 
biased coefficient estimates, provided that the dependent variable is a function of the 
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unobserved value of the variable and not the observed value of the variable. If this is not true, 
or if the dependent variable is correlated with the unobserved value of the variable, the 
coefficient estimates will not be biased.  
The former case is more likely, because measurement error would be induced in cases 
where the true measurement might not reflect well on the health center. Still, there is little 
reason to believe—and no empiric evidence to confirm—that any such errors in reporting of 
the information used in this study would be systematic across health centers. What is more, 
while the UDS data may be less than ideal, it remains the only comprehensive data available 
on FQHCs. 
Second, the HRSA report also notes that “the financial data in UDS cannot provide an 
accurate indication of an individual center’s financial status because costs are reported on an 
accrual basis, while revenues are reported on a cash basis…[making] it difficult to estimate 
the extent to which centers’ revenues cover costs (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2000b).” This is likely to bias operating margins downward, as costs will tend to be accurate, 
but cash-on-hand will not reflect pending charges not yet collected. 
Third, the data captured in the UDS can also be somewhat misleading with regards to 
the extent of service provision. For example, while a health center grantee must legally 
provide a comprehensive range of primary care services, an FQHC with multiple delivery 
sites must only meet this requirement collectively, meaning that not all delivery sites provide 
the full range of services. The GAO has recommended that HRSA could improve the health 
center program by monitoring information on the specific types of services an FQHC 
provides at its respective delivery sites (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2008). This 
limitation is partially addressed by modeling not only the scope of enabling services, but also 
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the volume of enabling services and the number of full-time equivalent enabling staff (FTEs), 
and controlling for the number of delivery sites an FQHC grantee operates. 
Fourth, the time-ordering of the relationship between board membership and health 
center patient status cannot be ascertained from the available data. To put it simply, an 
individual may first be asked to join the board, or hold a board leadership position in advance 
of their becoming a health center consumer. The interview results suggest that this may occur 
in approximately 25% of cases.  
Subsequently, this individual might begin periodically using the health center’s 
services to demonstrate his or her support of the organization. However, while technically a 
consumer, the individual is unlikely to be representative of the general patient population. 
This limitation was addressed by using data on board member occupation, linked to 
occupational wage data, to distinguish descriptive consumers from non-descriptive 
consumers. However, this process also has potential limitations. 
While I coded individual board members into standard occupational classification 
(SOC) groups as conservatively as possible, I was forced to make certain assumptions 
regarding the coding and categorization of board members. For instance, I assumed a cutoff 
of 200% FPL for a family of four as the indicator of a high status occupation. For single 
individuals or those in a smaller family, this will lead to a conservative estimate. However, 
for individuals from a larger family, this will tend to overstate their income relative to 
poverty.  
Furthermore, I relied on mean annual income for each occupation, and some 
occupations may have more variation in wages than others. For an individual at the lower end 
of the range, a higher mean income for the group may lead a descriptive consumer to be 
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categorized as a non-descriptive consumer, while for individuals at the higher end of the 
range, a lower mean income for the group may lead a non-descriptive consumer to be 
categorized as a descriptive consumer.  
Finally, the use of average annual occupational income is only directly accounting for 
one dimension of descriptiveness (i.e., income). To some extent this measure is likely to be 
correlated with other dimensions like education, but it is not a perfect indicator. In short, the 
transformation of a binary consumer variable into a categorical variable is at best a proxy 
measure for a more finely nuanced reality. That is, consumer board members are likely to be 
descriptively representative of the patient population in a variety of ways, and in reality, 
some consumer board members will be highly descriptively representative, others will not be 
at all descriptively representative, and others will fall somewhere in the middle. Thus, a 
continuous—rather than categorical—measure of descriptive representation would be the 
ideal solution. Unfortunately, data were not available to attempt such an approach. The 
method I used was conservative enough, however, to be confident in the results obtained. In 
fact, if anything, I believe that the results may understate the true effects. 
Fifth, the fact that FQHC grant application data was not received for all health centers, 
and that there were some systematic differences between missing and non-missing data, 
places limits on the ability to generalize the results of this study to settings other than those 
described by the sample.  
Sixth, while a number of factors are controlled for at the county level using Area 
Resource File (ARF) data, it is important to note that the county and the community are not 
necessarily synonymous. For smaller FQHCs with perhaps a single delivery site, the 
community service area may actually be only a portion of the county. For large, multi-site 
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FQHCs, however, the service area may span multiple counties, and even cross state lines. 
Consequently, some relevant county-level factors affecting delivery sites lying outside the 
central county may not be controlled for in the study. However, to the extent that those 
factors are time-invariant, the fixed effects models will control for them. Still, time-varying 
factors may persist and future studies should consider alternative ways to account for the 
diversity of settings in which large FQHCs with multiple delivery sites operate. 
Seventh, while the use of a fixed effects model seemed appropriate and was 
confirmed by a series of Hausman tests, that approach comes at the cost of a loss of 
efficiency. Although a consistent but inefficient model is preferable to an inconsistent model, 
the loss of efficiency can still be a problem. In the current study, I have a very short panel of 
four years. Furthermore, data was not available for all FQHCs in each of the years. For 
instance, in some cases, I had only a single year of data for a given FQHC. In other cases, I 
had two or three years of data for a given FQHC. This has the effect of shortening the panel 
for these cases.  
While the estimated coefficients are consistent, the loss of efficiency resulting from 
the use of a fixed effects model may in part explain the paucity of statistically significant 
results observed. While the use of a random effects model would boost model efficiency, it 
would require assumptions about the data that seem implausible. Instead, to the extent 
possible, future studies should strive to construct a longer and more complete panel dataset to 
overcome this issue. While this is not currently feasible, this may change in the future with 
the full implementation of an electronic grant application record system at HRSA. 
The interviews also have some potential limitations. First, there is the possibility of 
selection bias, as non-participants may have answered my questions differently than 
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participants did. By using a purposive stratified random sample, I hope to have minimized 
the consequences of any response bias. However, the qualitative interviews may still have 
suffered from two levels of selection bias.  
Specifically, there could have been selection bias at the health center level, and 
selection bias at the board member level. The first instance would occur if FQHCs where the 
executive director agreed to participate were significantly different from FQHCs that did not 
participate. The second instance would occur if the board members identified for 
participation by the executive director differed significantly from the board members not 
identified for participation. 
 To assess the extent to which selection bias is present at the level of the health center, 
I compared participants to all non-participants (i.e., all other health centers) to identify any 
meaningful differences in values of variables for the models. With one exception, no 
meaningful differences were observed between the participating and non-participating 
centers. The exception was that urban centers were disproportionately represented among 
interview participants, relative to the distribution of FQHCs nationally. However, this is the 
result of intentional oversampling of urban centers to ensure adequate representation of 
different views in the qualitative study. Thus, selection bias at the health center level does not 
appear to be a major concern. 
 To assess the extent to which selection bias is present at the board member level, I 
compared the proportions of descriptive consumers, non-descriptive consumers, and non-
consumers between the interview participants and the quantitative data sample. Among 
interview participants, only 6.7% were descriptive consumers, 73.3% were non-descriptive 
consumers, and 20% were non-consumers. By contrast, in the quantitative data sample, 
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26.5% were descriptive consumers, 42.6% were non-descriptive consumers, and 30.9% were 
non-consumers. From this comparison, it appears that selection bias led to oversampling of 
non-descriptive consumers and undersampling of both descriptive consumers and non-
consumers. This may have limited my ability to uncover important information from the 
perspective of both non-consumers and descriptive consumers. Future research should 
consider using in-depth case studies to ensure that the views of all board members are 
proportionately represented. 
Second, to the extent that participants told me that consumer governance was 
beneficial because they thought that that was the “right” answer or was what I wanted to hear, 
there is also the possibility that the interview data suffer from acceptability bias. In this case, 
interview participants may have underreported the disadvantages of consumer governance. 
This seems especially likely in cases where participants were unable (or unwilling) to 
mention any disadvantages of consumer governance. Fortunately, enough participants shared 
what they perceived to be the disadvantages of the requirement to enable me to make some 
inferences in this regard.  
The third and final limitation of the interviews relates to the manner in which they 
were conducted. Because interviews were conducted over the telephone, this limited my 
ability and that of the participants to respond to non-verbal cues and draw non-verbal 
inferences. However, telephone interviews were inexpensive, which made it feasible to 
collect data from all over the country. Such broad coverage would not have been possible 
with in-person interviews. 
Lastly, there are limitations to the conclusions this study is able to reach. In the truest 
sense, measuring the relationship between descriptive and substantive representation requires 
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having information on what the members of the community want and how the individual 
members of the board voted on an issue. This data is not available in the current study. 
Instead, aggregate data on board composition is used to predict health center outcomes that 
seem to be reasonable proxies for the interests of a majority of—but not necessarily all—
patients. Nor can this study conclude whether consumer governance matters in an absolute 
sense, because it does not compare FQHCs with other providers governed completely by 
non-consumers. Despite these limitations, the current study is able to determine the 
association between varying levels of consumer governance and tangible FQHC outcomes. 
 Going forward, there are many questions that remain to be answered about 
community health centers in the wake of the Affordable Care Act. Chief among these is how 
to integrate health centers into the broader health care system to most effectively maximize 
access, reduce costs, and improve the quality of care for underserved populations. More work 
is also needed to better understand which factors, other than consumer governance, might be 
associated with the outcomes examined in this study. For instance, what is the true 
relationship between enabling service provision and access to care or the quality of health 
outcomes? What factors are associated with an FQHC’s efficiency and sustainability?  
Answering these questions well will require HRSA to collect better health center data, 
including governance data on board member age, gender, race, education level and income. It 
would also be helpful to collect data on how long consumer board members have been 
receiving care at the center, and even how many visits for care they make each year, although 
collecting the latter may be unfeasible. It would also be beneficial for HRSA to begin 
auditing at least a portion of the UDS data to help ensure its accuracy. Finally, HRSA should 
make all health center data publicly available for research purposes. 
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Conclusion 
The idea of consumer governance is certainly powerful and inspiring. Giving a voice 
to the under-represented somehow seems like the right thing to do on a number of levels. 
When health centers were first established in 1965, the rationale was that a confluence of 
poverty and racism had kept many Americans from accessing basic primary care. By meeting 
the self-identified health care and public health needs of the community, health centers aimed 
to intervene and break the cycle of disadvantage (Schorr & Schorr, 1989). Ten years later, it 
became apparent that communities wanted ownership of their centers, and the consumer 
governance requirement was implemented.  
Today, the problems of poverty and the lack of access to health care that motivated 
the creation of the first health centers remain, but the health care system has become 
increasingly complex, creating arguably greater barriers to health care access. Racial 
disparities in health persist, and the country is now faced with sizable numbers of Latino 
immigrants whose unique health care needs may go unrealized without their input. 
The concept of community has also changed. People are more mobile than they were 
in the past. Inner city areas, once home to the majority of the urban underserved, have 
become gentrified, and the underserved have moved into suburban communities. As a result, 
health centers specifically located to serve a given community, may now find that that 
community has moved a considerable distance away from the center. 
Giving people from underserved communities a seat at the table will remain 
important as the country moves toward new models of care in an attempt to control costs, 
improve quality, and confront the social determinants of health. The issue is how such 
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democratic notions are to be effectively implemented. Community-based participatory 
research is one such mechanism. Consumer governance is another. 
Under the right conditions, there is no doubt that consumer board members can have 
a positive impact on the organizations they govern. However, it is not clear from this study 
that those conditions exist very often, if at all. There is evidence that including descriptive 
consumers on the board may harm health centers’ operating margins, without affecting their 
financial self-sufficiency or operational efficiency. However, a negative operating margin is 
not a sound strategy for the long-term sustainability of the organization.  
At the same time, when descriptive consumers serve on the executive committee, it 
appears that they may steer the health center towards providing a greater scope of enabling 
services. However, these study results clearly indicate that descriptive consumers are less 
likely than others on the board to hold positions of influence. As such, including descriptive 
consumers on the board, while excluding them from the executive committee, may mean 
enduring the financial disadvantages of consumer governance, without enjoying any of the 
advantages it brings to service provision. 
As Dr. H. Jack Geiger (1996), co-founder of the U.S. health center movement, once 
wrote: “The communities of the poor—places the public are taught to regard as sinkholes of 
pathology—are full of untapped human resources, people with drive and intelligence and the 
commitment to achieve if given half a chance (p. 17).” The results of this study do not 
suggest that descriptively representative consumers lack the potential to govern. They 
suggest that they are not being given half a chance. 
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APPENDIX A:  
 
Implied Consent Letter 
 
 
 
 
 
Dear [FQHC Executive Director]: 
 
Consumer participation in health care has been used in the United States both as a way to ensure that services 
are tailored to the needs of patients and to empower disenfranchised residents of disadvantaged communities 
since the 1960s. However, the contribution of consumer participation to board decisionmaking has not been 
well-established. We are conducting a study to examine decisionmaking in federally-qualified health center 
(FQHCs) governing boards. You were randomly selected from the database of FQHCs maintained by HRSA as 
a possible participant in this study. Your participation will help us to understand the value of consumer 
governance in the context of the health care safety net. A total of 16 FQHCs have been chosen from across the 
country to participate in this study. Your participation in this study is voluntary.   
 
To participate in the study you would agree to identify one consumer board member and one non-consumer 
board member (if available) on your board who consent to be interviewed (via telephone) about their current 
position on the board and how the board makes decisions, as well as some demographic questions used to 
describe the respondents in this study. Interviews should last between 40 and 50 minutes. Board members are 
free to answer or not answer any particular question and may choose to end the interview at any time. The 
interview will be audio-recorded to allow for accurate transcription of participants’ comments. Board members’ 
responses are confidential. The only persons who will have access to these data are the investigator named on 
this letter, and the transcription service which has signed a non-disclosure agreement.  
 
There are no direct risks anticipated with participation in this study, however participants will receive a $10 
gift card from Amazon.com for their participation. There will also be indirect professional benefit from this 
study, as the information obtained will be communicated to the profession through publication in the literature, 
presentation at professional meetings and direct dissemination to professional associations. You may contact me 
with any questions at (202) 465-4815 or by email (bradwright@unc.edu). All research on human volunteers is 
reviewed by a committee that works to protect your rights and welfare.  If you have questions or concerns about 
your rights as a research subject you may contact, anonymously if you wish, the University of North Carolina 
Institutional Review Board at 919-966-3113 or by email (IRB_subjects@unc.edu).  
 
Thank you for considering participation in this study. I hope that I can use your board members’ responses to 
help shape recommendations for improving the community health center program and share their views with the 
greater professional community. I will need to be in touch with board members to schedule and conduct the 
interviews. You may either provide them with my contact information and have them get in touch with me at 
their convenience, or provide me with their contact information and I will get in touch with them. I do ask that 
you please respond as soon as possible to indicate whether or not you agree to have your center 
participate, as interviews are being conducted on a rolling basis. 
 
Sincerely, 
 
D. Brad Wright, PhD (Cand.)     Daniel R. Hawkins, Jr.   
Principal Investigator     Senior Vice President, Public Policy and Research 
Dept of Health Policy and Management    National Association of Community Health Centers 
Gillings School of Global Public Health   Washington, DC                     
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill 
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APPENDIX B:  
 
Interview Guide 
 
 
Date of Interview:_______________________________________________________ 
 
Time of Interview:_______________________________________________________ 
 
Name of Person Interviewed:______________________________________________ 
 
Contact Info of Person Interviewed:________________________________________ 
 
Name of FQHC Site:_____________________________________________________ 
 
UDS Number of FQHC Site:_______________________________________________ 
 
Special Conditions Potentially Affecting Interview:____________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
________________________________________________________________________ 
 
Interview Script 
Introduction and Consent: Hi! Thank you so much for taking the time to speak with me 
today. My name is Brad Wright and I am conducting this interview as part of my doctoral 
dissertation research at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. You have been 
randomly selected to take part in this study, which is designed to gather information about 
decisionmaking by FQHC boards. Your participation is voluntary. The interview should last 
between 40 and 50 minutes. To ensure that I am able to accurately capture all of your 
comments, I would like to audio record the interview and have it professionally transcribed. 
Do I have your permission to do so? All information will remain confidential and any 
identifying information will be removed when the final results are developed. Do you have 
any questions about this? Do you consent to participate in this interview? Great, let’s get 
started. Please be sure to speak up so that I don’t miss any of your comments. 
 
Background Information on the Board Member 
I’d like to begin by asking you a few questions about your health center and your service on 
the board. 
 
1. How long have you been on the board of the health center? 
 
2. How would you describe your primary job as a board member?  
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3. In what areas of the board’s work do you feel the most knowledgeable? 
3.1. In what areas do you feel the least knowledgeable? 
 
4. Are you an officer of your board? 
4.1. If NO: Skip to question 5 
4.2. If YES: Which office do you hold? 
4.2.1. How long have you held this office? 
 
5. Are you currently a patient at the health center? 
5.1. If NO: Skip to question 6 
5.2. If YES: I’d like to ask you some questions about your use of the health center.  
5.2.1. Do you consider the health center your usual source of care?  
5.2.2. How long have you been coming to the health center for care?  
5.2.3. Were you a patient of this health center before you became a member of the 
board? 
5.2.3.1.If NO: Skip to question 6 
5.2.3.2.If YES: How long were you a patient before you joined the board? 
 
Health Center Mission 
Now I’d like to ask you some questions about the services your health center provides.  
 
6. Thinking about the services your health center provides, would you say that the board or 
the executive director was more influential in determining which services would be 
provided? 
 
7. How involved would you say your board is in determining which services the health 
center will provide? Would you say: 
7.1. Very involved 
7.2. Somewhat involved 
7.3. Not very involved, or 
7.4. Not at all involved 
 
8. At your center, who is primarily responsible for deciding which enabling services will be 
offered? 
8.1. Who else is involved in making this decision? 
8.2. How is the decision made (i.e., what things does it depend upon)? 
 
9. How much of a role would you say that the health center’s mission plays in the decisions 
the board makes regarding which services to provide? 
9.1. Can you give me an example of an instance when the board relied on the mission to 
guide a decision? 
9.2. How about a time when the board made a decision that seemed to conflict with the 
mission? 
 
Health Center Margin 
Now I’d like to talk with you some about the finances of your health center. 
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10. Thinking about the financial health of your center, would you say that the board or the 
executive director was more influential in maintaining the finances of the health center? 
 
11. How involved would you say your board is in determining the health center’s budget? 
Would you say: 
11.1. Very involved 
11.2. Somewhat involved 
11.3. Not very involved, or 
11.4. Not at all involved 
 
12. How would you say that the board views the health center’s financial health? 
12.1. What role does the board play? 
12.2. What is the board’s responsibility for finances versus the health center staff’s 
responsibility for finances? 
 
13. Has your board ever judged an effort as successful even if it lost money? 
13.1. If NO: skip to question 14 
13.2. If YES: Can you give me an example of a time when this happened? 
 
14. What is the “nominal fee” your center charges individuals who are below the poverty 
line? 
 
15. Some health centers use collection agencies, others have billing departments that set up 
payment plans or negotiate lower fees with patients, and still others refer patients to other 
providers to maximize revenues.  
15.1. What measures, if any, does your health center take to ensure payment from all 
patients?  
15.2. Does your center currently—or has it ever considered—collecting payment up front 
before services are provided? 
 
16. Many health centers face financial pressures because of a combination of reductions in 
funding and increasing demand for services.  
16.1. Has your FQHC been faced with budget cutbacks during your time on the board?  
16.2. If so, what specific actions did the board take in response to this pressure? 
16.3. Has your center ever reduced the amount or types of enabling services offered 
because of budgetary concerns? 
 
The Consumer-majority Requirement 
As you know, all federally-qualified health centers—with the exception of certain programs 
eligible for governance waivers—are required to have a governing board the majority of 
whose members must be patients at the center and who must be representative of the 
community served. I’d like to talk to you some about this aspect of your health center. 
 
17. What, if any, do you think are the advantages and disadvantages to the health center of 
having consumers on the board?  
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18. How does your board identify potential patients to serve on the board? 
 
19. Thinking about its impact on the board’s decisions, would you say that the consumer-
majority requirement matters: 
19.1. Very much 
19.2. Some, but not much 
19.3. Very little, or 
19.4. Not at all 
 
Board Member Participation and Influence 
Now, I’d like for us to talk a bit about how the board operates during a typical meeting. 
 
20. What proportion of board decisions would you say are made primarily by the board’s 
executive committee, with little or no input from the rest of the board? 
 
21. Thinking about the role of consumer board members on the board, would you say that 
patient board members have: 
21.1. More influence 
21.2. Less influence, or 
21.3. About the same amount of influence as non-patient board members when it comes 
to making decisions on the board? 
 
Wrap-Up Question 
Just to make sure I’ve covered everything and to give you the opportunity to address 
anything I may have neglected to mention during this interview, I’d like to ask you: 
 
22. What do you think makes health centers different from other safety net providers? 
 
Demographic Information on Interviewee 
Okay, we’re almost done. Finally, I’d like to ask you a few questions about yourself that will 
help me in analyzing my results.  
 
[Interviewer: Note respondent’s gender] 
 
23. If you don’t mind my asking, what is your current age? 
 
24. How would you describe your race and/or ethnicity? 
 
25. What is the highest level of education you have completed? 
 
26. What is your primary occupation? 
 
27. Which of the following categories best reflects your total household income before taxes 
last year? Would you say: 
27.1. Under $25,000 
27.2. $25,000 - $40,000 
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27.3. $40,001 - $60,000 
27.4. $60,001 - $80,000 
27.5. More than $80,000 
 
Concluding Remarks: 
Well, those are all of the questions that I have for you at this time. Before we finish up is 
there anything else you’d like to add? I really appreciate your taking the time to participate in 
this interview. To make sure that I’ve accurately captured your statements, I’d like to send 
you a copy of the written transcript of this interview by email once it is available. You are 
eligible to receive a $10 gift card to Amazon.com for your participation, which I can also 
send to you by email. Would you mind providing me with your email address solely for these 
two purposes? Then you can read through the transcript, and if you need to change anything 
or make any corrections, you can send me an email to let me know. Okay, well, thanks again 
for your participation! I’ll be in touch!  
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APPENDIX C:  
 
Coding Manual 
 
 
Background 
Coding is the process of breaking a larger text into discrete units and interpreting the 
meaning of these units, through the use of a number of theoretical constructs, which are then 
labeled by the applying of a code. The discrete units may be a word, a sentence, or a 
paragraph—there is no set size—but longer chunks of text tend to provide a richer context 
for analyzing and understanding the content. 
 
This manual, which will be modified as appropriate, begins with a list of start codes that have 
been derived from the theoretical model for the study as well as the particular interview 
questions asked. Each code is defined and decision rules are provided to help ensure that the 
code is applied appropriately with consistency. Where ambiguity may exist, examples of 
appropriate and inappropriate use of each code are also provided. During the coding process, 
it may become necessary to combine two or more codes into a single code or to create new 
codes if no pre-existing code adequately describes a given textual unit. Through an iterative 
process, codes, their definitions, and the decision rules regarding their use will be refined. 
 
Instructions 
You are being given 6 interviews to code. You may use any qualitative software you like to 
code the documents, or you may simply use Microsoft Word. In either case, please label the 
text units using the code abbreviation in the table below. If you choose to code the 
documents in Microsoft Word, please use different colors to highlight sections of the text, 
and then use the “comment” feature both to assign the code, to suggest new codes (please 
indicate new codes by name in all caps), and to record your thoughts (where necessary) to 
justify your application of a code. This will be important when we meet to discuss and 
resolve any discrepancies. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
222 
CODE SUMMARY TABLE 
 
CODE CODE SHORT DESCRIPTION 
A Board Tenure 
B Description of Board Work 
B1 CEO Oversight 
B2  Represent Community 
B3 Set Budget and Policies 
B4 Ensure Compliance 
B5 Fiduciary Duty 
C Knowledge Areas 
C1 Most Knowledgeable 
C2 Least Knowledgeable 
D Board Officer 
E FQHC Patient Status (Yes / No) 
E1 Usual Source of Care (Yes / No) 
E2 Patient/Board Member Timing 
E3 Use Peripheral Service Only (e.g., Dental) 
F Influence in Service Provision 
F1 Board More Influential 
F2 CEO / Staff More Influential 
F3 Shared Influence of Board and CEO 
G Influence in Finances 
G1 Board More Influential 
G2 CEO / Staff More Influential 
G3 Shared Influence of Board and CEO 
H Mission-Margin Tension 
H1 Mission Dominant 
H2 Margin Dominant 
H3  Balanced Approach 
I Nominal Fee ($ FIGURE) 
J Revenue Collection Strategies 
J1 Collect Up Front 
J2 In-House Billing 
J3 Refer to Collections 
J4 Fire Patients 
K Response to Adverse Conditions 
K1 Response to Financial Cutbacks 
K2 Response to Other Circumstances 
L Pros and Cons of Consumer (51%) Majority Requirement 
L1 Pros of Consumer Majority 
L
1a 
Secret Shoppers 
L2  Cons of Consumer Majority 
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L
2a 
No Cons to Consumer Majority 
L3 Community Work/Residency Trumps Patient Status 
M Identification of Consumer Board Members 
M1 Identify Person First 
M2 Identify Consumer First 
N Consumer Board Member Representativeness (1 – 4 scale) 
N1 Explanation of Representativeness 
O Identifying Community Needs 
O1 Originates with Board 
O2 Originates with Staff 
O3 Complaining to Board Members 
P The Consumer Majority in Practice 
P1 Consumer Majority Decisions (1 – 4 scale) 
P2 Consumer Participation (1 – 3 scale) 
P3 Consumer Influence (1 – 3 scale) 
P4 Who Talks at Meetings? 
Q Executive Committee Dominance 
R Demographics 
 
 
EXPLANATION OF CODES 
 
Code: BOARD TENURE 
Definition: How long (in years) the board member has served on the board. 
Position in Framework: This is used to gauge the respondent’s familiarity with the board, 
the health center, and the health center program. For example, a board member with a long 
tenure will be more likely to have many experiences to draw on during the interview, but 
may also be more committed to the doctrine and rhetoric of the health center program. On the 
other hand, a new board member may have less specific experience to draw from, but may be 
more open-minded in their assessment of the health center program.  
Decision Rules: This question is asked—and generally responded to—directly. It refers to 
total time on the board, and not to any particular aspect of board service (e.g., length of time 
a certain office has been held.) 
Sub-Codes: None 
Examples of Correct Use: “16 years.”; “About 10 years.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “I was probably chair six or eight years ago.” 
 
Code: DESCRIPTION OF BOARD WORK 
Definition: This code describes what the respondent thinks the board’s purpose is. Why is 
there a board? What does it do? What role does it play in the organization? 
Position in Framework: Governance theory suggests that boards exist to provide policy 
direction and organizational oversight, including oversight of the executive director, and are 
ultimately responsible for the organization, but are not to be involved in its day-to-day 
operation.  
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Decision Rules: This code will typically be applied in response to the question “How would 
you describe your primary job as a board member?” The code should generally be applied to 
descriptions of the board as a whole and its role in overseeing the organization. While it may 
sometimes be applied in instances that are specific to the individual, it should in such cases 
still focus on the individual’s role in the organization as a whole, and not to the individual’s 
role within the board. The latter case would most appropriately be coded as “knowledge 
areas” or “board officer.” 
Sub-Codes: CEO Oversight, Representing Community, Set Budget/Policy, Ensure 
Compliance, Fiduciary Duty 
Examples of Correct Use: “It’s to provide direction to the CEO and other management 
officials on the board, to set policies, to approve procedures….” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “Well, first, I was just a new board member without an office 
or anything and the past two to three years now, I’ve been president.” 
 
Code: KNOWLEDGE AREAS 
Definition: Board members bring different skills to their participation on the board. 
Knowledge areas capture both a board member’s strengths and their weaknesses. 
Position in Framework: The study framework assumes that individuals who are 
representative of the typical FQHC patient population (i.e., low-income, uninsured, etc.) will 
be knowledgeable in areas related to their consumer status and community membership, but 
less knowledgeable about those areas of the board’s work that rely on certain professional 
competencies (e.g., finances, law, etc.). Furthermore, a respondent’s knowledge areas 
provide a lens through which to view their responses in other areas. For example, an 
individual who identifies finances as a strength is likely to answer financial questions 
differently than an individual who identifies finances as a weakness. 
Decision Rules: This code should be applied in instances where the respondent refers 
explicitly to their own strengths and weaknesses as a board member, to the level of 
knowledge they possess in a given area of the board’s work. It should not be applied in cases 
where the respondent is speaking about the board as a whole. 
Sub-Codes: Most Knowledgeable, Least Knowledgeable 
Examples of Correct Use: “I didn’t bring to the board any particular knowledge of health 
care trends…”; “For me, personally, I would say financial, as far as making sure that 
everything has stayed within the budget.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “When we run into a situation where we don’t feel we have 
sufficient expertise on the board then we have said alright, on the next board meeting we 
want to bring in someone who can present to the board on a particular issue.” 
 
Code: BOARD OFFICER 
Definition: Board officer captures whether the board member is merely a board member or 
holds one of the following elected offices within the board: chair, vice chair, secretary, or 
treasurer. 
Position in Framework: Board officers (as defined) make up the executive committee, 
which is a powerful subset of the board. Not only may the executive committee take binding 
action on behalf of the full board, but members of the executive committee are likely to be 
more influential members of the board, given that the positions are elected offices voted upon 
by all board members. 
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Decision Rules: The default is that a respondent is a non-officer board member. This code 
only applies in cases where a respondent identifies that they are chair, vice chair, secretary or 
treasurer of the board proper. It should not be applied if the respondent refers to any other 
position or office (e.g., “chair” of personnel committee). President and vice president are 
synonymous with chair and vice chair. 
Sub-Codes: None 
Examples of Correct Use: “No.” (when asked if they are an officer of the board); “Right 
now I’m the…we have a president…I guess I’m the vice president of the board.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “So basically my committee job as the chair of the personnel 
committee is to make decisions to help make sure we have the best personnel possible…” 
 
Code: FQHC PATIENT STATUS 
Definition: This code applies to the board member’s personal use of the health center as a 
patient and includes sub-codes relating to the nature and timing of that use. 
Position in Framework: Identifying whether or not a respondent is a patient at the health 
center is likely to shed some light on their responses about the consumer-majority 
requirement. In addition, consumer board members are asked two questions that attempt to 
distinguish the idea of non-descriptive and descriptive consumers: “Is the health center your 
usual source of care?” and “Were you a patient before you joined the board?” A respondent 
who indicates that they were a patient long before joining the board and who identifies the 
center as their usual source of care is more likely to be a descriptive consumer in many 
respects, even if their demographic profile suggests otherwise. 
Decision Rules: This code will be applied in response to a direct line of questioning. Both 
patient status and usual source of care will likely be “yes/no” answers. The timing question 
may be wordier, but still apparent. If a person does not indicate use of primary care services, 
but says that they are a patient at the dental clinic or another similar service, they should be 
coded as using a peripheral service only. 
Sub-Codes: Usual Source of Care (Y/N), Patient/Board member Timing, Use Peripheral 
Service Only 
Examples of Correct Use: “That’s the only place I go for my primary care…”; “I visit the 
health center. It’s not my primary provider, but I do visit the health center as a consumer.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
 
Code: INFLUENCE IN SERVICE PROVISION 
Definition: Influence in service provision refers to which group or groups have the most 
influence in deciding which services the health center chooses to provide. 
Position in Framework: The link between the board’s structure and the health center’s 
provision of mission-oriented services passes through an important decisionmaking process 
identified by this code, which identifies the most influential group in the decisionmaking 
process. It may be the board, the executive director, other staff, or a combination. However, 
to the extent that the board is considered less influential, the relationship between board 
structure and organizational outcomes is likely to be moderated by external forces (e.g., 
CEO). 
Decision Rules: This code is to be applied only to those portions of the text that directly 
address the decisionmaking process surrounding the health center’s provision of services. It 
should not be applied in cases where the respondent is simply describing services that their 
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particular health center provides. That is, the focus is not on the specific services provided, 
but on the decisionmaking process in which the services to be provided are selected. 
Sub-Codes: Board More Influential, CEO/Staff More Influential, Shared Influence of Board 
and CEO 
Examples of Correct Use: “I would say the executive director would clearly be more 
influential. He or she would bring those things to the board as a suggestion as unmet needs of 
our patient base and we would discuss them and try to find a way to make our health center 
as relevant and valuable to our patient base as we can.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “We did have pharmacy deliveries for a while, but it didn’t 
seem to be cost effective and that program didn’t really serve us well….but there are several 
other alternative services that [we] offer other than, like you said, the core services that all 
medical centers and health care centers do offer their patients. We do have some other 
options.” 
 
Code: INFLUENCE IN FINANCES 
Definition: Influence in finances refers to which group or groups have the most influence in 
maintaining the health center’s finances. 
Position in Framework: The link between the board’s structure and the health center’s 
financial outcomes passes through an important decisionmaking process identified by this 
code, which identifies the most influential group in the decisionmaking process. It may be the 
board, the executive director, other staff, or a combination. However, to the extent that the 
board is considered less influential, the relationship between board structure and 
organizational outcomes is likely to be moderated by external forces (e.g., CEO). It is 
important to note that the board should be monitoring finances and approving the budget, but 
not involved in the day-to-day finances. 
Decision Rules: This code is to be applied only to those portions of the text that directly 
address the decisionmaking process and responsibility surrounding the maintenance of the 
health center’s finances. It should not be applied in cases where the respondent is simply 
describing the health center’s financial health—unless such a description is needed context 
for the proper understanding of influence surrounding the maintenance of finances. 
Sub-Codes: Board More Influential, CEO/Staff More Influential, Shared Influence of Board 
and CEO 
Examples of Correct Use: “Oh, no, we have the financial committee that is kind of 
managed by, we have a CPA on the board…and we have our financial director, our CFO, and 
he basically runs the budget and keeps everything in line so we just go over it every month.”; 
“Definitely the CEO would be a bigger influence on the finances.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “We control a fair amount of real estate, so we’re in the black.” 
 
Code: MISSION-MARGIN TENSION 
Definition: Any discussion of the conflict between the health center’s mission and the health 
center’s need to maintain its finances, including how decisions are made to resolve that 
conflict. 
Position in Framework: FQHCs are safety net organizations with a strong mission to 
provide primary care (and other health care services) to all, without regard for ability to pay. 
While they receive some federal grant funds to help offset the cost of uncompensated care, 
fulfilling their mission can present a very real threat to their finances. Although health 
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centers are not in the business to make money, their financial health is important, because if 
they become insolvent, they can no longer fulfill their mission. Thus, there can be a tension 
between mission and margin for health centers, especially in the case of services that are vital 
to the mission, but poorly if at all reimbursed and thus harmful to the margin. How health 
center boards navigate this tension and make decisions is of interest here. 
Decision Rules: This code should be applied in instances where the respondent discusses 
decisions involving and/or actions taken regarding the health center’s mission and/or margin. 
It especially applies to any simultaneous mention of mission and margin that discusses the 
tension or trade-offs between the two, and how the board attempts to tend to both. The 
“mission dominant” sub-code should be used in cases where the respondent indicates that the 
mission takes priority over the finances. The “margin dominant” sub-code should be used in 
the opposite case where finances take priority over the mission. Where both the mission and 
finances are discussed as equally important, the “balanced approach” sub-code should be 
used. 
Sub-Codes: Mission Dominant, Margin Dominant, Balanced Approach 
Examples of Correct Use: “Again, this was years ago, but we, at different points, closed 
clinics when we faced severe budget cuts or staff was replaced, but who those people would 
be is not the board’s decision.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
 
Code: NOMINAL FEE 
Definition: The sliding-fee scale amount that a health center charges a patient with an 
income below 100% of the federal poverty level for a basic office visit. 
Position in Framework: The amount of the nominal fee may reflect, to some extent, the 
FQHC’s focus on mission or margin. Of greater interest, however, is that the amount of the 
nominal fee is one of the few items mentioned in the FQHC legislation upon which the health 
center board is required to set by a vote. A board member’s ability to recall this information 
may be indicative of the level of board involvement around this issue. 
Decision Rules: This will appear as a fixed response to a single question. 
Sub-Codes: None 
Examples of Correct Use: “I think it may have just changed. It was around $5 or $6.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
 
Code: REVENUE COLLECTION STRATEGIES 
Definition: Methods that the health center employs to ensure that it collects as much of the 
charges it bills out as possible. 
Position in Framework: Health centers need to collect as much revenue as possible to 
remain solvent, but aggressively seeking payment from the low-income and uninsured can 
begin to run counter to the health center’s mission. More aggressive practices, like using a 
collection agency or denying care to people who abuse the system (i.e., have the ability to 
pay, but refuse to do so) are indicative of a margin-dominant orientation. No attempt to 
maximize collections would represent the extreme of mission-dominance. Areas in between 
these two extremes represent a balance. 
Decision Rules: Possibly a future sub-code of mission-margin tension. This code will 
typically be used in a respondent’s answer to a very direct line of questioning on the subject. 
The “collect up front” sub-code should be used anytime the respondent indicates that patients 
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are asked to pay when they come to the clinic for services. “In-house billing” applies in cases 
where the health center sends out a bill, makes payment arrangements with patients, etc. Any 
use of an outside collection agency should receive the “refer to collections” sub-code. Lastly, 
the “fire patients” sub-code applies whenever a respondent indicates that the health center 
tries to identify individuals who abuse they system by non-payment and may deny care to 
those patients. 
Sub-Codes: Collect Up Front, In-House Billing, Refer to Collections, Fire Patients 
Examples of Correct Use: “I believe we do try to collect up front what we can….I don’t 
think we’ve used very much of outside collection service.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
 
Code: RESPONSE TO ADVERSE CONDITIONS 
Definition: What actions or other responses a health center took in response to one or more 
adverse conditions it faced. 
Position in Framework: When a health center faces adverse conditions (financial or 
otherwise) that threaten its mission and/or margin, the board must choose a response strategy. 
How the board decides to respond is indicative of the health center’s mission/margin 
orientation. 
Decision Rules: This code should only be applied when the respondent includes a 
description of both the adverse condition and the response taken in its wake. If the 
respondent mentions an adverse condition, but does not discuss the response, a new code 
may need to be created. If the respondent mentions a response, but not an adverse condition, 
the assumption will be made that the board was responding to the general adversity faced by 
a health center and will code the response as appropriate (e.g., mission-margin tension). If the 
adverse condition is financial, obviously the “financial cutbacks” sub-code should be used. 
All other adverse conditions should use the “other circumstances” sub-code. Of course, both 
sub-codes can be used and may overlap. 
Sub-Codes: Response to Financial Cutbacks, Response to Other Circumstances 
Examples of Correct Use: “Again, this was years ago, but we, at different points, closed 
clinics when we faced severe budget cuts or staff was replaced, but who those people would 
be is not the board’s decision.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
 
Code: PROS AND CONS OF CONSUMER-MAJORITY (51%) REQUIREMENT 
Definition: The respondent’s opinion of the advantages and disadvantages of being required 
to have at least 51% of board members be patients at the health center. 
Position in Framework: The requirement for at least 51% of board members to be 
consumers of the health center is central to the current study. Board function is proposed as 
the linkage between board structure and organizational outcomes and how board members 
view the consumer-majority requirement offers some context for this function (i.e., how do 
they think it works/should work/doesn’t work?). This might be considered the input side of 
the board function variable. 
Decision Rules: This code should be applied any time the respondent discusses their 
perception of the pros and cons of the consumer governance requirement. This may include a 
detailed explanation of the pros and/or the cons. This code should not be applied to the 
evaluation of consumer participation, influence, and effect on board decisions. Sub-codes are 
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highly descriptive and their application should be intuitive. Questionable instances should be 
flagged for evaluation. 
Sub-Codes: Pros of Consumer Majority, Secret Shoppers, Cons of Consumer Majority, No 
Cons to Consumer Majority, Community Work/Residency Trumps Consumer Status 
Examples of Correct Use: “My first thinking is that I think it’s more beneficial than 
not…There’s nothing like being a patient to get a sense of the atmosphere and the treatment a 
patient gets the moment they come through the door…”; “Downside, I guess I can’t think of 
too much other than if a board member who was a consumer developed some sort of negative 
relationship with a provider…”; “I wouldn’t think it would be detrimental to the health 
center.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “We have patient focus group meetings also that people can 
attend and that is basically a time for feedback for what we like to see going on at the health 
center and what we don’t like to see or anything like that.” 
 
Code: IDENTIFICATION OF CONSUMER BOARD MEMBERS 
Definition: How the board identifies and selects consumers to serve as board members. 
Position in Framework: By identifying the process by which the board selects new 
consumer board members, it may be possible to gain some insight into the non-descriptive 
versus descriptive consumer board member characterization. For instance, are people asked 
to become consumers because the board wants them for other reasons (e.g., particular skills) 
or are people selected from the pool of current patients? 
Decision Rules: This code should be applied to any discussion of the identification of board 
members to serve on the board. In most instances, this will probably be consumer board 
members, because of the question posed to respondents. However, any reference to board 
member identification and recruitment should be coded using this code. If enough non-
consumer board member references are identified, a new code should be created. 
Sub-Codes: Identify Person First, Identify Consumer First 
Examples of Correct Use: “Typically, what we do is know people who have an interest in 
serving the community and just ask them to serve.”; “We ask people. We say ‘Hey, do you 
have anybody that you might think is a good candidate or a good fit?’” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
 
Code: CONSUMER BOARD MEMBER REPRESENTATIVENESS 
Definition: How representative the consumer board members are of the patient population as 
a whole. 
Position in Framework: This code attempts to further distinguish between non-descriptive 
and descriptive consumers, but at the board level as a whole. 
Decision Rules: This code applies to any discussion of the extent to which the consumers on 
the board represent or look like the patient population. This code should be limited to 
discussions of the level of demographic characteristic concordance between the consumer 
board members and patient population, and should not be used to describe how the board 
members interact with the community (even as a result of their demographic characteristics). 
Sub-Codes: Explanation of Representativeness 
Examples of Correct Use: “I think we represent the patients that are served.”; “We have 
extreme difficulty getting the low income people on the board. That is one group that is not 
well represented.” 
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Examples of Incorrect Use: “I know of some board members who aren’t using the clinic, 
but they bring a different perspective because they hear related stuff. They’re all community 
members, we all live in the community and so we hear about what’s going on.” 
 
Code: IDENTIFYING COMMUNITY NEEDS 
Definition: How the board identifies health care related needs in the community. 
Position in Framework: The assumption is that consumers are included on the board to help 
the organization identify and respond to the specific needs of the community. How 
community needs are identified has the potential to define the role of consumers on the board 
and address the veracity of this assumption. 
Decision Rules: This code should be applied any time a reference is made to identifying the 
community’s needs—whether that is done by consumer or non-consumer board members. 
This code should also be applied any time interactions between the community or patients 
(the “community”) and health center staff or board members (the “FQHC”) are mentioned. 
This code should not be applied to discussions of community needs or problems mentioned 
in other contexts, but should be limited to discussions surrounding the action of how the 
health center becomes aware of those needs. 
Sub-Codes: Originates with Board, Originates with Staff, Complaining to Board Members 
Examples of Correct Use: “I know of some board members who aren’t using the clinic, but 
they bring a different perspective because they hear related stuff. They’re all community 
members, we all live in the community and so we hear about what’s going on.”; “So yeah, 
we hear about things that are needed in the community. We bring them to the ED and she’ll 
either say ‘Oh, that’s a great idea. Let’s pursue that.’ Or ‘Gosh, we’re already doing that.’ 
And we just didn’t realize it.” 
Examples of Incorrect Use: “If your clinic is on the same block as a neighborhood 
pharmacy that has been there for many years, or even a chain drug store, it probably doesn’t 
make much sense for that clinic to open a pharmacy operation.” 
 
Code: THE CONSUMER MAJORITY IN PRACTICE 
Definition: The participation and influence of consumer board members during board 
meetings and their effect on board decisions. 
Position in Framework: This code captures not how the consumer-majority requirement is 
proposed to work (captured by the “pros and cons” code), but categorizes the process and 
outcomes of having consumers on the board. A board member might say many positive 
things about why it is important to have consumers on the board, but then conclude that they 
don’t actually participate much, have as much influence, or alter the outcome of board 
decisions in any meaningful way, or vice versa. 
Decision Rules: This code should be applied to discussions of how a board meeting operates, 
including who talks the most and the least, how much consumer board members participate 
compared to non-consumer board members, how much influence consumer board members 
have compared to non-consumer board members, and how much of an effect the consumer-
majority requirement has on the decisions the board makes. This code should not be applied 
when respondents are discussing their perceptions of the pros and cons of the consumer-
majority requirement. The focus of this code is on the consumer majority in the context of 
the actual conduct and outcome of meetings. 
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Sub-Codes: Consumer-majority Decisions, Consumer Participation, Consumer Influence, 
Who Talks at Meetings? 
Examples of Correct Use: “I would say it’s [i.e., participation] less often here because we 
have had experience with capital P patient board members. They had very poor attendance 
records and seldom spoke up. If they did, they were very focused on a single issue.”; 
“There’s no one person that dominates, but between the chair and the CEO, they lead the 
meeting through.”  
Examples of Incorrect Use: “They’re going to hear from those patients, you’re going to 
hear things like; this was one that when I first started on the board was ‘Why is that 
answering system so terrible?’”; “Patients that are on the board are going to bring real, every 
day issues as well as community perceptions to the board.” 
 
Code: EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DOMINANCE 
Definition: The extent to which the executive committee makes decisions on behalf of the 
full board. 
Position in Framework: This is a way of measuring the potential of the non-executive 
committee board members. If a respondent indicates that their executive committee 
frequently makes decisions on behalf of the full board, this would indicate that board 
members not on the executive committee have less authority and influence on board 
decisions and a lesser effect on organizational outcomes.  
Decision Rules: This comes from a single question. 
Sub-Codes: None 
Examples of Correct Use: N/A 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
 
Code: DEMOGRAPHICS 
Definition: Respondent’s age, gender, race, education, occupation, and income level. 
Position in Framework: Respondent’s demographic characteristics can be used to classify 
their responses in looking for possible associations, and may also contribute to the 
understanding of non-descriptive versus descriptive consumers. 
Decision Rules: This comes from a uniform series of questions appearing at the end of each 
interview. 
Sub-Codes: None 
Examples of Correct Use: N/A 
Examples of Incorrect Use: N/A 
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Appendix D: 
 
Coding Board Member Occupation / Expertise 
 
Variable 
Label 
Standard 
Occupational 
Code (SOC) 
Includes the Following Occupation / Expertise Values 
from Exhibit D of FQHC Grant Applications 
Management 11-0000* Administration, Administrative Director, Asset Manager, Banker, Business 
Management, Chief Financial Officer, Contractor, Corporate, Employment, 
Facility Management, Finance Manager, Funeral Homes Owner, Governance, 
Health Care Foundation, Health Care Management/Operations, Hospitality, 
Hospital Administration, Human Relations, Human Resources, Industrial 
Safety and Environment Officer, Labor Relations, Leadership Training, Loan 
Officer, Medicaid Manager, Manage/r/ment (not otherwise specified), 
Multicultural Coordinator, Nonprofit Boards, Operations Manager, Personnel, 
Physician Recruiter, Producer, Program Coordinator, Public Administration, 
Public Health Administration, Senior Staff Associate, Workers Compensation 
Government 
and 
Legislators 
11-1031* Borough Treasurer, City Clerk, City Councilman, City Employee, City 
Government, Civil Service, Community-Elected Official, Coroner, County 
Auditor, County Government, County Treasurer, DSHS, Dept. of Defense, 
Department of Environmental Conservation, Department of Human Service, 
Diplomatic Corps, Elected Official, Extension Agent, FBI, FDA, FEMA 
Employee, Govt. Worker, Health Policy, Housing Authority, Labor 
Department, Legislative Aide, Local Government, Mayor, Military, Natural 
Resources, Office of Public Assistance, Park Ranger, Policymaker, Postmaster, 
Public Housing Authority, Public Official, Public Policy, Public Sector, Public 
Servant, Recreation Dept., Regional Extension Service, Soc. Sec. Admin., 
State Government, State Medical Examiner, TDH (Texas Dept of Health), 
Town Administrator, Town Management, USDA, US Forestry, Veteran, Voter 
Registration 
Education 
Administration 
11-9039* Administration/Education, Board of Education, Education / Administration, 
Principal, School Administrator/Administration, School Development, School 
District Outreach, School Health and Safety Officer, School Official, School 
Superintendent, School Transition Coordinator, University Relations 
Business 13-0000* Arbitrator, Auditor, Bail Bond Agent, Bondsman, Book Store Owner, Business 
Administration/ Finance, Business Consultant, Business Development, 
Business/Finance, Business / Information Technology,  Business Owner, 
Business Relations, Businessman, Businesswoman, Business/Planning, 
Chamber of Commerce, Civic Association, Claims Specialist, Community 
Development, Compliance Officer, County Assessor, Development, 
Development Consultant, Economic Development, Field Development 
Consultant, Finance, Financial, Financial Analyst, Financial Consultant, 
Financial Services, Grant Writer/ing, Health Care Consultant, Housing 
Developer, Industry, Innkeeper, Insurance, International Business, KY PCA, 
Labor Union, Land Developer, Lobbying, Lodge Owner, Managed Care, 
Marketing, Marketing Consultant, Marketing/Finance, Mortgage Broker, 
Nonprofit Consultant, Nursing Home Consultant, Pharmaceutical PR, 
Philanthropy, Planning and Development, Private Sector, Procurement, 
Professional, Restaurant Owner, Revenue Agent, Revenue Office, Small 
Business, Small Business Owner, Stockbroker, Strategic Planning, Tax 
Assessor, Trade Union Organizer, United Way 
Events 13-1121 Marketing/Event Planning 
Accountant 13-2011* Accountant, Accounting, Accounting Clerk, Controller, Accounting Partner, 
CPA, Tax Preparation 
Information 15-0000* Computers(IT), Computer Analyst, Data Analyst, IBM, Information 
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Technology Technology, MIS, School Media Specialist, Systems Analyst, Systems 
Manager, Technology  
Architect /  
Engineer 
17-0000* Architect, Architecture, Biomedical Engineer, Chemical Engineer, Civil 
Engineer, Engineer, Engineering, Surveyor 
Scientist 19-0000* Biologist, Chemist, Clinical Research, Epidemiologist, Environment/alist, 
Environmental Scientist, Geologist, Health Research, Herbologist, Medical 
Researcher, Microbiologist, Researcher 
Psychology 19-3031* Behavioral Health (plus a PhD), Clinical Psychology, Early Childhood 
Development, Mental (plus a PhD), Mental Health Counselor (plus a PhD), 
Psychology, Social Service (plus a PhD), Social Work (plus a PhD) 
Social Work 21-1000* Addiction Specialist, Caseworker, Children and Youth Services, Community 
Counseling, Community Social Services, Counseling, CSW, DFACS, 
Domestic Violence, Employment/Job Training, End Hunger, Family Services, 
Head Start, Housing, Human Services, Job Programs, Job Training, Migrant 
Head Start, MSW, LCSW, Service Organization, Social Services, Social 
Work/ers, Substance Abuse Services, Supportive Living Caseworker, TANF 
Work Study Job Counselor, Therapist, Vocational Instructor, Youth Services 
Clergy 21-2011* Bishop, Chaplain, Church Minister, Clergy, Faith Based, Hospital Chaplain, 
Islamic Center, Migrant Ministry Coordinator, Minister, Priest, Religion, 
Religious Leader, Senior Pastor, Spanish American Baptist Church, Spiritual 
Counselor 
Lawyer 23-1011* AAL, Attorney, Circuit/Trial Court Judge, County Judge, Deputy City 
Attorney, District Attorney, Health Care Law, Insurance Law, Judge, Juvenile 
Courts, Law, Lawyer, Law & Legislation, Legal, Legal Advice, Legal Affairs, 
Legal Aid, Legal Services, Prosecuting Attorney’s Office, Superior Court 
Judge 
Paralegal 23-2011 Legal Assistant, Paralegal 
Professor 25-1199* Academic Professor, Alaska Bible College Educator, Business (plus a PhD), 
Chancellor (plus a PhD), College Instructor, College Professor, Community 
College Teacher, Dental Instructor, Education (plus a PhD), Educator/Law, 
Executive (plus a PhD), Higher Ed, Law Educator, Marketing (plus a PhD), 
Medical School Administration (plus a PhD), PhD (unspecified occupation), 
Religion and Ethics (plus a PhD), Researcher, ScD, Small College Instructor, 
University (plus a PhD),  University Lecturer 
Teacher 25-3099* Education, Educator, Migrant Education, Migrant Teacher, School System, 
School Teacher, Substitute Teacher, Teacher, Teaching 
Librarian 25-4021* Education / Library Science, Librarian 
Media 27-0000 APRN, Artist, Author, Broadcasting, Communications, Design, Editorial 
Coordinator, Entertainer/ment, Freelance Writer, Graphic Designer, Interpreter 
& Translator, Journalist, Magazine Publisher, Media Specialist, Medical 
Illustrator, Newspaper Editor, Photography, Printing & Photography, Public 
Relations, Public Relations and Marketing, Radio Broadcasting, Sculptor, 
Telecommunications Marketing, Writer, Writer – Advertising 
Dentist 29-1021* Dental, Dentist, Dentistry, DDS, DMD 
Pharmacist 29-1051* Doctor of Pharmacy, Pharmacist, Pharmacy 
Physician 29-1069* Alternative Medicine, D.O., M.D., Medical (not otherwise specified), Medical 
Care (plus an MD), Medical Education, Medical Evaluation, Medicine, 
Physician, Provider, Specific Types (e.g., Geriatric Specialist, Psychiatrist, 
OBGYN, Internist) 
Nurse 29-1111* ANP, Community Health Nurse, District Nurse, FNP, Nurse, Nursing, Nurse 
Practitioner, Parish Nurse, Public Health Nurse, RN, School Nurse 
Veterinarian 29-1131* Veterinarian, Veterinary 
Medical 
Records 
29-2071 Medical Records, Medical Transcriptionist 
Health 29-9099* Acupuncture, Alternative Therapy, Ambulatory Health Care Operations, 
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Behavioral Health, Chiropractor, Clinical, Clinician, Community Health, 
County Health Department, Healthcare, Health Education, Environmental 
Services, Health, Health Services, Hospice Care, Hospital, Hospital Employee, 
Managed Care, Medical Lab Technologist, Mental Health, MH/MR, MPH, 
Nutrition, Occupational Therapy, Optometry, Oral Health Care, Physical 
Therapy/ist, Physician’s Assistant, Primary Care Organization, Public Health, 
Radiology Technician, Rehabilitation Services, Rural Health, Ryan White, 
School Health, Speech-Language Therapist, WIC 
Health Care 
Support 
31-0000 Allied Health Services, Assistant to Handicapped, Care Giver, Caretaker, 
Chiropractic Assistant, CNA, Community Health Worker, Dental Assistant, 
Home Care, Home Health Aide, Massage Therapist, Medical Assistant, 
Medicare, Nurse’s Aide, Nursing Assistant, Outreach Coordinator, Refugee 
Health Mentor, Resident Caretaker, Spiritualist Healer 
Protective 
Service 
33-0000 Animal Control, Border Patrol Agent, City of Richmond Fire Department, 
Constable, Corrections, Criminal Justice, Emergency Mgmt., Emergency 
Responder, EMS, EMT, Fire Department, Juvenile Justice, Juvenile Officer, 
Juvenile Probation, LA County Probation, Law Enforcement, 
Marshall/Supreme Court, Parole Officer, Police Officer, Prison Guard, 
Security, State Probation Agent, State Trooper, Tribal Police Officer 
Protective 
Service 
Managers 
33-1021* Assistant Fire Chief, Customs Officer, Deputy Sheriff, EMS Director, Fire 
Battalion Chief, Fire Chief, Police Captain, Police Chief, Sheriff, U.S. Marshal 
Food Service 35-0000 Food Service, High School Cafeteria, Restaurant, School Cook, Supervisor 
Food Services, Waitress  
Cleaning 37-0000 Domestic Services, Facilities, Housekeeper/ing, Janitorial Services, 
Landscaper, Office Cleaner 
Service 39-0000 Barber, Cosmetologist, Fitness, Florist, Hair Dresser, Hair Stylist, Hostess, 
Interior Designer, Mortuary Assistant, Physical Fitness Trainer, Service Sector, 
UPS 
Child Care 39-9011 Childcare, Foster Care 
Retail 41-0000 Auto Parts Merchant, Car Salesman, Commerce, Good Year Tire, Retail 
Entrepreneur, Retail Sales, Sales, Sales Representative, Salvation Army, Store 
Manager 
Real Estate 41-9021* Real Estate, Realtor, Realty, Home Specialist 
Administrative 
Support 
43-0000 Administrative Assistant, Administrative Tech, Bank Teller, Bookkeeping, 
Business Support, Clerical, Clerk, Clinic Manager, Customer Service, 
Dispatcher, Expediter, Hotel Worker, Institutional Aide, Legal Secretary, 
Medicaid Eligibility Worker, Office Manager, Para Professional, 
Parliamentarian, Payroll, Receptionist, School Aide, School Assistant, School 
Registrar, Secretary, Service Coordinator 
Farmer 45-0000 Agriculture, Agricultural Worker, Crew Leader Fruit Ranch, Dairy Farmer, 
Farmer, Farm Worker, Farmworking Family, Forester, Grower, Horticultural 
Worker, Logging, Lumber, Migrant Farmworker, MSFW (Migrant and 
Seasonal Farm Worker), Orchardist, Organic Farmer, Pear Orchard Manager, 
Rancher, Ranching, Rural Farmer, Seasonal Worker, Timber Worker, Tree 
Farmer 
Construction 47-0000 Carpenter, Coal worker, Electrician, Infrastructure, Labor, Laborer, Materials 
Management, Molder, Painter, Plumber, Steel Worker 
Production 51-0000 APS Utilities, Embroiderer, Factory Worker, Manufacturing, Mill Worker, 
Plant Worker, Plateau Electric Cooperative, Poultry Plant, Power Company, 
Public Utilities, Refinery, Seamstress, Telephone Company, The Gas Co., 
Water Department, Water District Manager 
Transportation 53-0000 Longshoreman, Public Transportation, Railroad, Railroad Worker, School bus 
driver, Trucker 
Consumer N/A Advocacy, African-American Community, Aging, American Legion, Bosnian 
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Representative, Church Volunteer, City Representative, Civic, Community, 
Community Activist, Community Advocate/Advocacy, Community Affairs, 
Community Liaison, Community Member, Community Needs, Community 
Organizer / Organization, Community Rep, Community Resident, Community 
Service, Community Volunteer, Consumer Issues, Cultural Competence, 
Former Homeless, Haitian Community, Disability Advocate, Disabled, 
Formerly Homeless, General, General Community, Health & Tribal,  HCH, 
HIV Advocacy, Hispanic Representative, Home Economist, Homeless, 
Homeless Representative, Homemaker, Housewife, Immigrant Issues, Latino 
Health, Local Issues, Local Resident, Low-Income Sector, Low income user of 
center, Migrant, Minority Representative, Misc., Mother, Native Alaskan 
Homemaker, Native American Culture, Native Corporation, Outreach, Pastor’s 
Wife, Patient, Patient Relations, Patient User, Performance Improvement, 
Performance Measurement, Prison Population, Public Housing Resident, 
Public Housing Tenant Assoc., Public Welfare, Quality, Rural Health Needs, 
Ryan White, School Based Parent, Self Employed, Shelter Resident, Sliding 
Fee, Somali Culture, Special Population, Senior Citizen, Stay at home mother, 
Tenants Association, Traditional Knowledge, Unemployed, User Population 
Representative, Village Liaison, Volunteer, Young Families, Youth Health 
Retired N/A Retired (no other expertise specified) 
Other N/A Cable Services Staff, Compliance, Cosmetologist, Foster Care, Hospitality, 
Swim Instructor, Theatre, Tourism, Trailer Park Manager, Travel Agent, 
Youth, Student 
* Indicates a high-status occupational group based on average annual income greater than 
200% of the federal poverty level for a family of four in 2009 ($44,100). 
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